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This project proposes a new reading of the constitution of the critical category of film 
noir in terms of Lacan’s theorisation of the retroactive construction of meaning. The 
thesis contends that, despite a turn away from Lacan in Film Studies, psychoanalytic 
theory must not be abandoned and – rather than regressing to questions of film, 
language and psychoanalysis articulated in the 1970s (Metz, Screen) – aims to plot a 
new trajectory, alongside theorists such as McGowan and Žižek, for such inquiry into 
the cinema. The relationship between psychoanalysis and noir is itself well-trodden 
ground; however, the major interventions (Kaplan, Krutnik) have been oriented towards 
questions of gender, leaving unexplored the possibility of noir’s relation to Lacan’s 
theory of signification. Specifically, this thesis engages the historiography of film noir 
(Naremore, Vernet, Elsaesser) with Lacan’s theory of the point de capiton to work 
through the implications for a theory of discursive construction suggested by the 
registers of the Symbolic, Real and Imaginary. This thesis engages film and theory to 
discover not simply what Lacan can reveal about noir but crucially what noir can reveal 
about the structure of meaning. The project also explores various noir tropes as they 
raise theoretical questions: of particular interest are films such as Double Indemnity 
(1944) and D.O.A. (1950) that are concerned with the retroactive production of 
knowledge. In addition, the roles of contingency and necessity in such a relationship to 
the past are investigated, and both the ontology of noir as a category and the structures 
of film noir narratives – such as Gilda (1946) and Kiss Me Deadly (1955) – are explored 
in terms of the Lacanian theory of sets and concepts such as lalangue and suture; an 
extended reading of The Maltese Falcon (1941) explores the Lacanian notion of fiction; 
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A Note on Terminology 
A crucial, if not the crucial, critical term in this study will be Lacan’s “point de capiton”, 
which has been translated variously as ‘anchoring point’ (Alan Sheridan), ‘quilting 
point’ (Russell Grigg) and ‘nodal point’ (Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe).1 Bruce 
Fink suggests ‘button tie’ as an English rendering because it suggests ‘independent 
suspension:’ the stitch holding things in place without anchoring them to a frame, the 
button and the fabric simply tied to each other.
2
 To avoid confusion, the term will be 
used in the original French throughout, except in quotation. Its specific function – 
capitonnage – will also be retained in the original French, which has otherwise been 
translated as “quilting”. Other Lacanian terms, such as jouissance, already borrowed into 
English will be left this way, except in instances where the original French has a 
theoretical implication: such as the “big Other” where the French “Autre” provides the 
Lacanian symbol “A”, which will play an important role throughout this study. 
Furthermore, where a distinction in the original French has been lost in the standard 
English translation – such as Lacan’s “pas-tout” and “not-whole”/“not-all” in Chapter 2 
– the intricacies of such translations will themselves be discussed. Of course, this 
study’s other key term – “film noir” – is itself borrowed from the French; as will be 
argued, the phrase has achieved such widespread Anglophone usage that, in general, it 
no longer needs to be considered “foreign” and italics will be used only in instances 
where the original French term – “film noir” – itself is being employed. For the sake of 
standardisation, the topic of this study will be “film noir” in the singular and “films 
noirs” in the plural, except in quotation where the original author’s preference will be 
retained. 
                                                 
1
 Alan Sheridan, Écrits: A Selection (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 154; Russell Grigg, The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955-56, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Russell Grigg 
(London: Norton, 1997), p. 258; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
2
nd
 edn (London: Verso, 2001), p. xi. 
2
 Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2004), p. 113. 
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This is what happens, that after a movement has taken place, without people involved in it even knowing 
that it’s a movement, along comes these students, who can’t do the thing at all, but they become the 
experts on it, as it were. They write books interpreting the interpreters, and they create a special 
vocabulary. The thing that’s terribly wrong with Kant is the goddamned vocabulary, and Freud too, you 
see. 
 – Edward Dmytryk1 
 
Introduction: Into the Past/Out of the Past 
 
The idea for this project first suggested itself to me in the summer of 2006, when my 
interests in theory and film brought me, on the one hand, to Bruce Fink’s Lacan to the 
Letter: Reading Écrits Closely and Slavoj Žižek’s The Sublime Object of Ideology, and, 
on the other, to James Naremore’s chapter on ‘The History of an Idea’ in his More Than 
Night: Film Noir in its Contexts and Marc Vernet’s essay ‘Film Noir on the Edge of 
Doom’ from Joan Copjec’s collection, Shades of Noir.2 The first of these texts – Fink’s 
Lacan to the Letter – offered a way into the seemingly difficult thought of Jacques 
Lacan, and the second – Žižek’s Sublime Object – pointed to the possibilities such an 
understanding could offer for, amongst other things, the study of film. Parallel to this, 
Naremore and Vernet’s works necessitated a wholesale re-evaluation of my 
understanding of film noir, and brought together with Lacanian theory they suggested a 
new way of understanding the discursive constructions of film criticism. This in turn led 
me to further noir revisionists such as Thomas Elsaesser and his chapter, ‘Caligari’s 
Legacy? Film Noir as Film History’s German Imaginary’ from Weimar Cinema and 
After: Germany’s Historical Imaginary, and to Lacan’s own writings: in particular, his 
third Seminar on The Psychoses and his écrits, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the 
Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud’ and ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the 
                                                 
1
 Robert Porfirio, ‘Interview with Edward Dmytryk’, in Film Noir Reader 3, ed. by Robert Porfirio, Alain 
Silver and James Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 2002), pp. 27-38 (p. 27). 
2
 Fink, LTL; Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989); James Naremore, 
More Than Night: Film Noir in Its Contexts, new edn (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); 
Marc Vernet, ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, in Shades of Noir, ed. by Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 
1993), pp. 1-32. 
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Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’.3 Here I found a structural corollary 
between the characterisation of film noir as a retroactively constituted critical category 
and Lacan’s investigation, through the principles of structural linguistics, of the 
retroactive production of meaning. And as I watched again films such as The Maltese 
Falcon (1941), Double Indemnity (1944) and D.O.A. (1950), and saw them to be 
concerned throughout with the retroactive production of knowledge, it seemed to me 
then, that despite the sense in which “the time of Lacan” – or at least, a certain version 
of Lacan – had somehow passed in the study of the cinema, there still remained the 
richly suggestive possibilities of an exploration of Lacan and film, even over the 
heretofore well-trodden ground of film noir criticism.
4
 No longer should Lacan be made 
to play the part of Jeff Bailey in Out of the Past (1947), held forever responsible for the 
sins that went before.
5
 This project will seek to revisit that intersection of psychoanalytic 





                                                 
3
 Thomas Elsaesser, Weimar Cinema and After: Germany’s Historical Imaginary (London: Routledge, 
2000); Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955-56, ed. by Jacques-
Alain Miller, trans. by Russell Grigg (London: Norton, 1997); ‘The Instance of the Letter in the 
Unconscious, or Reason since Freud’, in Écrits, trans. by Bruce Fink (London: Norton, 2007), pp. 412-
441; ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’, in Écrits, 
pp. 671-702. 
4
 The Maltese Falcon. Dir. John Huston. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1941; Double Indemnity. Dir. Billy 
Wilder. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1944; D.O.A.. Dir. Rudolph Maté. USA, Cardinal Pictures, 1950. 
5
 Out of the Past. Dir. Jacques Tourneur. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1947. 
6
 This conjunction is of course being revisited by the work of other theorists (see the discussion below), 
alongside which this project is situated. 
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1. Film Noir/Film Theory/Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories 
The developments of cinema, psychoanalysis and film noir present important 
intersections in the history of Film Studies. Indeed, Vicky Lebeau charts the encounters 
between psychoanalysis and cinema from their appearance at the end of the Nineteenth 
Century: 1895 saw the inception of the cinema in the basements of the Grand Café on 
the Boulevard des Capucines as well as the publication of Freud and Breuer’s Studies on 
Hysteria.
7
 Similarly, Janet Bergstrom’s collection Endless Night charts the “parallel 
histories” of cinema and psychoanalysis.8 Furthermore, as Andrew Spicer and Deborah 
Thomas note, the popularisation of psychoanalysis in America coincided with the 
emergence of film noir.
9
 By 1925, Freud was already well-known enough in the USA 
for Sam Goldwyn to have offered him $100,000 for a screen play about love; in his 
biography of Freud, Ernest Jones describes the project as ‘a film depicting scenes from 
the famous love stories of history, beginning with Anthony and Cleopatra,’ he notes that 
Freud was ‘amused’ by the idea but ultimately turned it down.10 However, it was not 
until films as diverse as Bringing Up Baby (1938) – in which an analyst’s expertise is 
mocked – and Stranger on the Third Floor (1940) – which featured a surreal and 




                                                 
7
 Vicky Lebeau, Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Play of Shadows (London: Wallflower, 2001). 
8
 Janet Bergstrom, ed., Endless Night: Cinema and Psychoanalysis, Parallel Histories (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999). 
9
 Andrew Spicer, Film Noir (Harlow: Longman, 2002); Deborah Thomas, ‘Psychoanalysis and Film 
Noir’, in The Movie Book of Film Noir, ed. by Ian Alexander Cameron (London: Studio Vista, 1994), pp. 
71-87. 
10
 Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, vol. III (New York: Basic Books, 1957), p. 453. 
However, Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs did work with UFA on a psychoanalytic film (against Freud’s 
protestations), which resulted in GW Pabst’s Geheimnisse einer Seele (1926). Directed by one of the 
grandfathers of noir, the film’s nightmare sequences (where, for example, the protagonist stages his 
uxoricidal fantasies) perhaps anticipate the classic noir dream sequences of Stranger on the Third Floor 
(1940) and The Woman in the Window (1944).  
11
 Bringing Up Baby. Dir. Howard Hawks. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1938; Stranger on the Third 
Floor. Dir. Boris Ingster. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1940. 
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Indeed, Deborah Thomas notes the Freudian references in This Gun for Hire 
(1942), where Alan Ladd’s Raven reveals, ‘Every night I dream. I read somewhere 
about a ... about a kind of doctor. A psych-something. You tell your dream, you don’t 
have to dream it anymore’, and Christmas Holiday (1944), where Deanna Durbin 
declares, ‘When it was all over, a psychoanalyst said that Robert’s relations with his 
mother were pathological’.12 And from the slightly less pronounced Freudianisms of 
elicit or repressed sexuality in Double Indemnity, Gilda (1946) and The Big Sleep (1946) 
to the extended explorations of psychology and psychiatry in Spellbound (1945), The 
Woman in the Window (1944), The Dark Mirror (1946) and Whirlpool (1949), a 
popularised version of psychoanalysis can be seen as one of the key determinants of the 
noir universe.
13
 Indeed, this has been recognised by critics from Raymond Borde and 
Etienne Chaumeton, who list psychoanalysis in their ‘Sources of Film Noir’ and note 
that questions of “hidden meaning” and the play between eroticism and censorship 
characterise the series, to Paul Schrader, who insists that ‘the roots of film noir are 
World War II, and German Expressionism, existentialism and Freud.’14 Frank Krutnik is 
more specific, suggesting that it was between the emergence of hard-boiled fiction and 
its adaptation into film noir that psychoanalysis came to prominence in American 
culture, rendering it a dimension particular to the cinematic rather than literary 
exploration or noir; and more recently, Marlisa Santos has devoted a book-length study 
– The Dark Mirror: Psychiatry and Film Noir – to the argument that film noir was 
                                                 
12
 See Thomas, ‘Psychoanalysis and Film Noir’, p.72. This Gun for Hire. Dir. Frank Tuttle. USA, 
Paramount Pictures, 1942; Christmas Holiday. Dir. Robert Siodmak. USA, Universal Pictures, 1944. 
13
 Gilda. Dir. Charles Vidor. USA, Columbia Pictures Corporation, 1946; The Big Sleep. Dir. Howard 
Hawks, USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1946; Spellbound. Dir. Alfred Hitchcock. USA, Selznick 
International Pictures, 1945; The Woman in the Window. Dir. Fritz Lang. USA, International Pictures, 
1944; The Dark Mirror. Dir. Robert Siodmak. USA, International Pictures, 1946; Whirlpool. Dir. Otto 
Preminger. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1949. 
14
 Raymond Borde and Etienne Chaumeton, A Panorama of American Film Noir, 1941-1953, trans. by 
Paul Hammond (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2002), pp. 19 & 145; Schrader quoted in Foster 
Hirsch, Detours and Lost Highways: A Map of Neo-Noir (New York: Limelight Editions, 1999), p. 2.  
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utterly dependent upon the introduction of psychoanalytic principles, through, for 
example, the psychiatric treatment of war veterans.
15
 
In fact, both psychoanalysis and classic film noir are themselves crucial to the 
development of academic Film Studies and film theory as a discourse. For example, 
Naremore notes, in the French tradition, the parallel trajectories of the terms “auteur” 
and “film noir” in the work of the Cahiers du Cinéma group, both operating as the 
triumph of “style” – one individual and one collective – over the constraints of the 
studio system; he adds that, ‘it is no accident that the two terms would enter the English 
language at the same time.’16 In America, the rise of academic Film Studies in the late 
1960s/early 1970s coincided with renewed popularity of film noir, for example in 
college film societies.
17
 Mark Bould argues that in Britain, E Ann Kaplan’s Women in 
Film Noir – as ‘an intersection of feminism, Marxism, Lacanian psychoanalysis and  
(post-)structuralism – was at the very centre of the theoretical developments then 
shaping Film Studies.’18 And it is, moreover, the British tradition – in its relation to the 
French and American – that was central to the development of psychoanalytic film 
theory.  
The principal site of this discourse was the journal Screen, which, as Philip 
Rosen notes, made a concerted effort to publish English translations of foreign critical 
works on film with the aim of establishing new modes of thinking in British film 
culture.
19
 Indeed, in some reflections on the period, a leading light of the Screen group, 
Laura Mulvey, comments that:  
[t]he combination of popular cinema from across the Atlantic and theory from across 
the channel amount to [a] slap in the face to the traditional Englishness, that was, in 
                                                 
15
 Frank Krutnik, In a Lonely Street: Film Noir, Genre, Masculinity (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 45; 
Marlisa Santos, The Dark Mirror: Psychiatry and Film Noir (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010). 
16
 Naremore, MTN, p. 26. 
17
 Ibid., p. 28. 
18
 Mark Bould, Film Noir: From Berlin to Sin City (London: Wallflower, 2005), p. 21. 
19
 See Philip Rosen, ‘Screen and 1970s Film Theory’, in Inventing Film Studies, ed. by Lee Grieveson 
and Haidee Wasson (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2008), pp. 264-297 (p. 266). 
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many ways, characteristic of this generation [i.e. 1950s and 1960s UK critics], and 
constituted a rejection of English isolationism and chauvinism.
20
 
Through this combination of Hollywood film productions and French film theory, 
Screen rapidly established itself as a leading venue for the critical examination of the 
cinema. This discourse can be traced back to 1970 and both Jean-Louis Baudry’s essay 
‘Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’, published in Cinéthique, 
and the Cahiers du Cinéma group’s collaborative reading of Young Mr. Lincoln and its 
translation published in Screen in 1972.
21
 From this point, psychoanalysis became the 
dominant discourse of the journal, which itself became perhaps the leading publisher of 
Anglophone film theory informed by Freud and Lacan.  
The most significant statement in this conjunction of psychoanalysis and cinema 
was, however, Christian Metz’s essay, ‘The Imaginary Signifier’, published in 1975 in 
France in the journal Communications and soon after by Screen.
22
 Metz began his career 
as a semiologist of the cinema, producing studies that expounded a structuralist 
understanding of film. He concluded, for example, that film was a language without a 
langue (a Saussurean language system of intercommunication, arbitrary signs, and 
double articulation); it could nonetheless be considered a language because it consisted 
of the ordering of signifying elements.
23
 Metz’s turn to psychoanalysis in ‘The 
Imaginary Signifier’ – broadly in the structuralist mode developed by Lacan – was then 
a logical progression of his semiological endeavours. Here he poses a fundamental 
                                                 
20
 Laura Mulvey, ‘A Short History of the BFI Education Department’, unpublished pamphlet (London: 
British Film Institute, 1994), pp. 2-3, quoted in David Sorfa, ‘Laura Mulvey’, in Film, Theory and 
Philosophy: The Key Thinkers, ed. by Felicity Colman (London: Acumen, 2009), pp. 286-295 (p. 287). 
21
 Originally published as Jean-Louis Baudry, ‘Cinéma: effets idéologiques produits par l’appareil de 
base’, Cinéthique, 7-8 (1970), 1-8; Cahiers du Cinéma, ‘John Ford’s Young Mr Lincoln: A collective text 
by the Editors of Cahiers du Cinéma’, trans. by Helen Lackner and Diana Matias, Screen, 13, no. 3(1972), 
5-44. 
22
 This special issue of Communications was titled ‘Psychanalyse et cinéma’ and was edited by Raymond 
Bellour, Thierry Kuntzel and Christian Metz (see Bergstrom, Endless Night, p. 3). 
23
 See Christian Metz, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema, trans. by Michael Taylor (New York: 
Oxford UP, 1974). He subsequently rearticulated his theory in terms of a semiotic code in Language and 
Cinema, trans. by Donna Jean Umiker-Sebeok (The Hague: Mouton, 1974).  Metz’s semiology of the 
cinema entered Screen in 1973, taken up particularly in the work of Stephen Heath (for example, Stephen 
Heath, ‘Film/Cinetext/Text’, Screen, 14, no. 1/2 (1973), 102-128). 
17 
 
question: ‘What contribution can Freudian psychoanalysis make to the study of the 
cinematic signifier?’24 His answer was a theory of spectatorship that, for example, 
considered the modes of presence and absence in film as compared to theatre, leading 
him to the conclusion – quite Lacanian in its aphoristic quality – that ‘every film is a 
fiction film,’ which is to say, predicated upon the presence of absence.25 Moreover, 
taking up Baudry’s suggestions regarding the cinema and the mirror stage, Metz 
formulated a theory of cinematic identification (with both the mechanism and the 
content of the film) situated in the Lacanian Imaginary.
26
 The possibilities of such a 
connection between Lacan and Film Studies led to a proliferation of psychoanalytic film 
theory in the work of critics such as Stephen Heath, Ben Brewster, and Colin MacCabe, 
and moreover, led to some of the most influential works of film theory in general: such 
as, Mulvey’s ‘Visual Pleasure and the Narrative Cinema’ in which psychoanalysis, noir 
and Film Studies all converge to produce a theory of male castration anxiety that is 
formulated in terms of the noir femme fatale.
27
 Introducing feminism to the theory of 
spectatorship, Mulvey’s article thus suggested yet another possibility for the ideological 
critique of the cinema and has since become a canonical work in the field of not only 
film theory, but Film Studies more broadly. 
Two years later, Screen again took up the theorisation of film and the Lacanian 
Imaginary in terms of the concept of “suture”. The ‘Dossier’ on suture published in 1977 
included Jacques-Alain Miller’s original theoretical work, ‘Suture: Elements of the 
Logic of the Signifier’ and Jean-Pierre Oudart’s groundbreaking application of suture to 
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 This work suggested that Miller’s Lacanian theory of the relation between 
the Imaginary and the Symbolic could account for the continuity effect of the 
shot/reverse shot technique: the action of suture renders such filmic structures invisible 
to the spectator. Again, Stephen Heath was instrumental in the dissemination of this 
psychoanalytic theory; his article ‘Narrative Space’ first gestures towards these 
conceptions and subsequently, in his elaborations on suture in Questions of Cinema, 
Heath constructs a more generalised version of the theory, based on the ‘rhythm of lack 
and absence.’29 Kaja Silverman follows on from Heath, suggesting that suture can 
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2. Contra Lacan 
However, the backlash against psychoanalytic theory (and psychoanalytically-informed 
feminism) in Film Studies was almost immediate. In 1976, even before the development 
of suture, four of Screen’s editors announced that they could no longer contribute to the 
publication, whose dominant discourse was now the ‘unnecessarily obscure and 
inaccessible’ psychoanalytic theory of film.31 The efforts of the Screen theorists in the 
late 1970s served to establish psychoanalysis as one of the dominant discourses in 
theoretical investigations into film, and as a result, the criticisms of such theory have 
continued unabated since that point. More recently, for example, David Bordwell and 
Noël Carroll’s collection Post-Theory sets itself up in express opposition to the 
‘aggregate of doctrines’ and the ‘vagaries of Grand Theory’ represented specifically by 
the Screen appropriations of Structuralist Marxism and Freudo-Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, and insists instead upon a cognitivist, empirical approach to the 
cinema.
32
 Moreover, there has been, since the 1990s, a general turn away from 
psychoanalysis in Film Studies, towards a range of possibilities offered by philosophical 
investigations into the cinema. For example, Vivian Sobchack’s existential-
phenomenological project in The Address of the Eye, opposes a psychoanalytically-
oriented understanding of the film as an object of vision, and formulates instead a notion 
of embodied vision inspired by Merleau-Ponty.
33
 More generally, there has been a 
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Deleuzian-inspired movement away from what is perceived as the ocularcentric, 
psychoanalytic “Screen Theory” discourse towards theorising the cinema in terms of 
affective and bodily sensations; for example, in the work of Patricia Pisters and Barbara 
Kennedy.
34
 And Laura U Marks’ work stands out in this field for its combination of 
Sobchack’s theory of subjectivity and a formulation of a Deleuzian haptic visuality in 
opposition to psychoanalytic optic visuality.
35
   
Perhaps most interesting in this Deleuzian vein are the works of Steven Shaviro 
and Daniel Frampton. Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body presents a radical rejection of the 
‘psychoanalytic model currently in vogue in academic discussions of film theory.’36 This 
wildly polemical text compares psychoanalytic film theory to the suffocating orthodoxy 
of a religious cult and aims to explode this hegemonic paradigm by introducing to the 
viewing experience a Deleuzian notion of the body in its capacity to be affected. In 
contrast to this “cinematic body”, Frampton’s Filmosophy presents a “filmind” – a 
Deleuzian notion of film thinking that is almost entirely blind to psychoanalytic 
considerations.
37
 The field of film theory has then developed far beyond the semiotic 
and psychoanalytic thinking of the “Screen” period. For example, Frampton is the 
founder of the Film-Philosophy journal, which endeavours to bring both continental and 
analytic philosophy and Film Studies together in productive ways, publishing for 
example special issues on Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean Baudrillard, 
and organising an annual international conference that supports not only work on the 
classic film theorists such as Béla Balázs and Jean Epstein, but also emerging encounters 
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between film and the philosophies of Alain Badiou or Ludwig Wittgenstein.
38
 
Scholarship within the area of film-philosophy is then not limited to the Deleuzian field, 
with, for example, Lisa Downing and Libby Saxton’s Film and Ethics: Foreclosed 
Encounters, suggesting further possibilities for philosophical engagement with the 
cinema outside of the psychoanalytic film theory developed in this project.  
                                                 
38
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3. In Defence of a Lost Cause? 
Is psychoanalytic film theory then in a terminal decline? The answer must be a 
resounding No! The picture in the new millennium was certainly bleak: Todd McGowan 
and Sheila Kunkle declared that, ‘[w]ithin film studies, not only has Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory disappeared, but theory as such has given way almost completely 
to historicism and empirical research. The discipline has become, as David Bordwell and 
Noël Carroll prophesied in 1996, post-theoretical.’39 This was reiterated by Richard 
Rushton who noted that, ‘the engagement between psychoanalysis and cinema has, to a 
large degree, disappeared,’ and Slavoj Žižek, who read the decline of the status of suture 
theory as an ‘indication of the decline of cinema studies.’40 It is, however, with such 
thinkers that the fate of (Lacanian) psychoanalytic film theory rests. First and foremost 
is Žižek who, along with his Slovene colleagues (particularly Mladen Dolar and Alenka 
Zupančič) and Joan Copjec, is responsible for the continued interest in Lacanian theory 
and its relation to the cinema.
41
 Stephen Heath observes that, ‘[s]uture is no longer doing 
too well, nor, on the whole, is fetishism; the phallus is mostly holding up, while fantasy 
is fine but prone to disparate appreciations; as for real and symptom, they have come up 
strong indeed,’ and goes to argue that this is as a result of what he calls ‘“Žižek-film”:’ 
the exciting new possibilities suggested by Žižek’s Lacanian interrogation of the 
cinema.
42
 Indeed, it is particularly interesting to note that in a recent article Shaviro 
softens the stance taken in The Cinematic Body against psychoanalysis. He admits that 
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there is another Lacan suggested by the work of Žižek, and closes ranks with 
psychoanalytic theory in the face of a common threat from Bordwellian cognitivism.
43
 
In The Fright of Real Tears, Žižek launches a robust defence of Theory against 
Bordwell and Carroll, suggesting that the critique of Post-Theory should be considered 
‘The Strange Case of the Missing Lacanians.’44 Žižek insists that he does not recognise 
the “Lacanian” theory described by Bordwell; this “Grand Theory” is a straw man, an 
effigy of Mulvey and Silverman who are not “Lacanians”, Žižek insists, but film 
theorists who have engaged with Lacan. Indeed, this engagement owes as much to 
Althusser as it does to Lacanian theory itself; Althusser’s work provided an approach to 
psychoanalysis through the critique of ideology that was in accord with the expressly 
political motivations of the so-called Screen theorists.
45
 Žižek thus complains that, ‘as a 
Lacanian, I seem to be caught in an unexpected double-bind: I am, as it were, being 
deprived of what I never possessed, made responsible for something others generated as 
Lacanian film theory. My response to this, of course: what if one should finally give 
Lacan himself a chance?’46 McGowan reiterates this argument, insisting that such an 
understanding of psychoanalysis is mistaken, predicated upon an ‘Imaginary Lacan.’47 
The rejection of what has been characterised as “Lacanian psychoanalytic film theory” 
in the philosophical turn is thus unfounded; a valid critique of 1970s Screen theorising 
perhaps, but it can claim no basis in a critique of Lacanian psychoanalysis in Film 
Studies.
48
 As McGowan himself argues in The Real Gaze, the notion of the Gaze 
attributed to Screen Theory is not to be found on the side of the Subject; rather, it must 
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be considered a properly Lacanian object, objet petit (a).
49
 McGowan’s work – which 
includes both a Lacanian-auteur study of David Lynch and the aforementioned Lacanian 
theory of the film experience – is therefore at the forefront of a new wave of film theory 
which suggests that, far from being exhausted, from having not enough to say, the work 
of Lacanian investigation into the cinema has only just begun.
50
  
And indeed, far beyond this, the more general project of psychoanalytic Film 
Studies is once again a burgeoning field: for example, Vicky Lebeau’s article, ‘The arts 
of looking: D.W. Winnicott and Michael Haneke’ in Screen represents an emergent 
object-relations theory.
51
 Film theory and Jung come together in Christopher Hauke and 
Ian Alister’s collection, Jung & Film: Post-Jungian Takes on the Moving Image and 
Greg Singh’s Film After Jung.52 Freud lives too, in Mulvey’s work on the uncanny and 
the death drive in the filmic image in Death 24x a Second, and through Laplanche’s 
interpretation of Nachträglichkeit as employed by Paul Sutton in ‘Afterwardsness in 
Film’.53 There is also renewed interest in the psychoanalytically-informed feminisms of 
Kristeva and Irigaray, represented by Katherine Goodnow’s Kristeva in Focus: From 
Theory to Film Analysis  and Caroline Bainbridge’s A Feminine Cinematics: Luce 
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Irigaray, Women and Film.
54
 Such developments accord with the sentiment expressed 
by Janet Bergstrom in the introduction to her collection on psychoanalysis and cinema, 
where she insists that this discourse ‘has renewed itself over time and remains one of the 
most vital areas within contemporary film theory,’ and points to the sense of “unfinished 
business” that motivates each new turn in psychoanalytic Film Studies.55 
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4. Theorising Noir 
Such unfinished business extends to a new way of approaching even the perennial 
favourite of film criticism, film noir. Work on the ontology of noir appears broadly to 
fall into two categories: the endeavour to define noir, first in France in the 1940s and 
then in America in the 1970s, and then the consideration of the relationship between noir 
and criticism itself. It will be the role of the first chapter to explore the development of 
such noir criticism in full – from Nino Frank to Paul Schrader and beyond – so it will 
suffice to say at this point that it is in particular the revisionist work of three authors – 
Naremore, Vernet, and Elsaesser – that will serve as a starting point for the investigation 
of film noir in this project. Žižek in fact comments upon the theoretical paucity of work 
associated with the first movement in noir criticism, characterising it as a bric-à-brac of 
clichés and suggesting that, ‘[i]nstead of directly trying to supplant them with a new 
better theory, our first step should therefore be a kind of “metacommentary”.’56 
Elsewhere, Žižek gestures towards the metacommentary of the second, self-reflexive 
movement in noir criticism. He references Naremore’s ‘cognitive semantics’ with its 
radial structure of family resemblance and takes up Vernet’s rejection of noir – primarily 
as a means of critiquing the notion of ‘poststructuralist deconstruction’ (conversely to 
noir, an American invention of French origin) – to suggest that the category functions as 
a Hegelian concept, a ‘structuring principle.’57 Žižek reiterates this notion in The Fright 
of Real Tears, characteristically adding a new twist by discussing noir in terms of the 
structural necessity of the exception in the construction of the universal.
58
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However, aside from Žižek’s brief notes, theorisation of the second movement in 
noir criticism is lacking.
59
 Both Naremore and Elsaesser make remarks to the effect that 
there is perhaps a dimension of Nachträglichkeit in film noir. Naremore describes a 
postmodern condition in which the idea of noir has become a worldwide image and 
features in high fashion editorials; he suggests that ‘our contemporary fascination with 
noir may entail a sort of Nachträglichkeit, or method of dealing with the present by 
imagining a primal scene.’60 This is, however, the extent of his insight. The theoretical 
ambitions of his project are not far-reaching; as he himself professes, ‘my own approach 
has less to do with (...) theory than with cultural and social history.’61 Naremore invokes 
Freud but briefly, as an aside to his historiography. His investigation of noir is crucial to 
any understanding of the formation of the category, but its implications for critical 
theory have not been realised. Elsaesser is more theoretically engaged; his concept of the 
“historical imaginary” depends upon an explicitly Lacanian invocation and his 
suggestion that the category’s most striking feature is its ‘historical imaginary as 
deferred action (Nachträglichkeit)’ requires the further discussion it will receive in 
Chapter 3.
62
 Elsaesser’s work does not, however, entail a detailed exploration of 
structure and retroaction in film noir and its relation to Lacanian theory. A further critic, 
Steffen Hantke, makes a similar connection between a ‘constructionist’ view of film noir 
and deferred action but his brief article quickly abandons this richly suggestive 
observation in favour of other considerations.
63
 It is perhaps unsurprising that this sort of 
parallel has before been suggested – it is a truism that film noir is a retroactive category 
– but the possibilities of this comparison for an enquiry into psychoanalysis and the 
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cinema have not been brought out. Such work provides but the ground on which this 





5. Lacan and Noir: Encore 
Heretofore, psychoanalytic work on film noir has largely been oriented towards 
questions of sex and gender, and the field is extensive.
64
 The femme fatale has been the 
subject of widespread psychoanalytic scrutiny: Kaplan’s landmark collection Women in 
Film Noir, which includes psychoanalytically oriented work by Claire Johnston and 
Patricia White, is a founding moment of this discourse, which is taken further by Kaplan 
herself in Women and Film.
65
 It is continued by Elizabeth Cowie, who contributed the 
Freudian-inflected ‘Women and Film Noir’ to Copjec’s Shades of Noir and elsewhere 
suggests that the femme fatale is a ‘catchphrase for the danger of sexual difference.’66 
The work of both Mary Ann Doane and James Maxfield explore the noir femme in 
terms of male fears of female sexuality (see in particular, Doane’s insight into the role of 
femininity as epistemological trouble in ‘Gilda: Epistemology as Strip Tease’).67 Kelly 
Oliver and Benigno Trigo take up a notion of noir anxiety – over sex and race – in terms 
of Kristeva’s theory of abjection; and Kaplan – again – presents a psychoanalytic-
postcolonial exploration of femininity in Cat People (1942).
68
 Elisabeth Bronfen 
investigates the modes of jouissance available to the noir man and woman, and Juliet 
Flower MacCannell patriarchy, Law and jouissance in the two versions of Cape Fear 
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 Copjec too takes up the femme fatale and ‘lethal jouissance’ in an 
extended discussion of the Lacanian logic of sexuation.
70
 Even Žižek’s most sustained 
examination of film noir is in fact in terms of the femme fatale’s role as “Woman” in the 
construction of “man”, and her relation to the obscene-knowing Father.71 Representing 
the “other side” of sexual difference, Frank Krutnik’s In a Lonely Street presents an 
investigation of the ‘noir phenomenon’ in terms of a crisis of masculinity and a Freudo-
Lacanian framework.
72
 Elsewhere, Robert Lang explores homophobia and the Freudian 




There are, moreover, works that examine aspects of noir from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, which do not necessarily entail questions of sex and gender. For example, 
Hugh Manon’s ‘Some Like it Cold: Fetishism in Billy Wilder’s Double Indemnity’, 
which draws upon Metz, Freud and Lacan to explore a “fetishistic” desire to commit a 
crime in Double Indemnity; and Deborah Thomas’ aforementioned ‘Psychoanalysis and 
Film Noir’, which despite its title, offers a discussion of noir informed by Deleuze and 
Guattari and could then perhaps be more honestly titled ‘Anti-Psychoanalysis and Film 
Noir’.74 There are psychoanalytically-informed investigations of noir narrative and 
structure: Maureen Turim’s Flashbacks in Film contains a chapter on film noir 
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flashbacks and Freud’s theory on death and repetition; and JP Telotte’s Voices in the 
Dark, while not a psychoanalytic study as such, does draw upon Freudian and Lacanian 
theory at certain points, such as on spectatorship and the mirror stage.
75
 Moreover, the 
increasingly general condition in the contemporary encounter between psychoanalysis 
and film noir is the (sometimes passing) reference in one context to the other: either 
theoretical works that refer to film noir, or works of film criticism and analysis that refer 
to psychoanalysis.
76
 As noted above, Thomas Elsaesser draws upon a Lacanian notion to 
explore noir and German cinema, and Naremore’s book is peppered with references to 
Freud. Robert Miklitsch uses films noirs such as Woman in the Window and The Maltese 
Falcon to critique Žižek’s Lacanian theory of fantasy, and Henry Bond’s book on 
Lacanian criminal psychology, Lacan at the Scene, mentions certain crime scene photos 
which ‘come close to resembling stills from film noir classics.’77 Lutz Peter Koepnick – 
also exploring German cinema – makes some comments, via the work of Kaja 
Silverman, on Lacan, speech and ‘vocophilia’ in film noir; and again, with reference to 
the space of the crime scene, Edward Dimendberg – in his resolutely non-psychoanalytic 
study, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity – makes references to Freud’s theories of 
memory and the uncanny and the briefest of references to Lacan’s Seminar on Edgar 
Allan Poe’s The Purloined Letter.78 Such works are then a testament to the position of 
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both psychoanalysis and film noir in the cultural imagination and the contemporary 
critical idiom. 
Noir criticism has not, however, always been receptive to such psychoanalytic 
theory. Alain Silver’s dispute with the work of Marc Vernet over noir and structuralism 
shows that the rejection of Theory is not limited to cognitivism and Deleuzian film-
philosophy.
79
 Indeed, to the uninitiated Vernet’s suggestions that the problem of film 
noir is whether ‘[t]o commit or not to commit incest’ might sound like a bizarre 
pronouncement.
80
 However, understood in its properly structuralist – that is, Lévi-
Straussian and Lacanian – context, such a statement contributes to a complex discussion 
of the structure of noir narratives. Combined with Vernet’s problematisation of noir in 
‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, such work provides a basis for further exploration of 
film noir. Moreover, the suggestions made in the work of Žižek and Copjec, and of 
Vernet and Elsaesser present an opportunity to theorise the emergence of the category of 
film noir, as described by Naremore and as it appears in the work of Frank, Chartier, 
Borde and Chaumeton. Taking the notion of a cinematic category formed after the fact 
and subject to subsequent, retroactive determination, made up in part by a group of films 
that depict or are structured by the retroactive production of knowledge, an intersection 
between the fields of film noir and psychoanalytic theory is suggested. And such an 
intersection can, in turn, suggest new understanding of, for example, Lacanian set theory 
and provide fresh insight into the question of film genre. Beyond previous 
psychoanalytic interventions on film noir and gender, and avoiding the regressive move 
suggested by Richard Rushton’s reconsideration of Metz, it will be possible to return to 
the intersection of film, psychoanalysis and language to plot a new trajectory for film 
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 The aim here is not to diminish or reject such earlier work (for example, 
Krutnik or Metz), indeed considerations of structure and gender are as inseparable in 
film noir as they are in Lacanian theory; rather the aim is to take psychoanalytic enquiry 
in a new direction, carrying forth with it some of the valuable insights such work has 
granted. Indeed, articles mentioned above by Doane and Edelman, as well as the non-
psychoanalytic portion of Krutnik’s investigation of noir, definition and genre, will be 
vital to the exploration of film noir in this project. 
And furthermore, while Metz stands as a crucial figure in the development of 
first semiological and then psychoanalytic investigations of film, this project will aim to 
achieve quite different goals in its deployment of such theory.
82
 Film noir narratives will 
be approached through structural linguistic principles, not in an effort to categorise their 
scenes in a Grande Syntagmatique, but to understand the temporality involved in a film 
where a final, climactic scene confers (new) meaning on all the scenes that have 
preceded it. And films will themselves be treated as signifiers in a critical discourse, as 
differential elements in a system of relations, which constitutes, for example, a film 
genre. Metz used psychoanalysis to understand why people were drawn to the cinema, 
and discussed the interplay of absence and presence offered by the medium in terms of 
fiction and the Imaginary. Again, both of these terms play a crucial role in this 
investigation of film noir, but to very different ends: instead of “why”, this project will 
examine how films are read and categorised, not only in terms of the Imaginary, but 
also the Symbolic and the Real, and, importantly, Lacan’s version of set theory. The 
thesis engages with similar questions of language and structure as those articulated by 
Metz, not in an effort to produce, for example, an ontology of the cinema but in order to 
understand the critical processes which surround the cinema as well as produce 
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extended, close analyses of individual films themselves.
83
 And so, while this project will 
proudly claim Metz as an intellectual predecessor, it also aims to move far beyond his 
own deployment of structuralism and psychoanalytic theory.
84
 
Moreover, it is not enough simply to bring (Lacanian) theory to bear on films, 
nor solely to use film as a means of illustrating theory. In order to avoid the stultifying 
practice of “applied theory”, where moribund structures and terms are imposed upon a 
given cultural object (‘A Lacanian/Feminist/Deleuzian Perspective On...’), as well as the 
subordination of film to theory, whereby it serves only as corroboration in the form of 
the example, film theory should endeavour to do the work of theory. Of course it must 
always bring new insights to a film or films, or indeed the medium itself (there would 
otherwise be little point in the enterprise) but film theory must also look to the ways in 
which it is possible to theorise with film, to explore the ways in which films offer a 
challenge to theory: as much what The Maltese Falcon can reveal about Lacan as what 
Lacan can reveal about The Maltese Falcon. This will ensure film theory remains a 
living, breathing discourse, sensitive to the exigencies of a film as much as any pre-
given conceptual framework. As such there will be portions of this project devoted 
solely to film critical or historical topics, or to Lacanian theory alone; however, these 
will be necessary steps required to prepare the ground for a fully engaged discussion of 
both noir and Lacan together. Therefore, engaging Lacan and film noir in a dialectical 
relation, which avoids such a subordination of film to theory or theory to film, can serve 
to initiate an investigation of the structures of noir in comparison with Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis to produce a new understanding of the formation and function 
of the category and its constituent films. This can be achieved, in the first instance, 
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through a reconsideration of the structural linguistic import of Lacan’s theory of the 
‘point de capiton,’ which is currently understood largely in terms of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s ‘nodal point’ and its development by Žižek as the ideological ‘quilting 
point.’85 Elaboration of this concept will also require an interrogation of Lacan’s 
deployment of set theory and the philosophical notion of fiction in order to explain the 
point de capiton/master signifier distinction at work in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. 
To this end, the first chapter will take the idea of film noir as a retroactive 
critical category as its starting point. Beginning with an overview of the development of 
the idea of noir, through work in the 1940s in France, 1970s in America and again more 
recently, this chapter will restate the truism of film criticism that film noir is a 
retroactive category – a critical concept posited ex post facto – and it will be noted that 
such retroactivity can also be discerned in the narratives of certain key films noirs. The 
psychoanalytic theory of retroactivity will then be introduced: from Freud’s notion of 
Nachträglichkeit or “afterwardsness” to the Lacanian après-coup it will be established 
as a fundamental principle of psychoanalysis. It will be argued that retroactivity in 
psychoanalytic theory establishes a relation of meaning between two events, and it is 
through the idea of meaning that Lacan’s structure of the point de capiton will be 
introduced as a central theoretical concept of not only the chapter, but also the project as 
a whole. The point de capiton expresses Lacan’s theory of the relation between past, 
present and future, the anticipation of meaning and its subsequent, retroactive 
determination. The main contention of this chapter will then be that the concept of film 
noir can be understood in terms of this Lacanian point de capiton: as a signifier, an 
ordering principle, that intervenes after the fact to confer meaning upon a disparate 
group of films. It will be argued that the signifier “noir” functions this way in 1946 for 
the French critics who first “discovered” American film noir, and then again for the 
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American film critics of the 1970s who (re)discovered the French term as a means of 
understanding their own past. Having established noir as a point de capiton in critical 
discourse, the chapter will then move to the consideration of individual films noirs 
themselves to suggest that a similar structure can be found in the retroactively structured 
narratives of The Maltese Falcon or Double Indemnity so that a corollary can be found 
between the shape of certain film noir narratives and the category to which they belong. 
Finally, Gilda and The Killers will suggest a way in which to understand the progressive 
vector of the point de capiton: the unfolding of the chain of signifiers in the anticipated 
certainty of its completion at a later point. It will be argued that these films present 
“letters”, floating signifiers that require the addition of another signifier to confirm their 
meaning. 
Chapter 2 will take the work on film noir of Marc Vernet as its starting point, 
exploring the ways in which his analyses can be understood in terms of the relationship 
between the Lacanian Symbolic and Real. Beginning with a reading of his essay, ‘The 
Filmic Transaction’, this chapter will propose that his examination of noir narrative 
structure – in terms of a “set up” and the explosion of a “black hole” – can be 
reconsidered as an expression of Lacan’s theory of trauma as tuché and automaton that 
is set out in Seminar XI: as the symbolic machinery that works in response to the 
intrusion of some traumatic event, which cannot be directly symbolised but nonetheless 
has a powerful effect on the shape of this symbolic structure. Vernet will be vigorously 
defended against the critique of Alain Silver, who attempts to dismiss this work as mere 
theoretical excess. Instead it will be shown that Vernet offers an intelligent study of noir 
that can serve as a point of departure for a Lacanian theory of film noir narrative. From 
here, the concept of the Real will be taken further, as a conceptualisation of 
impossibility and failure. This will entail a journey into the archives of film noir 
criticism to explore contemporaneous reactions in the period identified as classic film 
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noir to understand the ways in which the American tradition in the 1940s and 1950s 
might – following Vernet’s deconstruction of the category in ‘Film Noir on the Edge of 
Doom’ – offer problems for the somewhat Eurocentric characterisation of noir offered in 
Chapter 1. Sheri Biesen’s thesis in Blackout that noir was referred to as a “red meat” 
film cycle in the American press will be discussed as just such a problem and will itself 
then be found wanting. In the final, and most significant, development of this chapter, 
Vernet’s dissolution of the noir category will be taken as a point of departure for a 
Lacanian ontology of film noir – based in the theory of feminine sexuation (understood 
as a logical rather than biological category) – as a non-universalisable, and thus open, 
set. 
Chapter 3 will offer first a response to this open ontology of noir, proposing that 
the project to define noir, as exemplified by Frank Krutnik, amongst others, can be 
understood in terms of the Lacanian logic of masculine sexuation. This chapter will 
argue that any determinate definition of noir (or a definition as such) is impossible 
because the Symbolic order offers no firm ground on which a defining statement can 
rest. Through a reconsideration of the concept of “suture”, in its original context as the 
relationship between zero and one, void and structure, a solution to this impossibility 
will be offered: imaginary borders must be established – through a “masculine” logic of 
inclusion/exclusion – to allow the set of noir (as a defined entity) to function “as if” it 
were closed. The crucial point of this section will be to understand that this does not 
constitute some “solution” to the open set, but another mode of ontology, a mode that 
represses the impossibility rather than turning it into a condition of possibility. The 
chapter will then carry the concept of the Lacanian Imaginary from the ontology to the 
historiography of film noir. This involves an engagement with Thomas Elsaesser’s 
formulation of the “historical imaginary”, as a process whereby the intricacies and 
inconsistencies of the history of film noir are replaced by a consistent and seemingly 
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impermeable discourse, which insists unproblematically that, for example, American 
film noir was the product of the influx of German émigrés to Hollywood that followed 
the rise to power of National Socialism. The repressive function of the historical 
imaginary will be compared to the Lacanian structure of the paternal metaphor, where a 
signifier is repressed by the intervention of the Name of the Father, and results in the 
imaginary discourse of phallic signification. Elsaesser’s own attempt to rediscover the 
lost possibilities in the history of film noir will be considered in terms the relationship to 
the past theorised by psychoanalysis and the possibility of introducing there new 
possibilities as expressed by Bergson and Žižek. Finally, the emergence of necessity 
from contingency that attends the production of the historical imaginary will be shown 
to be a retroactive effect that reshapes the past in the image of the present; this will be 
discussed through Ginette Vincendeau’s reading of Poetic Realism as “French Film 
Noir”, and the transformation of the point de capiton into the master signifier in 
Lacanian theory. 
Chapter 4 will draw together all of these strands to provide the culmination of 
this investigation of film noir and Lacan. Firstly, the theories of open and closed sets 
will be brought together to explore film noir endings. Seemingly neatly-concluding films 
such as Gilda that appear to offer a “closed” ending in fact suggest once again the 
impossibility of such closure, and the concept of suture will be employed to examine the 
way in which such narratives can appear to tie up loose ends and yet still leave a sense 
of unfinished business. Conversely, a film such as Kiss Me Deadly, which was exhibited 
for many years shorn of its final moments, presents the possibility of a radically open 
ending that quite literally explodes any possibility of closure. What then follows is an 
extended discussion of The Maltese Falcon that draws primarily upon the “as if” mode 
first identified in Chapter 3. Firstly, the Falcon statue itself is explored in terms of 
Lacan’s use of the theory of imaginary numbers – as something that “does not exist” (it 
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is a fake) and yet has an effect (people die in search of it) – to suggest a way in which 
Lacan’s much misunderstood deployment of the square root of minus one should be 
understood in terms of the imaginary function of signification. Following on from this, 
the chapter will explore the way in which the imaginary status of the Falcon allows the 
film narrative to construct certain “fictions” – understood in the sense as something 
treated as if it were true, or real – that point to a rapport between the psychoanalytic 
theory of Lacan and the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. These sections are therefore 
particularly significant because they present the clearest example of the kind of 
dialectical relationship between film and theory that this project envisages. Like the 
point de capiton, the concept of fiction speaks to both the cinematic and filmic levels of 
noir; it grants insight into the functioning of the critical category and a key constituent 
film, while at the same time these subjects suggest new ways in which to understand 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. In its final, crucial move, this chapter will then turn to the 
development of film noir since the 1970s, and the emergence of contemporary 
permutations such as neo-noir. These versions of noir will be considered in terms of 
repetition and the manner in which they establish a relationship to their past. 
Furthermore, an understanding of the development of noir, and then neo-noir into a 
fully-fledged genre at both the critical and industrial levels will permit the introduction 
of a final distinction to the formulation of noir as point de capiton: in terms of the 
empty, master signifier and the noir genre as a network of knowledge that serves to fill 
out this signifier with positive content. Bringing theory and film, then, together for the 
last time, this project concludes with an investigation of the way in which the 
exploration of noir as genre can suggest a new understanding of the development of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, while concomitantly presenting what should be considered a 
Lacanian theory of genre, which both illuminates and questions a concept and critical 




This project does not seek to add new films to the category of noir, to uncover 
lost B-features or recontextualise films not necessarily considered “noir”. It does, 
however, seek to explore such processes of addition and inclusion in the constitution of 
the film noir canon and suggest the ways in which the noir list (or set) can be understood 
in Lacanian terms. The concluding section of the thesis will then provide a summation 
of these insights and aim to describe the new position this confluence of cinema and 
psychoanalysis leaves both the already well-explored field of film noir criticism as well 
as the once-flagging discipline of Lacanian film theory. This reinvigoration begins, in 
the following chapter, with a place and a time (France, 1946), a selection of films (from 
The Maltese Falcon to Double Indemnity) and a Lacanian concept (the point de capiton), 
and from here proceeds a thoroughgoing investigation of the discursive constructions of 





Chapter 1. Film Noir as Point de Capiton: Retroactive Temporality and Symbolic 
Structure 
 
Reading noir with Lacan can establish a structural corollary between the function of the 
signifier “noir” in film criticism and the retroactive function of the point de capiton as 
formulated in Lacan’s theory of language. Furthermore, at a narrative level, the function 
of the point de capiton can also be found in the retroactive constructions of film noir 
flashbacks. Exploring such cinema, not as a signifying image but as a meaningful 
structure, it is therefore possible to say that a retroactive “noir temporality” is also the 
temporality of the Symbolic order. This chapter will explore the way in which the 
signifier “noir” enables the analysis of a certain type of Hollywood film from the 1940s 
and 1950s, and now stands in metonymically for an entire cinematic discourse, as well 
as the way in which a film noir such as Double Indemnity is thoroughly concerned with 
the retroactive production of knowledge through narrative structure. It will then go on to 
investigate the theoretical implications of such an engagement with the point de capiton 




1. Noir and Retroactivity 
As suggested in the Introduction to this study, it is a truism of film criticism that noir is 
a retroactive category. Indeed, retroaction can be seen to operate at every level in film 
noir. The conventional historiography of the category suggests that the term originated 
in French film criticism of 1946, in response to what appeared to be a new tendency 
emergent in the American cinema. The May 1946 Blum-Byrnes agreements – designed 
to help alleviate France’s war-debt – ensured the distribution of Hollywood movies 
across the country, and so in the summer of that year films such as Citizen Kane (1941) 
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and How Green Was My Valley (1941) could finally make their way across the 
Atlantic.
2
 It has become a critical commonplace to begin a discussion of noir with a 
vignette from this period. Raymond Durgnat and Paul Schrader – two of the first and 
most influential writers on noir in the Anglo-American tradition – begin their articles 
with variations on the same historical scene: cut off from Hollywood by the Occupation, 
liberated France welcomed a number of American crime films, made during or just after 
the war, in which the French critics discerned a certain ‘darkening of tone,’ a ‘new 
mood of cynicism and pessimism’ and for which they had an adjective, the appellation: 
“noir”.3  
The critic particularly identified by this historiography was Nino Frank. Writing 
in L’Écran Français in August 1946, Frank recognised amongst the new American 
releases  a constellation of psychological crime movies – The Maltese Falcon, Double 
Indemnity, Laura (1944), and Murder, My Sweet (1944) – that stood apart.4 Three 
months later, Jean-Pierre Chartier reiterated this categorization in Révue du Cinéma, 
adding The Lost Weekend (1945) and the forthcoming The Postman Always Rings Twice 
(1946) to a collection of what both critics described as “noir” films.5 Frank’s article, ‘A 
New Kind of Police Drama: the Criminal Adventure’, would appear to be the first use 
of this term in relation to the 1940s Hollywood cinema. Alain Silver and Elizabeth 
Ward go so far as to attribute ‘the actual invention of the term “film noir”,’ formed by 
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analogy with Marcel Duhamel’s Série Noire paperbacks, to this work.6 Frank celebrated 
a new class of American filmmakers – Wilder, Preminger, Chandler and Huston – who, 
during the war years, had come to supersede the old guard of Ford, Wyler and Capra, 
and whose dark and mysterious films had displaced the sentimentalism of their 
predecessors. Frank made a determined effort to name this class of films: ‘criminal 
adventures or, better yet (...) criminal psychology.’7 They were films defined by ‘the 
dynamic of violent death,’ that signalled the end of the classic detective film. No longer 
was the question “Whodunit?”, rather, it was “How do they act?”. The seminal term 
emerged where Frank noted, ‘the “noir” films no longer have any common ground with 
run-of-the-mill police dramas.’8 Although marked by inverted commas, “noir” appears 
to slip out almost incidentally, descriptively. It did, however, seem to be the apposite 
term. 
Chartier’s piece, ‘Americans Are Also Making Noir Films’, recognised the same 
dark qualities in the Hollywood cinema. Chartier asserted the essential similarity 
between Double Indemnity, Murder, My Sweet, and The Postman Always Rings Twice, 
all of which could be represented by the first film’s tag line: ‘She kisses him so that 
he’ll kill for her.’9 Though instead of celebration, Chartier greeted the films with moral 
outrage; they were pessimistic, disgusted with humanity, and populated with venal 
characters: monsters, criminals and psychopaths. He puzzled at the censors who lifted 
the ban on such work, and dismissed ‘talk of a French school of film noir’ because films 
such as Hôtel du Nord (1938) and Le Quai des brumes (1938) ‘contain some glimmer of 
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resistance to the dark side,’ while the American films were totally noir.10 Despite its 
moralist stance, Chartier’s piece does contain some important insights into the emerging 
category; it identified the main culprits – Chandler and Wilder – who are collectively 
responsible for Double Indemnity’s adaptation, and widened the group to include 
Wilder’s despairing ‘other “noir” film’ – The Lost Weekend – a title often overlooked in 
subsequent work on the category.
11
 Chartier also echoed Frank’s comments on the 
popularity of the first person narration, and discussed its implications in the various 
films. 
Despite their diametrically opposed reactions to the films, Frank and Chartier 
were in agreement insofar as they both constituted a group of “American films noirs”, 
that – although made at different times, by different filmmakers, and featuring different 
actors, plots and structures – all seemed to be pervaded by the same darkness, which 
was felt all the more keenly by critics in a country that had recently emerged from its 
own années noires. And so the first writings on the American film noir – that perennial 
of film criticism – appeared not in Hollywood, not in the industry or in the press, nor 
did it appear at the time or shortly after the release of the films involved. Rather it was 
in the French film journals of 1946 that the category was created ex post facto, at 
several years’ and several thousand miles’ distance.12 
In 1955, two more French critics, Raymond Borde and Etienne Chaumeton, 
revisited this first scene – the inception of the category – to construct their Panorama of 
American Film Noir. They noted that the summer of 1946 produced five films – The 
Maltese Falcon, Laura, Murder, My Sweet, Double Indemnity, and The Woman in the 
Window – that had ‘an unusual and cruel atmosphere in common, one tinted by a very 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., p. 23. Hôtel du Nord. Dir. Marcel Carné. France, Sédif Productions, 1938; Le Quai des brumes. 
Dir. Marcel Carné. France, Ciné-Alliance, 1938. 
11
 Chartier, ‘Noir Films’, p. 21. 
12
 Retrospectively, of course, this intervention can be seen as more in medias res, arriving before classic 
film noir’s “demise” in 1958. 
45 
 
particular eroticism.’13 However, they argued that critics at the time did not realise the 
true impact of these films: Borde and Chaumeton credited Frank as one of the first to 
discuss “film noir” and identify its basic traits but suggested that he subordinated these 
criminal psychology films to the detective genre. It was not until the release the 
following year of films such as This Gun for Hire, The Killers, The Big Sleep (1946), 
and The Lady in the Lake (1947) that the French public were obliged to accept what 
Borde and Chaumeton called ‘the idea of film noir.’14 Through a synthesis of almost a 
decade’s worth of French criticism on this new Hollywood cinema, they were able to 
gain an overview of the category as a whole (their panorama) and discern what 
appeared to be its essential qualities: the presence of crime, a feeling of alienation in the 
spectator, and five adjectives – ‘oneiric, strange, erotic, ambivalent and cruel.’15 
Borde and Chaumeton’s was also therefore the first work to construct a history 
of the American film noir, tying it to a specific period in time: 1941 to 1953. Having 
defined the object of their study both in terms of its qualities and its time-frame, these 
critics were able to order a disparate collection of Hollywood films into a workable – if 
not entirely coherent – category, describe its formation and rise to prominence, and 
chart what they perceived to be its decline and diffusion into other cycles and genres. 
Noir was thus, according to Borde and Chaumeton, a short-lived series that inverted 
conventional Hollywood formulas, presenting flawed heroes, sympathetic villains, and 
vicious femmes, that peaked around the time that these films first found their way to 
France (1946-1948), and whose influence can be felt in a film as little noir as The Band 
Wagon (1953).
16
 Further to their historiography, Borde and Chaumeton commented also 
on the process of criticism itself. They noted a necessary distance and time lag required 
for criticism to function, which explained why the “idea of noir” did not emerge for 
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them until 1947 and why a film which at first seemed unclassifiable could later be 
understood as the first in a new series. Here again the process of retroaction is operative: 
in Borde and Chaumeton’s schema, the films of 1947 determined those that had 
preceded them, solidifying them into the category “noir”; and the critics’ project as a 
whole served to reinvest that first scene in 1946 and the French critical tradition that it 
engendered with a significance that is still recognised half a century later.
17
 
More recently, and perhaps as a result of this significance, research on film noir 
has found it necessary to amend, even to rethink entirely this historiography. Ginette 
Vincendeau insists that it should be remembered that, ‘noir is also a French word,’ and 
that, despite Borde and Chaumeton’s dismissal of the European influence on noir and 
their suggestion that the French cinema was largely unknown in Hollywood, masters of 
the American film noir such as Lang, Siodmak, Wilder and Tourneur were in fact 
making French films in the 1930s.
18
 Vincendeau highlights the importance of French 
Poetic Realism to noir, noting that it is sometimes mentioned in passing as a source (for 
example by Schrader) but it is not explored in the literature as a significant antecedent. 
Furthermore, Vincendeau notes that Borde and Chaumeton recognise only in passing 
that many American noirs were in fact remakes of 1930s French films, or found original 
versions in France. For example, Renoir’s La Chienne (1931) became Lang’s Scarlet 
Street (1945), Pépé le Moko (1937) became Casbah (1948), and The Postman Always 
Rings Twice was in fact first adapted in 1939 as Le Dernier Tournant.
19
 Charles 
O’Brien reiterates this insight and carries it further; he suggests that, rather than being a 
post-war coinage, the term “film noir” was in fact used by French film critics in a 
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consistent manner – during the period immediately prior to the Second World War – in 
reference to poetic realist classics such as La Bête humaine (1939) and Quai des 
brumes.
20
 In contradistinction then to Chartier – who had denied that these films had 
anything noir about them – and to Borde and Chaumeton – who disavowed the French 
films entirely and suggested that “French film noir” was a phenomenon of the mid-
1950s – O’Brien and Vincendeau establish 1930s Poetic Realism not only as an 
important precursor to the American series (bridging the gap between 1920s German 
Expressionism and 1940s classical Hollywood cinema), but also, and more 
significantly, as the original films noirs. This omission in the standard historiography 
has meant that Poetic Realism can only now be understood in its vital relation to noir; it 
has retroactively found its place in the history of noir, and as a result the category has 
once again been rethought, reformulated after the fact.
21
 
It would seem that every critic since Borde and Chaumeton has deemed it 
necessary to revise or refine, clarify or even deconstruct the category of noir. Work on 
the ontology of noir appears broadly to fall into two categories: the endeavour to define 
noir and the consideration of the relationship between noir and criticism itself. This first 
phase, the movement towards a definition of noir, takes up Borde and Chaumeton’s 
founding gesture. Higham and Greenberg’s 1968 chapter on ‘Black Cinema’ (a 
translation of “film noir” into the Anglo-American tradition) is credited as the first 
English-language work to explore the category and describes film noir as a fully-
realised genre characterised by violence, greed, lust, ambition, and fear: a dark 
European flower blooming in Hollywood.
22
 This notion of noir as genre was taken up 
by a variety of subsequent critics, such as James Damico and Foster Hirsch, who 
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identified it in terms of specific narrative conventions and character types.
23
 In 
opposition to these genre studies, noir is also defined in terms of motif and tone in a 
manner that renders it incomparable, Durgnat contends, with genres such as the 
Western; for him, noir is a bleak exploration of crime and punishment as old as Oedipus 
Rex.
24
 Robert Porfirio concurs, suggesting that pessimism is the unifying trait of noir; he 
treats the films of the classical period almost in terms of a philosophical movement, a 
specifically American brand of existentialism distinct from its Continental 
counterpart.
25
 Place and Peterson suggest that it is noir’s visual style – low-key lighting, 
wide-angle lenses and bizarre compositions – that runs as a consistent thread through 
the films and thus defines them.
26
 Schrader’s work combines both these discourses, 
suggesting that it is through the distinctive visual style that noir expresses its dark tone, 
while delimiting the classical period from 1941 to 1958.
27
  
Bordwell and Telotte emphasise the non-conformist or unconventional 
dimension of noir as its defining feature, but both critics also point towards the second 
movement in the study of noir when they suggest that a consideration of the category is 
as much a consideration of criticism itself as it is of any group of films.
28
 This self-
reflexive approach to noir is centred on the work of James Naremore, Thomas Elsaesser 
and Marc Vernet, who argue that film noir is the product of a critical rather than a 
filmmaking tradition. Naremore argues that its expansive and contradictory nature as a 
category suggests that noir can best be understood as a discursive construction, a body 
of films that writers have constituted retroactively in the classical Hollywood cinema.
29
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Elsaesser insists that noir is an historical fantasy: a Germanic spectre conjured, in the 
first instance, by Lotte Eisner and Siegfried Kracauer.
30
 Vernet goes further, stating that 
noir is an idea that can ‘only be found in books,’ and using the radical heterogeneity of 
the category to unfound its critical myths regarding expressionism and hard-boiled 
fiction, thereby deconstructs noir entirely.
31
 There is then an argument to be made for 
the case that film noir exists most convincingly as the retroactive product of critical 
discourse. Hollywood had no single name for the broad range of films it produced in the 
1940s and 1950s that have now come under the aegis of “noir”; it is a category that, it 
seems, did not appear in the Anglo-American tradition that produced it for another 
twenty years.
32
 Borde and Chaumeton’s idea of noir is thus one projected into the past, 
its every usage constituting a retroactive determination and reinvestment with meaning. 
Interestingly, retroaction can also be found to operate within a number of the 
noir films themselves. To distinguish between this structure and that of the critical 
category, it will therefore be necessary, and instructive, to observe the distinction made 
by Gilbert Cohen-Séat between the filmic fact and the cinematic fact. In his Essai sur 
les principes d’une philosophie du cinéma, Cohen-Séat defines the former as the 
expression of life through ‘a determined system of the combination of images,’ which is 
to say, the films themselves. The latter, after Durkheim, is the cinema in its social 
dimension; it is the ‘circulation in human groups of a resource of documentations, 
sensations, ideas, feelings, materials offered by life and given form by the film in its 
fashion,’ which includes film criticism.33 And so, having established that retroaction is 
operative at the cinematic level in noir, it can be added that it is also operative at the 
level of the filmic itself. In their narrative structures, noir films are often concerned, for 
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instance, with the production of knowledge ex post facto. For example, the flashback 
narratives of films such as Double Indemnity, The Killers, D.O.A., and Sunset Blvd. 
(1950) present an opening scene – in each case a dead or dying man – whose meaning is 
determined only at the end of the film; the climactic revelations of The Maltese Falcon, 
The Woman in the Window, and The Postman Always Rings Twice effect a 
transformation of the entire proceedings, retroactively framing them and providing a 
previously unknown context; and other films noirs, such as Out of the Past, are 
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2. Psychoanalysis and Retroactivity 
Therefore, with the notion of a cinematic category formed after the fact and subject to 
subsequent, retroactive determination, made up in part by a group of films that depict or 
are structured by the retroactive production of knowledge, an intersection between the 
fields of film noir and psychoanalytic theory is suggested. An investigation of the 
structures of noir suggests that a comparison with Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis – in which retroaction plays a fundamental role – can produce a new 
understanding of the formation and function of the category and its constituent films.
35
 
An understanding of this potential intersection will require an exploration of 
temporality and causality as discussed in psychoanalytic theory. The starting point for 
any such discussion is Freud’s concept of Nachträglichkeit, which would translate 
literally into English as “afterwardsness”.36 The Standard Edition translates the term as 
“deferred action”, a phrase that invites an interpretation of the concept of 
Nachträglichkeit based on the idea of a linear determinism. This model of causality is 
based upon Freud’s pre-psychoanalytic work, where the concept emerges in the context 
of the theory of seduction. The analysis of Emma’s hysteria, discussed in the Project for 
a Scientific Psychology, presented a situation in which a childhood sexual trauma does 
not manifest itself as anxiety until the memory of this scene is evoked by a much later 
event. Freud commented that, in such cases of hysterical repression, ‘[w]e invariably 
find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by deferred action.’37 
This would seem to suggest that the infantile trauma leaves a trace, something deposited 
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in the individual, which is subject to an “incubation period” – the time lapse required 
for the psychic change involved in sexual maturation – and develops only when 
triggered by a second experience.
38
 This is one sense of the German adjective 
nachträglich (“later” or “afterwards”) and Freud’s substantive noun Nachträglichkeit: a 
movement from past to future. Strachey’s choice of “deferred” emphasises this forward-
looking orientation. “Defer” suggests a delay between cause and effect: it comes from 
the Latin, differre, to postpone. This is an interpretation based on Freud’s theory of the 
aetiology of psychoneuroses in the 1890s, where traumatic sexual experiences exert a 
pathogenic influence in the unconscious. These experiences are, in a sense, transmitted 
into the future, creating a predisposition towards pathology: they are ‘the fundamental 
precondition for hysteria.’39 Freud adds that such experiences ‘create the hysterical 
symptoms, but (...) do not do so immediately, [they] remain without effect to begin with 
and only exercise a pathogenic action later, when they have been aroused after puberty 
in the form of unconscious memories.’40 Childhood traumas thus operate by “deferred 
action”. Nachträglichkeit therefore means that, as Freud and Breuer stated, ‘hysterics 
suffer mainly from reminiscences.’41 They suffer, in a sense, from the past. 
Nachträglichkeit, however, cannot be reduced to this model of linear 
determinism. With Freud’s move away from the theory of seduction to a theory of 
infantile sexuality, the concept loses its prominence in his work. A seemingly more 
nuanced version emerges in his later thought: a properly psychoanalytical theory of 
Nachträglichkeit based on the case of the Wolf Man and the dimension of 
retroactivity.
42
 This case study presents a complex set of interrelated experiences and 
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memories that result in a variety of debilitating symptoms. Freud’s analysis focuses on 
an anxiety-dream recounted by the patient from the night before his fourth birthday in 
which he saw a group of wolves sitting in the tree outside his bedroom. After lengthy 
consideration, Freud concludes that the dream refers to a scene of parental coitus his 
patient must have witnessed at the age of one and a half. The scene itself had no 
significance for the child, but it was retained in the unconscious. It was not until two 
and half years later that, as a result of his patient’s infantile sexual researches and 
excitations – which included what Freud considered to be a genuine seduction by an 
older sister – this “primal scene” was imbued with a sexual significance, thereby 
constituting it as traumatic. This gave rise to the pathogenic dream: the sole means 
through which the trauma could at the time be represented. Freud notes that it was only 
in analysis twenty years later that the Wolf Man could put ‘the impressions and 
impulses of his fourth year into words which he would never have found at the time,’ 
adding, ‘[t]his is simply another instance of deferred action.’43 There are in fact 
multiple instances of Nachträglichkeit throughout the case: the first here being the 
retroactive determination of the memory of the primal scene later in childhood, the 
second the determination of both these impressions in adult life. The scene had no 
significance, no existence as trauma, until it was activated later; it was constituted as a 
trauma in this very movement of return and thus operated ‘like a fresh event.’44 
Nachträglichkeit is implicated at every point in the Wolf Man’s symptom formation; for 
example, his butterfly phobia revealed a childhood scene involving the maid that 
consisted of a threat of castration and an evocation of the primal scene, which was 
“innocent” at the time but retroactively determined as traumatic.  
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This complex set of interrelated elements substantiates Freud’s notion of the 
overdetermined symptom, and ultimately demonstrates that his conception of 
Nachträglichkeit involves both retroactive and progressive dimensions. He states that 
his theory contains a ‘part which, starting from reality, operates in a regressive 
direction’ side by side with ‘another influence which, starting from the impressions of 
childhood, operates in a forward direction.’45 Indeed, Freud’s insistence on 
Nachträglichkeit here – a retroactive understanding of the primal scene – depends upon 
an affirmation of the progressive determination that the scene as event engendered. 
However, having emphasised this retroactive dimension through the reconstructions of 
the Wolf Man’s analysis, Freud acknowledges that his theory was open to the critique  – 
expressed by Jung – that these ‘forgotten experiences of childhood’ could be the 
product of ‘retrospective phantasying’ in adult life rather than infantile trauma.46 As a 
result, Freud agonises over the ontological status of the primal scene, revising, 
qualifying, and restating his conclusions throughout the case study. He goes back and 
forth, between stressing the progressive and regressive aspects of determination, in what 
Lee Edelman calls a ‘Freudian Wolf-trot.’47 Even considered as fantasy, Freud 
maintains that the primal scene must be the ‘reproduction of a reality experienced by the 
child’ because a fantasy can only be produced ‘from material which has been acquired 
from some other source.’48 He also insists that this material must have been acquired at 
an early age because the dream-symptom emerged not in later life but at the age of four. 
Freud does, however, begin to modify his considerations of what this “reality” could 
have been, suggesting that the scene could have been constituted by the sight of animal 
copulation displaced onto an “innocent” scene involving the parents. He concludes his 
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discussion with a ‘non liquet,’ a legal term meaning “it is not clear”: in the case of the 
reality of the primal scene, the evidence is inconclusive.
49
 
Whether or not it was a factual reality, the primal scene was, in Freud’s view, a 
psychic reality for the Wolf Man that depended upon a retroactive movement, on 
Freud’s conception of Nachträglichkeit as a relation to the past. This aspect of Freud’s 
work was emphasised by the French psychoanalytic tradition. Translating the term as 
après-coup – like nachträglich, a common word, literally meaning an “after-blow” – 
French psychoanalysis highlights the retroactive dimension of the concept, thus 
avoiding the risk of reducing Nachträglichkeit to a linear “deferred action”. This 
innovation was suggested by Loewenstein’s translation of the Wolf Man case, but it is 
Lacan who is credited with recognising the importance of this element in Freud’s 
work.
50
 In his first Seminar, Lacan reflects upon the complexities of Freud’s conception 
of temporality in the Wolf Man case and notes that it raises a fundamental question for 
the theory and practice of psychoanalysis: ‘what value does the subject’s reconstructed 
past have?’51 With regard to trauma, the clinical evidence suggests that it is not its 
actuality as an event but its aspect as fantasy that is most important for the subject. 
Lacan recognises that no-one will ever know what the Wolf Man saw or did not see. It 
is only in retrospect that such things can be defined; the primal scene could only be 
reconstructed on the basis of its traumatic effect on the patient. The scene acquires this 
pathogenic dimension at the time of the dream, which Lacan likens to an ‘imaginary 
break-in (...) – the Prägung of the originating traumatic event.’52 This Prägung, or 
“striking” in the sense of imprinting a coin, is brought about by the retroactive effect of 
the child’s integration into the field of symbolic significations. It is only once the child 
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is able to integrate his experiences into the law of the Symbolic that the primal scene 
can emerge as the symbol of the dream and take on its status as trauma. As trauma, 
however, it must be detached from the subject; it is no longer integrated but repressed 




Lacan’s conception of après-coup ensures that psychoanalysis cannot be reduced 
simply to a question of the linear determination of the subject’s history, or even an 
inverted determinism where the future determines the past; rather it emphasises the 
dialectical relationship between the two directions. That Freud used the same term, 
Nachträglichkeit, to refer to both the progressive and regressive movements in his 
theory suggests that there is no clear demarcation between them, that they are in fact 
interdependent. It is a theory of the relation between past, present and future. For the 
subject the past is always implicated in the present, and the future in the past. An 
element in the past must wait to be understood, to find its meaning in the future, and so 
in the present the past becomes what it will always have been. Deferred action and 
après-coup, these are the two vectors of Nachträglichkeit. And already this suggests a 
certain corollary between the constitution of film noir and psychoanalytic theory. As a 
category constituted ex post facto, noir is indeed subject to similar structures as those 
identified by Freud. As observed in the Introduction, this connection has not gone 
unnoticed; for example, both Naremore and Elsaesser identify an element of 
Nachträglichkeit in the understanding of film noir. However, the possibilities of such a 
connection are as yet unrealised. It will be the aim of the investigation below to explore 
fully this convergence of film and theory. 
Returning then briefly to psychoanalysis, Laplanche – while acknowledging his 
contribution to the understanding of Nachträglichkeit – suggests that Lacan’s insights 
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are ‘precise but restricted’ and that it was his own work with Pontalis that drew 
attention to the concept’s general importance.54 This is not so. The operation of après-
coup can be found throughout Lacan’s work. While Freud limited Nachträglichkeit to 
the field of sexuality and trauma, Lacan’s work shows that human experience, 
particularly in its linguistic dimension, is always inscribed in this non-linear 
temporality. Lacan insists that, ‘[h]istory is not the past. History is the past insofar as it 
is historicised in the present.’55 The subject exists après-coup for Lacan. The Wolf Man 
shows that the subject’s entry into the Symbolic order is an act of historicisation; it 
makes the subject capable of history. As Malcolm Bowie notes, ‘[t]he principle of 
Nachträglichkeit, on the basis of which Freud has scanned and interconnected the 
widely separated epochs of the patient’s emotional history, now reappears inside every 
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3. The Point de Capiton 
The Freudian concept of Nachträglichkeit establishes a connection between two events, 
the latter producing the (traumatic) meaning of the former: indeed, the relation between 
the events could be considered a relation of meaning. For Lacan, meaning as such is a 
retroactive effect; he takes the example of the structure of a sentence and its punctuation 
to explain this notion. Lacan’s theory and practice are predicated upon concepts of 
punctuation. In ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language’, he discusses the 
analyst’s practice of interrupting or terminating the session, which is experienced by the 
analysand as a “punctuation”. Lacan compares this to the necessity of punctuation in a 
text: its lack in ancient manuscripts of the Bible, for example, is the source of their 
ambiguity. It is only once punctuation has been inserted that meaning is established.
57
 
Further to this, Lacan repeats throughout his work that meaning is in fact the retroactive 
effect of this punctuation, that, taking an example from concrete language,‘[t]he 
sentence only exists as completed and its sense comes to it retroactively.’58  Before its 
terminal point – its “punctuation” – the sentence is simply a chain of discourse; it only 
comes into being as it is finished, at the moment of its full stop. Prior to this, the 
meaning of the sentence is indeterminate; with its punctuation, the sentence’s meaning 
is sealed in a movement from end to beginning. The final point confers meaning 
retroactively on the elements that preceded it. Before punctuation there is only the 
possibility of meaning; the first word in a sentence is dependent upon the arrival of the 
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“last word” (in the sense of “to have the last word on the matter”). Meaning is thus not a 
linear progression, an unfolding from start to finish. The sentence does not immanently 
transmit its meaning; its construction is inscribed in (the possibility of) meaning. The 
sentence can only be understood once meaning has been superimposed on it after the 
fact, endorsed by the intervention of a punctuating mark. Meaning is initially lacking; it 
is produced as an effect après-coup. It could thus be considered an historical product; it 
is the introduction of a context ex post facto that frames what preceded it and constitutes 
it as a whole.
59
 
 To formalise this notion of retroaction, Lacan introduces the concept of the 
‘point de capiton’ (a type of upholsterer’s stitch that holds a button in place). 60  It is a 
theorisation of the relation between the signifier and the signified: Lacan’s nuanced 
understanding of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit translated through a rethinking of the 
structural linguistic theory of Saussure and Jakobson. Taking the example of speech, 
Saussure conceived of signifieds and signifiers as two parallel sequences, with the 
conceptual ‘plane of vague, amorphous thought’ (signified) above the ‘featureless plane 
of sound,’ or the acoustic-image (signifier).61 Language was thus a linear temporal 
progression with no clearly marked divisions, the signifier flowing along with the 
progress of the signified. Demarcation depended upon the attribution of meaning to 
each segment, which can separate one linguistic unit from another. For Saussure, this 
delimitation required that the divisions established in the sound sequence match the 
divisions in the sequence of concepts, and vice versa; the signifier and signified were 
therefore established in the one-to-one, bi-univocal relation of the linguistic sign. This 
was Saussure’s famous image of the sheet of paper: to cut the thought is to cut the 
sound. Signifier and signified are inseparable, interdependent components. The sign was 
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structured by this “cut” in the two parallel planes, and the overall meaning of a sentence 
would equal the sum of meanings of each of its signs: meaning = (s1 and S1) + (s2 and 
S2) + (s3 and S3). Furthermore, the sign – while delimited – cannot be isolated from the 
language system as a whole because an individual signifier can in fact have several 
signifieds – homonymy means that “suit”, “suit” and “suit” are all written and 
pronounced the same but signify a legal proceeding, a set of clothes, and “to be in 
accord” respectively. And several signifiers can have one signified: to match and to fit 
both correspond to the concept of “suiting”.  Saussure concluded that the meaning of a 
sign – and thus its delimitation – was determined by its value, its differential relation to 
all other signs. Like the pieces on a chess board, signs derived their specific linguistic 
value from their positions relative to all other signs: match, fit, and suit have shades of 
meaning that depend upon not only their differences from each other, but from all other 
linguistic units.
62
 The sign could therefore be considered a function of its context. 
 Lacan takes up this formulation with his characteristic revisionism. Following 
Lévi-Strauss, Lacan tacitly inverts the Saussurean sign to suggest that the signifier 
logically precedes the signified.
63
 He notes that while signifiers can insist through 
history, their signifieds change over time; these shifts in meaning ‘prove that no one-to-
one correspondence between the two systems can be established.’64 Signifiers can thus 
be considered autonomous in their relation to signifieds; there is no mutuality between 
them, they are no longer bi-univocal. Lacan retains Saussure’s notion of language as a 
system of differential elements, except – in accordance with his assertion of the primacy 
of the signifier over the signified – it is the signifier rather than the sign that constitutes 
these units. He takes the example of two doors, one with the word “Gentlemen” above 
it, the other “Ladies”, and notes that the abstract concept of ‘urinary segregation’ does 
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not reside in either one of the doors alone but is precipitated by their juxtaposition.
65
 
Lacan’s reversal of Saussure therefore suggests that the signified is caused by the 
signifier, or, more accurately, the conceptual plane of language is a product of the 
interrelation between signifiers. The signifier does not represent the signified: their 
relationship ‘always appears fluid, always ready to come undone.’66 The unity of 
Saussure’s sign is therefore broken down by Lacan. Lacan thus finds Saussure’s 
diagram of the signified and signifier as two planes progressing in parallel questionable; 
instead of ‘one flux that is meaning and another that is discourse,’ he conceives of 
language as a linear chain of signifiers that retroactively gives rise to signifieds.
67
 
 He states that clinical experience has shown that language cannot be considered 
as a sequence of successive, delimited elementary units and that these units as a result 
do not generate meaning progressively; there is instead an ‘incessant sliding of the 
signified under the signifier,’ an indeterminacy, an uncertainty of meaning.68 It is here 
that Lacan finds it necessary to introduce the notion of the point de capiton; it is the 
caesura, the full stop that turns the chain of discourse into a sentence. As a function of 
language, the point de capiton has both synchronic and diachronic dimensions: the 
synchronic aspect is its punctuation of discourse, the terminal point that brings the 
sentence into existence, and the resultant retroactive production of meaning is its 
diachronic, albeit retrogressive, aspect. He rejects Saussure’s ‘correspondence between 
these two flows that would segment them’ in favour of the retroactive effect of the 
punctuation mark, which temporarily halts the slippage of the signified by tying down 
its meaning like an upholsterer’s button.69 This process, through which the signifier 
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meets, or more accurately produces, the signified Lacan calls “signification”.70 At this 
point, the signifier and the signified can be considered as being momentarily “sewn” 
together; the indeterminacy of the signifying chain is suddenly narrowed by the 
punctuating point de capiton. It does not, however, consist at any particular point of the 
chain, rather it insists in or along the chain as a result of the action of the point de 
capiton; Lacan shows that meaning cannot be isolated in a single element. Just as the 
meaning of the Wolf Man’s trauma is constituted in the movement of return to the 
primal scene, meaning is not crystallised in the point de capiton itself but is produced as 
a function of its synchronic intervention in the diachronic chain of signifiers.
71
 And just 
as the Wolf Man’s return to the traumatic scene constitutes it qua trauma after the fact; 
as Žižek observes, ‘meaning is not revealed, excavated from the hidden depth of the 
past’ but constructed ex post facto.72 
 In place of Saussure’s image of the parallel planes of thought and sound, Lacan 
diagrams the relation between signifiers and signified in what he calls the ‘elementary 
cell’ of the Graph of Desire.73 The diachronous chain of signifiers is conceived of as a 
progressive vector intersected by the thread of the meaning-making process, the 
retrogressive vector of the point de capiton that produces the signified. Lacan evokes 
this effect of meaning, stating that ‘only in this latter vector does one see the fish it 
hooks.’74 The double intersection of the vector 
    
   in Lacan’s diagram reflects the 
nature of retroaction and shows that the effect of the point de capiton qua punctuating 
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mark should be considered the action of the structure of the signifying chain.
75
 The 
point de capiton is thus a relation between signifiers as well as between signifier and 
signified. It should be remembered that signifiers exists as differential units in the 
system of language and are therefore never isolatable. The two intersections of the chain 
of signifiers Lacan designates s(A) and (A): the former is the signification of the Other 
(Autre), the instance that meaning is produced as an effect of the point de capiton; the 
latter is the big Other (Autre), the structure of the Symbolic order as a synchronous 
whole – the locus of the Law in which the articulation of the signifying chain is 
inscribed – it is the structural relation of the differential elements in the system of 
language.
76
 Each signifier in a chain necessarily refers to all other signifiers and so 
anticipates the arrival of its final signifier, the point de capiton; the chain of signifiers 
‘always anticipates meaning by deploying its dimension in some sense before it.’77 
Lacan takes the example of phrases such as “The fact remains...” that insist upon their 
completion by certain other signifiers. This “anticipation” is expressed in Lacan’s écrit 
on ‘Logical Time’; it is, by extension, the assertion of ‘anticipated certainty’ that the 
point de capiton will complete it and retroactively determine what has preceded it.
78
 The 
signifying chain functions because it presupposes its completion at a later point. Freud’s 
bi-directional Nachträglichkeit is thus translated into the Graph of Desire and these dual 
vectors of anticipation and retroaction. 
 Furthermore, this diagram of the structure of signification can be understood in 
terms of Lacan’s appropriation of Jakobson’s categories of metonymy and metaphor, 
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the two axes of language.
79
 Metonymy corresponds to the horizontal axis of language, 
the linear progression of the diachronic chain of signifiers (the vector 
    
   in the Graph). 
Lacan expresses metonymy with the following equation: 
                  
Metonymic structure is ‘the signifier-to-signifier connection’ whose function is the 
slippage of the signified beneath it.
80
 This equation suggests that metonymy is 
congruent with the maintenance of the bar – conceived of as the resistance to 
signification – between the signifier and signified; meaning is not produced, it is 
perpetually deferred along the chain. As Lacan states, ‘it is in the relation of a signifier 
to another signifier that a certain relation signifier over signified will be generated [c’est 
dans le rapport d’un signifiant à un signifiant, que va s’engendrer un certain rapport 
signifiant sur signifié].’81 Metonymy is therefore the precondition of metaphor; it is the 
coordination of signifiers in this way that allows for the intervention of the point de 
capiton and its metaphoric effect.
82
 
Metaphor corresponds to the point at which the synchronic intervention of the 
point de capiton intersects with the chain of signifiers, s(A). It is the punctuating point 
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‘in which signification ends as a finished product.’83 Temporal rather than spatial, Lacan 
insists, it is the moment in which the meaning of the chain is retroactively determined. It 
is, however, elaborated in terms of the ‘spatializing device’ which Lacan uses to 
theorise this vertical axis of language.
84
 Metaphor is the process by which meaning 
enters the world.
85
 Following Jakobson, the Lacanian structure of metaphor is 
dependent upon a process of substitution: one signifier is substituted for another. This 
substituted signifier, however, is not erased; it is contained within the metaphor as an 
unspoken element. It is in this sense “repressed”: latent in the metaphor but always 
evoked by its structure because repression, it should be remembered, always entails the 
return of the repressed.
86




            
The left side of the equation refers to the signifying function of this substitution; the 
right-hand portion suggests that this function is congruent with the movement of the 
signifier across the bar, which produces the signified. Conceived in these spatial terms, 
the point de capiton qua metaphor is this point at which the signifier crosses the bar that 
separates it from the signified. Lacan states that it is ‘the passage of the signifier into the 
signified’ – the latter, it should be remembered, being merely a function of the former – 
and this passage is thus the production of the signified. This is the movement of 
signification and therefore the moment of the production of meaning.
87
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Further to the notion of repression in metaphor, Lacan nuances his conception of 
the point de capiton by adding that the signifying chain sustains ‘as if attached to the 
punctuation of each of its units (...) all attested contexts that are, so to speak, 
“vertically” linked up to that point.’88 Lacan suggests that the possible contexts of each 
signifier are aligned “above” them as if on the staves of a musical score.89 The weight of 
these possibilities renders the chain indeterminate; it can be understood in many 
different ways, until the intervention of the point de capiton closes it off with a 
punctuation mark. This does not, however, reduce the sentence to a single, indisputable 
meaning because each of the contexts of the signifier are retained in the signifying chain 
as its repressed. Poetry, as Lacan notes, plays with these connotative possibilities in 
opposition to meaning. To establish a meaning – any meaning – the point de capiton 





                                                                                                                                               
only be expressed through metaphors of space – that metaphors, in a sense, construct time. (See also the 
reference to the Hegelian ‘Punkt’ in Chapter 4.) 
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4. The Noir Category and the Point de Capiton 
With the idea that a retroactive movement is required to grasp meaning, as suggested by 
Lacan’s theory of the point de capiton, the formation of noir can now be approached 
and Marc Vernet’s suggestion that, ‘the Americans made it, and then the French 
invented it,’ can now be understood.91 The French term “film noir” was (practically) 
unknown in the US during the 1940s and 1950s.
92
 It would be tempting to compare the 
movies and the surrounding discourse of the classical period to Philip Marlowe in 
Murder, My Sweet; he was, as Borde and Chaumeton note, ‘involved in events whose 
meaning he is absolutely unaware of.’93 Indeed, it is only at the end of the film that their 
significance is revealed by Velma and the meaning of his actions retroactively 
conferred. There was, however, some recognition of certain tendencies within the 
Hollywood productions of the 1940s. This recognition did not always accord with the 
category of noir: Naremore notes that American critics compared The Maltese Falcon to 
Hitchcock’s British thrillers of the 1930s, and furthermore, that Billy Wilder suggested 
that with Double Indemnity he intended to ‘out-Hitchcock Hitchcock.’94 At its release, 
Gilda was presented as a ‘romantic melodrama,’ and films like it the industry 
designated as ‘Detective-Mystery Melodramas,’ ‘Social Problem Crime Films’ and 
‘Psychological Dramas.’95 Hollywood, it seemed, lacked an organising principle for the 
array of films now understood as noir. The American critical tradition produced myriad 
descriptors for the films then emerging. In a single article, Lloyd Shearer described 
films noirs such as The Big Sleep and The Blue Dahlia (1946) as ‘homicidal films,’ 
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‘lusty, hard-boiled, gut-and-gore crime stories,’ ‘movie murder,’ and ‘hard-boiled crime 
pictures.’96 The New Yorker described Double Indemnity as ‘murder melodrama,’ the 
LA Times described it as an ‘intellectual exercise in crime;’ Newsweek designated 
Murder, My Sweet a ‘brass-knuckled thriller;’ and the Hollywood Reporter commented 
upon the ‘hard-boiled, kick-em-in the teeth murder cycle’ in which Paramount Pictures 
had invested.
97
 Durgnat notes that ‘the English spoke only of ‘the “tough, cynical 
Hammet-Chandler thriller”.’98 Moreover, Siegfried Kracauer coined a new term – 
‘Hollywood’s terror films’ – in an article which rehearsed the argument put forward in 
From Caligari to Hitler, that films such as Somewhere in the Night (1946) and Shadow 
of a Doubt (1943) reflected an American state of mind.
99
 While pre-empting the French 
critics by some months, it seems that this term lacked a certain resonance – which could 
be provided by the suturing power of the point de capiton “noir” – to endure, to serve as 
a nodal point for discourse. 
It was only with the distance that history had afforded them that Frank and 
Chartier could look back at the American cinema of the early 1940s and affix a signifier 
to what they saw. The French critics conferred upon this proliferation of American 
signifiers the signification “noir”, thereby connecting a disparate collection of films – 
such as The Postman Always Rings Twice and The Lost Weekend – in a signifying chain 
and suggesting the possibility of their analysis in a systematic way. They provided the 
punctuation necessary to discern the meaning of this chain, in an instance of what Lacan 
calls ‘the transmutation of the situation through the intervention of the signifier.’100 This 
French signifier therefore intervened as a point de capiton, retroactively conferring a 
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meaning onto a group of films that they did not originally bear. And so, while it seemed 
that a certain tendency in the American cinema had been discerned before Frank and 
Chartier gave it a name (the signifier noir), it is the very fact that they did give it a name 
that conferred upon this tendency its significance. For Lacan, the point de capiton is the 
‘point around which all concrete analysis of discourse must operate’ and so the effect of 
Frank and Chartier’s punctuation could be considered as the constitution of a locus 
around which a critical discourse on a certain kind of Hollywood film from the 1940s 
would be allowed to function.
101 Here the signifier “noir” is ‘the point of convergence 
that enables everything that happens in this discourse to be situated.’102 Furthermore, 
put into the context of the corollary between noir and Lacanian structural linguistics 
here suggested, Naremore’s observation that ‘French writers (...) were fascinated by the 
noir metaphor’ gains a new resonance.103 The action of their critical point de capiton in 
fact constituted the “noir metaphor”. Frank and Chartier’s works instantiate the structure 
of signification, the production of meaning conferred upon the group of American films 
in their application of the signifier “noir”. 
 The discourse to which Frank and Chartier gave rise then resulted, in the 1950s, 
in the Panorama of American Film Noir. This impressionistic study of noir constitutes 
the category as a body with vague boundaries. The Panorama lists twenty-one “core” 
titles under the heading ‘Film noirs,’ which include such classics as the The Maltese 
Falcon, Gilda and The Big Sleep. The listing process is, however, somewhat 
unorthodox in light of the modern understanding of noir. Following this central category 
are a number of related categories, such as ‘Criminal psychology’ and ‘Gangsters’ that 
encompass quintessential films noirs such as Double Indemnity and The Killers, but also 
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less obvious titles such as The Lost Weekend and Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1941).
104
 
Their method suggests that Borde and Chaumeton constituted noir through a process of 
discursive construction, which Naremore describes in terms of a Wittgensteinian notion 
of a loose network of “family resemblances” that establish a relation from one object to 
the next. He suggests that critical categories are formed through imaginative forms of 
metaphoric and metonymic association that constitute ‘networks of relationship,’ 
establishing a corpus characterised by ‘complex radial structures, with vague boundaries 
and a core of influential members at the centre.’105 To account for the relation between 
this category and the signifier “noir”, Naremore invokes Foucault; he suggests that ‘the 
Name of the Genre (...) functions in the same way as the Name of the Author.’106 
Foucault’s author function is, Naremore notes, a means of textual classification that 
establishes and articulates a discourse; the genre function is then, by extension, the 
articulation of a cinematic discourse. Naremore’s project, however, is not a theoretical 
one; this notion of the “genre function” is richly suggestive and deserves further 
exploration in its own right, but is not opened up to a sustained theorisation of the 
structure of noir as a cinematic category. In fact, Naremore’s account of noir is in tacit 
accord with the function of the point de capiton; furthermore, the latter can illuminate 
the inconsistency of the category that Naremore identifies.
107
  
He suggests that the establishment of the network of relations from one film 
object to the next can be considered as a form of chaining. This process is operative in 
Borde and Chaumeton’s Panorama: they note that The Woman in the Window is 
‘related to the noir series in its chiaroscuro technique’ and The Big Sleep by its ‘sordid 
and bizarre details’ but these features do not necessarily relate to all the other films in 
                                                 
104
 Borde and Chaumeton, Panorama, pp. 161-3. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Dir. Victor Fleming. USA, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1941. 
105
 Naremore, MTN, p. 5. 
106
 Ibid., p. 11. 
107
 The normative function of the noir category, which Naremore suggests in his Foucauldian aside, will 





 For example, both films are indeed “sordid” but the latter is characterised 
less by a low-key aesthetic than the low contrast, studio-bound look, and both films 
feature a femme fatale, but only the latter a private detective. Films noirs are related by 
such localised similarities rather than a single feature. Naremore recognises this when 
he notes that, ‘[c]ertain items (...) will be connected in different ways and will be utterly 
unlike others.’109 It is clear therefore that Borde and Chaumeton’s films noirs are not 
grouped together solely by virtue of their overt similarities but rather through a more 
abstract process of association comparable to that which Naremore describes. He notes 
that individual films – such as The Shanghai Gesture (1941) and The Asphalt Jungle 
(1950) – have little or nothing specifically in common, ‘even though both movies have 
been called noir.’110 The category as a whole thus appears radically heterogeneous and 
Naremore concludes therefore, that ‘[u]nfortunately, nothing links together all the things 
described as noir.’111 However, in the context of the Lacanian point de capiton, it should 
be added that there is nothing that links them all except the signifier “noir”. The process 
of constituting the category in this manner can only function underneath the signifier 
noir; the consistency of the chain that criticism produces depends upon the intervention 
of the signification “noir”. Borde and Chaumeton in fact suggest this structure when 
they state that the object of their study ‘will be evoked first (...) by referring to 
productions the critics have most often deemed to the “film noirs”.’112 For Borde and 
Chaumeton, as for Lacan, the signifier dominates; their discourse is determined by the 
signifier “noir”, which functions as a point de capiton. “Noir” unifies the field of films 
under consideration, making them part of a structured network of cinematic meaning.
113
 
This construction can be understood as an instance of the Lacanian play upon 
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“insistence”: the Latin insistere meaning “to stand upon”, and so the signifier “stands 
upon” the category, determining it. This insistence is not limited to the category alone. 
Borde and Chaumeton suggest that it can in fact determine a filmmaker’s entire oeuvre: 
‘[t]he insurgents in John Huston’s We Were Strangers [(1949)] are part and parcel of a 
career that, from The Maltese Falcon to The Asphalt Jungle, is situated under the sign of 
noir or noirified film.’114 Everything in the Panorama must come under this signifier 
“noir”.  
Steve Neale suggests that, ‘as a concept film noir seeks to homogenize a set of 
distinct and heterogeneous phenomena; it thus inevitably generates contradictions, 
exceptions and anomalies and is doomed, in the end, to incoherence.’115 Film noir does 
indeed appear an inconsistent grouping, and yet it persists as a critical category. Here 
Bruce Fink’s commentary on repetition and Heraclitus – who of course suggested that it 
is not possible to step in the same river twice because the waters keep on flowing – is 
illuminating. On one level Heraclitus is very obviously right that it is always changing, 
but it nonetheless remains the “same” river. There is repetition because there is a 
signifier. Although Bruce Fink explains that, ‘repetition seems to be something of a 
misnomer, consisting in the return, not of the same, but of the different—the return of 
something else, something other’ because the very word “twice” indicates that 
something is different: it may be the same object or the same place but time has 
intervened so they are at the very least chronologically different.
116
 Like the waters, noir 
seems ever-changing, made different with each film, but the category nonetheless 
remains the same.  
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What allows these things to be considered the same is that they occur beneath 
the same signifier: in the current case, “noir”. The reason both Stranger on the Third 
Floor and Gilda, for example, can be considered in some respect the same, despite their 
manifest differences, is because they both appear in relation to the same signifier.
117
 
Again, Fink is here instructive: 
Heterogeneous things may be equated because one signifier covers all of them. At this 
level, repetition thus implies the “return” of something that would be different the 
second time but for the signifier. You can only step in the same river twice because you 
have a word or name for it – the “Swanee River,” for example.118 
The concept of “noir” returns with every film to which the signifier is attached, and a 
commonality is established between them. The only way in which identity can be 
attributed is on the basis of such attachment of a signifier to two different phenomena or 
things. This is not, it should be noted, the Lacanian notion of repetition proper – which 
bears upon the Real and will be explored briefly in relation to tuché and automaton in 
Chapter 2 – instead, Fink offers the term “substitution” to refer to this common usage of 
“repetition” as a process occurring under the signifier. Substitution, he states, 
‘establishes an equivalence between things that are not identical:’ it is a case of “return 
with difference” that establishes connections between disparate things.119 Each film noir 
is thus a “return with difference” of the idea of noir, corroborated by the insistence of 
the signifier functioning as its placeholder. 
Naremore’s constructionist account of the category is utterly dependent upon the 
function of the signifier “noir” qua point de capiton. He states that, ‘[w]e can never 
know when the first film noir was made;’ he cites Griffiths’ Muscateers of Pig Alley 
(1912) and Feuillade’s Fantômas (1913) as possible contenders.120 In light of the 
                                                 
117
 It is, moreover, this repetition/substitution that – apropos of the discussion of the point de capiton in 
this chapter – allows diverse films such as Laura and The Maltese Falcon to be called “noir” in the first 
place. 
118
 Fink, ‘Real Cause’, p. 224. 
119
 Ibid., p. 224. 
120
 Naremore, MTN, p. 13. Muscateers of Pig Alley. Dir. DW Griffith. USA, Biograph Company, 1912; 
Fantômas. Dir. Louis Feuillade. France, Société des Etablissements L. Gaumont, 1913. 
74 
 
productive function of the point de capiton in discourse, it can, however, be suggested 
that the first film noir was “made” in the first writings on the category in 1946 (and 
made again in 1955).
121
 Borde and Chaumeton – quoting Georges Sadoul – suggest that 
‘The Maltese Falcon creates, in one fell swoop, the conventions of film noir.’122 The 
Panorama therefore retroactively posits Huston’s work as the original film noir, the 
very core of the category from which the analysis of all its films can proceed. Like 
Minerva’s owl, it seems that the Maltese Falcon too spreads its wings only with the 
falling of the dusk: the film (whose narrative is subject to a climactic point de capiton) 
and the category to which it contributes both depend upon their retroactive 
determination. As a function of the point de capiton, film noir – as Vernet notes – ‘thus 
finds itself to be literally (but also in all senses of the term) a critical object: invented by 
French criticism.’123 Indeed, when the signifier “noir” entered the Anglo-American 
tradition in the 1970s, this structure was repeated with the establishment of the neo-noir 
discourse.
124
 At every instance, the intervention of the point de capiton constitutes the 
cinematic category “noir” and enables its critical discourse; as Lacan notes, 
‘[e]verything radiates out from and is organized around this signifier.’125 Noir is thus 
structured by the point de capiton. 
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5. Double Indemnity, the Graph of Desire, Metalepsis 
The “retroactive transmutation of the scene” is, it has already been noted, discernible 
not only in the cinematic category but also in the filmic objects that constitute it. The 
relation between the first scene and the penultimate scene of Double Indemnity suggests 
the metonymic-metaphoric relation between signifiers and the resultant production of 
the signified theorised with the point de capiton. The film presents a narrative structure 
in which a scene at the end of the film gives meaning to a scene at the beginning. The 
film’s opening sequence – a desperate confession in a darkened office – cannot be 
understood until it is brought into connection with a subsequent scene: the murder and 
attempted murder of the final flashback.
126
 There is an indeterminacy to the first scene 
of Double Indemnity that suggests Lacan’s dialectic of anticipation and retroaction.127 A 
man enters a building at night, presumably his workplace. He appears to be unwell. 
There is an unspecified stain on his left shoulder. He speaks into the Dictaphone, ‘I 
suppose you’ll call this a confession when you hear it’: a line which anticipates its own 
retroactive determination. He announces that he is Walter Neff. He introduces 
characters and elements – the Dietrichson case, a murder for which he is responsible –  
but their meaning is uncertain. He gestures to his shoulder with the line, ‘No visible 
scars, ‘til now that is’, thereby conferring meaning to the stain, which now becomes a 
wound. The scene then dissolves into a flashback. Now, fast-forwarding through the 
film to arrive at the scene which finally produces the meaning of this first one, Phyllis 
Dietrichson hides a revolver beneath her chair and Neff walks through the door. Their 
dialogue retroactively modifies preceding events: ‘We were talking about automobile 
insurance. You were thinking about murder. I was thinking about that anklet’. Finally, 
as first Phyllis shoots Neff, and then Neff – wounded but not dead – kills her, the 
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meaning of that first scene has been revealed. As he staggers out of the Dietrichson 
house (and presumably makes his way back to the office), the end of the film rejoins its 
beginning and the full import of Neff’s confession can now be understood. The bullets 
that pierced their bodies are the points that stitch this scene to the first; the door that 
closes behind Neff here seals the meaning of his confession back at the office. 
 This structure of retroaction can be diagrammed as the elementary cell of the 
Graph of Desire.
128
 The first scene of Double Indemnity can be considered a “first 
signifier”, designated S1; the subsequent scene that determines the first, a “second 
signifier”, S2.
129
 The progression of the narrative from this first scene to the second can 
be conceived of as the diachronic chain of signifiers, designated on the Graph of Desire 
by the vector 
     
   . When Neff and Phyllis shoot each other at S2, this provides the film 
with a punctuating mark; it brings into operation the structure of the point de capiton, 
the retrogressive vector that intersects with the signifying chain. The point de capiton 
constitutes a synchronic intervention at S1 that retroactively determines the meaning of 
the wounded man sitting at his desk. The indeterminacy of this first scene is suddenly 
fixed by its relation to the second. The first of these intersections, which Lacan 
designates A, corresponds to the plot of the film as a synchronic whole; it is the 
structural relation of the elements of the narrative, the locus of the Law of the film, 
where the articulation of the narrative (i.e. the film as signifying chain) is inscribed. 
Neff’s bullet wound is invested with meaning at the second intersection – the 
instance of the signification of the Other, s(A) – which constitutes a signification that 
produces a signified. This, it should be remembered, is the structure of metaphor, the 
‘precise point at which meaning is produced in nonmeaning.’130 The same is true of 
other films noirs that feature such a flashback narrative structure: Sunset Blvd., D.O.A., 
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and The Killers all feature a later scene, S2, that retroactively determines their opening 
sequences, S1. For example, it is not until Norma shoots Gillis in the penultimate scene 
of Sunset Blvd. that it is revealed how a washed-up writer finished face-down in a faded 
film star’s swimming pool.131 Indeed, other retroactive movements of noir – filmic and 
cinematic, in Cohen-Séat’s sense – can be diagrammed in this way. For example, 
recalling the creation of the critical category of film noir in the 1940s, S1 can be 
considered the Hollywood movies, made and released in America between 1941 and 
1945; S2 is then the point at which the distribution of these films in France in the 
summer of 1946 motivated film critics to designate them “noir”.  The intersection (A) is 
the locus of the inscription of the filmic objects as a chain within the cinematic 
discourse: the reception of the films by the film critics as big Other. The instance of the 
signification of the Other, s(A) – where the meaning of the films is produced 
retroactively – is engendered by the connection of S1 to S2 through the work of Frank, 
Chartier, et al. The vector of the critical signifier “noir” qua point de capiton intersects 
the vector of the chain of signifiers constituted by the American films – first at S2 in 
1946 and then retroactively at S1 – where the signification “noir” is produced. The films 
thus become what they always-already appear to have been. To render this process 
concretely at the level of the sentence would be to state quite simply that, “Double 
Indemnity is a film noir”. The structure of Double Indemnity is therefore the structure of 
the noir category itself; its retroactive temporality is the temporality of Lacan’s 
Symbolic order. 
 Furthermore, that the structure of retroaction found in Double Indemnity, Sunset 
Blvd. and D.O.A. presents a “dead man” long before he receives his mortal wound thus 
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suggests the metaleptic reversal – an inversion of effect and cause – inherent to 
retroactivity. The logic of psychoanalysis is characterised by such a metalepsis: for 
Freud the effect often determined its cause. For example, recalling the Wolf Man’s 
symptoms, Nachträglichkeit presents what Žižek describes as the ‘paradox of trauma 
qua cause that does not pre-exist its effects but is itself retroactively “posited” by 
them.’132 More generally, Freud’s metapsychology often depended upon the 
determination of a cause by its effect; consider, for example, the speculative journey 
Freud made from the manifestations of adult sexual relations and practices to the 
hypothesis of infantile sexuality in the Three Essays on Sexuality, a movement of return 
through which ‘the cause retroactively becomes what it always-already was.’133 
Paradoxically, the “cause” becomes the effect of its effects.134 
To reiterate, Nachträglichkeit interrupts the forward movement of time. By 
insisting upon its retroactive dimension, Freud inscribed metalepsis as its structuring 
principle. Logically, the cause (trauma) should precede its effects (symptom), but 
chronologically, the cause is determined qua cause after the effects (après-coup) 
because it had no existence qua cause until the movement of return retroactively 
determined it as such: chronologically the effect can be considered therefore to precede 
the cause.
135
 And following Lacan’s transcription of the Freudian concept into structural 
linguistic terms, the point de capiton is – equally, although differently – the inscription 
of metalepsis in the signifying chain. Chronologically, the sentence precedes its full 
stop; its articulation as a chain of signifiers precedes its determination as a signifying 
structure. Logically, however, if the sentence is considered as a grammatically 
complete, meaningful articulation, then the “cause” of a sentence is the point de capiton, 
the terminal punctuation mark that brings it into existence. The structure of signification 
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that the point de capiton engenders is the cause of meaning. The “cause” of the sentence 
appears after its articulation, and its sense is thus constructed retroactively. With 
recourse to the Graph, S2 is the cause of (the meaning of) S1: the latter had no meaning 
until retroactively determined by the former. Chronologically then, the sentence qua 
meaningful construction can emerge only after its full stop; structurally, the sentence – 
as an effect of meaning – is posited retroactively by the point de capiton qua cause.136 
The metalepsis here is more subtle; whereas, in the case of trauma, the cause is 
retroactively posited before the effect, in the structure of the sentence, the cause comes 
after the effect – the former retroactively positioning the latter as its antecedent.137 
This structural relation is suggested by the kind of temporality involved in noir 
films such as Double Indemnity. The flashback is a device that allows these films to 
effect a metaleptic reversal – to present effect before cause – through a non-linear 
narrative. The examples are striking: Walter Neff sits down to die in Double Indemnity 
long before he is “killed” by Phyllis Dietrichson; Frank Bigelow walks into a San 
Francisco police station to report his own murder and then proceeds to explain how to 
the baffled detectives in D.O.A.; and Sunset Blvd. takes the even more extreme step of 
presenting Joe Gillis face down in a swimming pool, dead, and then having him explain 
from a narrative afterlife how Norma Desmond came to shoot him in the back. Marc 
Vernet’s reading of the narrative structure of such films noirs and his comments on 
Double Indemnity in particular can help illuminate this structure. Vernet identifies two 
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narrative moments: ‘the set-up [mise en place]’ and the black hole or ‘enigma [pot au 
noir].’138 The “set up” is the promise of a coherent story; the opening of a film noir 
offers ‘a foretaste of what will be the truth: the final pleasure, the solution of the 
intrigue.’139 This corresponds to the anticipatory vector of the diachronic signifying 
chain; it is the suggestion that the narrative will progress in a linear fashion. The “black 
hole” is a sudden, violent interruption that manifests ‘the force of its relation with the 
set-up by revealing the gaps and marking out the absences contained within its own 
movement.’140 This enigma is a synchronic intervention into the linear progression of 
the narrative, which effects a transformation.  
What is most interesting in this discussion is the relation between these two 
narrative moments that Vernet theorises. It is not a question of which comes first; 
rather, it is the relationship between these elements – their juxtaposition – that produces 
an effect, thus recalling the differential system of signifiers that constitutes Symbolic 
structure. Apropos of Double Indemnity in particular, Vernet notes that, ‘[a]lthough the 
set-up is logically speaking the first step in the development of the narrative, 
chronologically speaking it does not have to be the first sequence of the film.’141 The 
metaleptic inversion here allows Vernet to emphasise a structural relation between 
elements. The set up in Double Indemnity – Neff’s first visit to the Dietrichson house, 
which initiates the linear progression of the flashback – is in fact the second scene of the 
film; the first scene Vernet considers part of the enigma, the ‘second movement of film 
noir.’142 He articulates this relation between set up and enigma in terms of question and 
answer. Logically, a question must be asked in order that an answer can be given: that is 
the structural relation between the two elements. However, as Double Indemnity shows, 
a question does not always chronologically precede its answer. This suggests a Lacanian 
                                                 
138
 Vernet, ‘Filmic Transaction’, pp. 59 & 62. 
139
 Ibid., p. 61. 
140
 Ibid., p. 65. 
141
 Ibid., p. 62. 
142
 Ibid., p. 62. 
81 
 
articulation in terms of the structural relation of logical precedence rather than a 
chronological relation; Vernet’s structure is not specified in relation to a clock, it is not 
constructed in terms of chronometric units. It expresses not a linear progression but the 
circular narrative of the film.  
Vernet is concerned with the relation between the second scene in the film – the 
set up (S1 qua question) of the linear narrative as Neff first visits the Dietrichson house 
– and the first scene – Neff’s confession – as an aspect of the violent interruption of the 
black hole of Phyllis and Neff’s mutual destruction (S2 qua answer). However, the 
properly Lacanian metaleptic inversion relates to the microstructure of this enigma: the 
relation between the effect of the confession (S1 qua answer) and the murders as its 
cause (S2 qua question). Despite these differences, Vernet’s theoretical constructions 
can provide further insight into this relationship. After Lévi-Strauss, Vernet describes 
the enigma as ‘a question without an answer or an answer without a question.’143 The 
opening scene of Double Indemnity provides answers to questions that have not yet 
been asked: the Dietrichson case was a murder, the culprit is the man speaking into the 
Dictaphone. The answers (qua effect) proffered by the confessions paradoxically ask 
questions themselves; they ask a question of meaning, thus constituting a kind of “set 
up”, S1, in their own right. This set up gestures towards its retroactive determination; it 
will be “answered” by S2, the penultimate scene of murder (question qua cause). This 
complex double relation of question and answer is therefore that of cause and effect in 
the dialectic of anticipation and retroaction. Vernet evokes this structure when he notes 
that, ‘[i]t is only with the resolution of the intrigue at the film’s conclusion that the 
answer will finally rejoin its question.’144 This metaleptical statement describes the 
intervention of the point de capiton, the signifier that transmutes the scene. It is the 
moment, for example, that a French signifier transforms films such as Double Indemnity 
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and D.O.A. into noirs; they are retroactively constituted as the “answer” to a critical 
“question” posed by Frank and Chartier. Moreover, it is the climactic moment of 
Double Indemnity, where the answer (S1) finds its question (S2) as Phyllis’ bullet finds 
Neff’s shoulder and Neff’s bullets then find her. The effect finally finds its cause and he 
slips out of the house to return to the office and make his confession. 
Furthermore, this circular narrative in Double Indemnity confers a sense of 
fatalism on the film, a sense which is said to pervade noir as a whole.
145
 It is felt all the 
more keenly in D.O.A., where it is clear from the outset that Frank Bigelow is a dead 
man walking. This inevitability is the product of the metaleptic reversal involved in the 
film’s narrative looping, and as it is in film noir, so is it in Lacanian theory; there is an 
inevitability inherent to meaning produced by the structure of the point de capiton. The 
effect of the signifier is such that, as Lacan suggests, ‘all that takes place in the order of 
language is always already accomplished.’146 The relation of these first scenes – S1 – to 
their determination by S2, ensures that the outcome of events will have already been 
decided, even though it may seem that other narrative possibilities are still available; Ed 
Sikov admits that he ‘was shocked when he saw [Sunset Blvd.] for the first time’ 
because he did not realise that the corpse in the opening scene would be Gillis.
147
 There 
appears to be a radical contingency to the progression of the signifying chain, until the 
moment the point de capiton intervenes to insist that Gillis, Neff and Bigelow were 
always already dead men.
148
 Equally, the meaning of a sentence appears to always 
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6. Gilda, The Killers, and the Meaning of the Letter 
This noir fatalism is a recurrent feature of existentialist discourse on the category, where 
it contributes to a sense of the meaninglessness of life as such.
150
 This threat of nihilism 
in film noir Mark Conard suggests is an ‘American response to the death of God.’151 
Gilda, however, appears thoroughly to be concerned with the creation of meaning, its 
retroactive construction through the effect of one signifier (S2) on another (S1).
152
 Of 
course, any film with an element of mystery presents enigmas, in most cases, later to 
reveal their meaning but what makes Gilda particularly interesting in this regard is the 
presence of questions of meaning at several different levels. First, there is the typical 
noir intrigue: the enigma of Mundsen’s tungsten monopoly and the fascist subplot that 
turns out to be a MacGuffin. There is also the insistence on enigma and meaningfulness 
centred on Gilda: she has to qualify her remarks to ensure she is understood by her 
Argentine dancing partner – ‘I am. I mean, I was’, ‘I mean New York’; after the dance, 
Johnny – upset by her flirtations – warns Gilda, ‘You can’t talk to men here the way 
you would at home. They think you mean it’, to which she replies, ‘Mean what?’. The 
theme continues: after hitting a stranger with her discarded cigarette, Gilda asks him, 
‘And that means something?’; she even engages in a long discussion with her maid 
about the exact meaning of Carnival.
153
 Moreover, Gilda delights in the play of meaning 
in the double entendre. Dancing closely with Johnny, she tells him, ‘You’re out of 
practice...dancing I mean. I could help you get in practice...dancing I mean’. By 
repeating the phrase ‘dancing I mean’ she opens up a potential polysemy, 
simultaneously suggesting an unspoken meaning of “dancing” while purportedly 
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 Gilda’s double entendre is reduced to a single entendre through this 
insistence on meaning. Prompted by the repetition, Johnny shows that he understands 
Gilda’s meaning too well; his angry rejection punctuates her discourse. It functions as a 
point de capiton, tying the meaning of her suggestive signifier to an explicitly sexual 
signified.  
What makes Gilda’s (and Gilda’s) insistence on meaning all the more interesting 
is her invocation of Freud. After he has described her as his boss’ dirty laundry, Gilda 
tells Johnny, ‘Your thought associations are very revealing’, and insists that ‘Any 
psychiatrist would tell you that means something’. Deborah Thomas rightly warns 
against putting too much emphasis on the overtly psychoanalytic moments in film noir 
because they can obscure more profound implications.
155
 However, the accumulation of 
“meaningful” moments in the film combined with this reference to the meaningfulness 
of the symptom necessitates a psychoanalytic investigation. Gilda expresses what 
Frédéric Declerq and Paul Verhaeghe call ‘belief’ in the symptom.156 It is this belief that 
brings the analysand to the analyst: the belief that their illness has a meaning that can be 
discovered through analysis. It is this belief that Alan Ladd’s character Raven expresses 
in This Gun for Hire when he speaks of ‘A kind of doctor. A psych-something. You tell 
your dream, you don’t have to dream it anymore’. Declerq and Verhaeghe suggest that 
this belief amounts to belief in ‘a final signifier, S2, [that will] reveal the ultimate sense 
and signification of the S1.’
157
 This is what Gilda seeks throughout the film; she insists 
upon meaning, she believes in meaning. The final scene – unsatisfactory for a feminist 
reading such as Doane’s – surrounds Gilda with meaning; the vanquishing of Mundson 
and her reconcilement with Johnny ultimately stabilise her world and allow the film to 
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 This last scene reveals the meaning of Gilda’s action – a performance to rouse 
Johnny – retroactively determining her as a “good girl” after all. Gilda’s performance is 
an S1 seeking, waiting for its determination by an S2. This recalls Lacan’s suggestion 
that the retroactive production of meaning is anticipated by the signifier. Gilda’s 
“misbehaviour” is a signifying chain ordered in anticipation of signifiers to come; this 




This orientation towards the future is played out through dialogue, soundtrack 
and cinematography in Gilda’s introduction to the film. The scene provides a number of 
“floating signifiers”, which is to say signifiers without signifieds.160 Indeed, before the 
suturing movement of the point de capiton, this is the condition of all signifiers; they 
can be arranged in the uncertain signification of a half-finished sentence – this is the 
indeterminacy invoked to describe Double Indemnity – but they do not signify until they 
are tied to a signified through the punctuation of the chain. The floating signifiers in this 
scene from Gilda are the “canary” discussed by Johnny and Mundson, the acousmatic 
voice singing ‘Put the Blame on Mame’, and finally the empty frame before Gilda 
appears.
161
 Hayworth’s appearance on screen is the point de capiton that constitutes 
these signifiers as a meaningful chain. Her movement into the frame visually represents 
the movement of metaphor – the moment the signifier crosses the bar and ‘stuffs the 
signified’ – it reveals the signification of the term “canary” and constitutes a de-
acousmatisation of the voice.
162
 The empty frame anticipates its being filled, the 
signifier its retroactive signification, the voice its de-acousmatisation. This is the logical 
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time of the anticipation of future certainty; retroactive determination is ‘announced in 
the future perfect tense.’163 The point de capiton ensures an articulation in the future 
anterior; it ensures that, in the preceding shot, the voice will have been Gilda’s, the 
canary will have referred to her, and finally that the empty frame will have been a close 
up of her face. This circular temporality is evoked by Schrader’s description of ‘the 
over-riding noir theme: a passion for the past and present, but also a fear of the 
future.’164 Schrader suggests the interdependence of past, present and future found in 
noir and the structure of the language; in Gilda, Johnny remarks ironically that, ‘I’m all 
future and no past’. Johnny and Gilda are, in the present, subject to future 
determinations of their past: for them, the future is all past. There is, in this sense, no 
future in film noir because all it entails is a return to (or of) the past. There is only a 
gesture towards it: futurity.
165
 
 This futurity is the very raison d’être of Siodmak’s The Killers. With its 
flashback narrative, it does in fact present a metaleptical structure similar to Double 
Indemnity, Sunset Blvd. and D.O.A.: it is a common, but not defining, feature of noir. 
However, what is particularly interesting about the The Killers is its status as an 
adaptation. As is well known, the film is based on Hemingway’s short story of the same 
name. In fact, the whole first scene – the hoods in the diner and the execution of the 
Swede – is a reasonably faithful rendering of the Hemingway. But being a short story, 
that is where it ends, with the enigma of the Swede’s passivity, with the question of why 
a man would wait for his own death. Siodmak’s film constructs a narrative to answer 
that question. Therefore, if the short story is Hemingway’s famous “one eighth of the 
iceberg”, then Siodmak’s project constitutes a full glaciography, determined to map the 
contours of the other seven eighths. The entire contribution of the script writers – John 
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Huston, Richard Brooks, and Anthony Veiller – is the retroactive determination of this 
single scene. This scene – the Hemingway story – seems then to anticipate its future 
signification. To explore this condition, it will be necessary to introduce Lacan’s notion 
of the letter, or at least one version of it.  
Concomitant with Lacan’s three interdependent orders Real, Symbolic and 
Imaginary are the three dimensions of language: letter, signifier, signified. Signifiers, it 
should be remembered, are the differential elements of Symbolic structure and 
signifieds their Imaginary products. The letter then is a Real of language.
166
 Lacan states 
that, ‘[b]y letter I designate the material [support] that concrete discourse borrows from 
language.’167 With recourse to the ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”’, it seems that it 
is this materiality of the letter that distinguishes it; as a crumpled and discarded epistle it 
suggests a signifier that has no signification. It is in this sense a letter in purely formal 
terms. In the story neither the details of the contents nor the sender of the letter are 
given: it is its form as a letter that is important. As a material substratum, the letter 
remains the same throughout the story; it persists as an unchanging dimension of the 
Real in language. Furthermore, Lacan suggests that the materiality of the letter is 
‘singular’, that it will not ‘allow partition,’ and so it becomes clear that the letter takes 
on the dimension of the smallest unit of language: the phoneme.
168
 The letter is 
materialised by but not equated with printed characters as the written equivalent of the 
phoneme. It is therefore a formal unit; it is the signifier considered in isolation, before it 
enters into the combinatorial system and can structure signification.  
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Already discovered in the above mentioned scene from Gilda, the letter is the 
free-floating, ‘pure signifier’ before it joins the signifying chain.169 It is the signifier 
before it has acquired a linguistic value, in the sense that it is inscribed in the 
differential system of the Symbolic. The indeterminate support of language, it cannot 
signify but it anticipates its future signification. To formalise this notion in the Lacanian 
algebra, the letter is S1 disconnected from S2. It should be written in the Lacanian 
algebra as S1... to signal its incompleteness.
170
  The letter only becomes a signifier when 
connected to S2: without S2, S1 has no status. This structure grants the letter a meaning 
that it did not have at the outset.
171
 Signifiers do not signify anything considered 
separately from the signification that they generate; the letter thus constitutes a 
dimension of meaninglessness inherent to the process of meaning-making. Freud 
identified this signifier without signification in his case studies. For instance, with the 
Rat Man Freud tracked the phoneme rat as it circulated in the unconscious to form 
‘verbal bridges’ between the signifiers Ratten, Raten, Spielratte, heiraten.172 Identifying 
with rats (Ratten) as a child, his “rat complex” incorporated the idea of instalments or 
repayments (Raten), which was associated with father, a gambler (Spielratte), as well as 
the idea of getting married (heiraten) to his fiancé. The meaningless phoneme connects 
the signifiers through a metonymic/metaphoric process, joining together what Bruce 
Fink calls these ‘purloined letters,’ to form a signifying chain in which meaning insists 
not at any given point but along its entire length.
173
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In relation to the Siodmak film, the Hemingway short story is just such a letter, a 
floating signifier – S1... – it anticipates its determination by a future signifier – S2 – 
which will engage it in the differential Symbolic system (of the story of the film) and 
begin the process of signification. Siodmak’s endeavour, the quest to give meaning to 
Swede’s enigma, is this very S2. It is the same future-oriented aspect of the S1 that 
produces the insistence on meaning seen in Gilda. The letter – S1... – is the element 
responsible for the dimension of futurity in language; Edelman insists that ‘this ellipsis 
itself should be understood as the defining mark of futurism.’174 In Siodmak’s The 
Killers, this ellipsis – the defining mark of futurism – is the Swede, his enigmatic stare 
as he waits passively to look death in the face. This ellipsis is in fact repeated at the 
level of dialogue: the Swede confesses, ‘I did something wrong...once’; the emphatic 
silence breaks up his sentence between words. The signifying chain here yearns for its 
completion; the signifier “once”, however, is not a point de capiton. It brings no 
meaning to his statement; the chain remains palpably incomplete. The meaning of this 
scene remains entirely unclear. It is this mystery that drives the plot: it demands an 
explanation. Swede’s confession, his death, and his silk handkerchief constitute the S1 
in need of explanation; they impel Reardon to reconstruct Swede’s history, to produce 
the S2 that is constituted by the revelations of the rest of the film. As before, meaning 
thus comes to the scene retroactively through the structure of its relation to the rest of 
the film that it precedes. 
 
The letter is thus the anticipatory element of language, and the structure of the 
signifying chain its retroactive determinant. The relationship between the two allows 
meaning to be produced both in linguistic constructions and the narrative constructions 
of film noir. The relation between past, present and future in noir is therefore 
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comparable to the structures of Nachträglichkeit and the point de capiton in 
psychoanalysis. Furthermore, the interdependence of the vectors of diachrony and 
synchrony constitutes both the temporality of Lacan’s Symbolic order and the noir 
narratives of Double Indemnity, Gilda and The Killers. Having introduced the concept 
of the letter – the Real of language – it will now be necessary to explore the function of 
the Real more generally in relation to the Symbolic structure here identified. While this 
project does not aim for a theory of subjectivity, Lacanian formulations of the subject 
and its relation to structure will be instructive in further understanding the constitution 
of film noir. The next chapter will make the transition from the structure of the s(A) – 
the signification of the Other – to the S(A) – the signifier of the lack in the Other – or 
the point at which the Symbolic order is found to be incomplete, in order to investigate 
the numerous contradictions encompassed in the formation of noir. Further to this, 
Miller’s suggestion that the subject is ‘the possibility of one signifier more’ will be used 
to interrogate the apparent lack of boundaries to this critical category and the enduring 
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Chapter 2. Film Noir Doesn’t Exist: Impossibility, Definition and the Point of 
Failure 
 
The question arises, What was lacking in the account of film noir given in the previous 
chapter? The answer is that which distinguishes Lacanian psychoanalysis from 
structuralism proper: the Real. This chapter will in this sense proceed from the structure 
of s(A) to the lack in S(A): from the signification of the Other to the signifier of the lack 
in the Other. The vector 
     
    has already been associated with a dimension of the Real; 
the signifier S1 was conceived in terms of the letter, Lacan’s early conception of the 
Real as brute materiality. However, the tacitly Lacanian dimension of Vernet’s work 
suggests a number of ways of approaching the Real as theorised by Lacan in his later 
work. As trauma, as impossibility or failure, and – with the introduction of a crucial 
distinction – as pre- and post-symbolic, Lacan’s theory of the Real provides an 
invaluable tool in the pursuit of an ontology of film noir. 
 
1. Tuché, Automaton and Noir Narrative 
In his study, ‘The Filmic Transaction’, Vernet reflects upon the general characteristics 
of the films noirs under consideration (The Maltese Falcon, Double Indemnity, The Big 
Sleep, The Lady from Shanghai (1947), Out of the Past, and The Enforcer (1951)). He 
notes that the story often begins with an air of quietude which is suddenly and brutally 
disturbed.
1
 This provides the films with a structure of contrasts which, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, Vernet characterises in terms of two narrative elements: the ‘Set-
Up [mise-en-place]’ and the ‘Enigma [pot au noir]: the “black hole”.’2 The opening 
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movements of the plot – literally a “putting in place” – establish a network of signifiers 
that denote tranquillity and comfort. For example, Sam Spade quietly rolls a cigarette in 
his office and a lady enters; Walter Neff knocks on a door in the summer afternoon; and 
Jeff Bailey leaves for a meeting with his fiancée. These are the foundations of a 
coherent narrative; the initial relations between characters are established and the 
elements necessary for the progression of the narrative appear. The opening scenes 
designate and clarify roles and attributions of each character in a manner Vernet 
compares to a feature identified by Vladimir Propp’s analysis of folk tales: the initial 
establishment of a contract between characters that regulates their relations in the story 
that will follow.
3
 With the satisfactory arrangement of elements – everything is in its 
place and seemingly destined to go well – the unfolding of narrative can begin. Vernet 
concludes that the set up insists that ‘the story will advance in rectilinear fashion.’4 
However, the apparently perfect accord of this first movement will suddenly fall into 
chaos due to a collision with the second movement: the black hole. Vernet’s examples 
emphasise the violence and contingency of these irruptive moments; with one shot 
Miles Archer is dead, with one step Joseph Rico plunges to his death. The set up had 
promised an orderly progression but now ‘the expected disappears from the film with a 
brutal and unpredictable force.’5 Death’s intervention interrupts and disconnects the 
narrative; it shoots the narrative full of holes causing it to fragment. The black hole is a 
sudden, disturbing appearance that upsets the established order. 
Already this begins to suggest an approach to film noir narrative in terms of 
Lacan’s concepts of tuché and automaton and a formulation of the Real as trauma. 
Nowhere does Vernet invoke such Lacanian concepts, nor does he anywhere mention 
Lacan by name but his method of combining Freud and Lévi-Strauss – psychoanalysis 
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and structural anthropology – is thoroughly Lacanian, and such theory can provide a 
powerful investigative or explanatory tool for Vernet’s complex piece of structuralist 
film criticism.  
Lacan borrows the concepts of tuché and automaton from the discussion of 
causality in Aristotle’s Physics.6 Characteristically, he redefines or “translates” these 
terms: tuché becomes an ‘encounter with the real’ and automaton ‘the network of 
signifiers.’7 Automaton is the machinery of the Symbolic order. It is the linear ordering 
that proceeds according to the laws of metaphor and metonymy. Automaton is thus the 
way in which the Symbolic is structured by a chain of associative connections. Lacan 
relates automaton to the French automatisme by which ‘we sometimes translate into 
French the Zwang of the Wiederholungszwang, the compulsion to repeat.’8 There is 
something compulsive about automaton; it is the pure mechanical insistence of the 
unfolding of the chain of signifiers in the unconscious, the functioning of the primary 
process that Lacan describes as ‘the insistence of the signs by which we see ourselves 
governed by the pleasure principle.’9 This is the structure of the Symbolic order that 
characterised Lacan’s work from the 1950s. He articulated this notion of automatic self-
reiteration in Seminar II in terms of a game of coin flipping that provided a series of 
“pluses” and “minuses” (heads or tails). Lacan noted that, ‘once the symbolic chain is 
constituted, as soon as you introduce a certain significant unity, in the form of unities of 
succession, what comes out can no longer be just anything.’10 Through the simple act of 
grouping the results into sets of three – for example, “plus, plus, minus” or “minus, 
plus, minus” – a number of laws emerge which determine the possibility of certain 
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predictable sequences; these groupings can appear only in certain combinations, making 
other outcomes impossible.
11
 Establishing a series of relations between the elements 
transforms the results of a coin toss into a ‘primitive symbolic organisation’ that gives 
rise to a spontaneous and precise determination of what can appear in the chain in no 
way suggested by or contained in the original act of symbolic grouping.
12
 Thus the 
Symbolic produces by itself its own structures and organisations: this is the automaton 
that moves by itself and the law of this network is then the realm of the possible. 
However, this automatically functioning chain of signifiers will always come up 
against an impossibility: tuché, the Real ‘which always lies behind the automaton.’13 
Tuché is something that happens as if by chance; it is the unpredictable irruption of pure 
contingency. It is the precipitation of an undetermined, unanticipatable event that 
interrupts the smooth functioning of automaton. Tuché disrupts this automatic, law-like 
regulated stringing together of signifiers. It is a hitch or obstacle that causes the 
signifying chain to falter: the shock of the intrusion of the Real. A painful and terrifying 
intervention that wholly perturbs the Symbolic order; it appears as a tear in the blanket 
of reality. Lacan describes this tuché as ‘an encounter (...) with a real that always eludes 
us’ because it appears as something inassimilable; it cannot be integrated into the chain 
of signifiers.
14
 Lacan elaborates: ‘the encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far 
as it is essentially the missed encounter – first presented [itself] in the history of psycho-
analysis in a form that was in itself already enough to arouse our attention, that of the 
trauma.’15 Tuché as event is thus a traumatic encounter that cannot be symbolised. If 
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automaton functions according to the pleasure principle, then tuché is the trauma of an 
encounter with a Real beyond the pleasure principle.
16
 
Thus, the formulation of tuché situates Lacan’s theory in Freud’s studies of war 
neuroses and traumatic neuroses. In the figurative biological terms of Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, Freud’s notion of trauma extended the concept of the wound from 
the physical to the psychical; it was conceptualised as a breach in the protective layer 
that sheltered the psyche from excessive external stimuli. Freud designated as 
“traumatic” any such excitation that was powerful enough to break through this 
otherwise efficacious barrier.
17
 Furthermore, Freud emphasised the utterly contingent 
nature of trauma; it is the impact of an event for which the psychic apparatus was 
entirely unprepared, an experience Freud called ‘fright [Schreck].’18 Expressed in 
economic terms, Freud described trauma as ‘an experience which (...) presents the mind 
with an increase of stimulus too powerful to be dealt with or worked off in the normal 
way, and this must result in permanent disturbances of the manner in which the energy 
operates.’19 The traumatic breach causes the mental apparatus to be flooded with 
excitation. The psyche is overwhelmed by this stimulus; its mechanism is disrupted. 
Freud suggested that, faced with the problem of mastering this energy, the “normal” 
functioning of the psyche – that is, the pleasure principle – is suspended. It instead 
becomes fixed upon the task of binding, making continual attempts to circumscribe this 
excess so that the dominance of the pleasure principle can be reinstated. This is the core 
of Freud’s ‘compulsion to repeat.’20 
In these terms, the connection can be made between Lacan’s tuché and 
automaton and trauma and the repetitive insistence of the psyche. Lacan’s example 
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comes from The Interpretation of Dreams and illustrates his conception of the way in 
which tuché “appears” in the repetition of automaton, in a manner that will then shed 
light on Vernet’s theory of “narrative trauma”. In the Interpretation, Freud had already 
been led, by the consideration of unpleasurable “anxiety” or “punishment” dreams, to 
qualify his notion that the dream was the fulfilment of a wish, so that it became ‘a 
(disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish.’21 However, Freud’s work 
with trauma compelled him to question this founding principle; the dreams of traumatic 
neuroses led him ‘to admit for the first time an exception to the proposition that dreams 
are the fulfilment of wishes.’22 Instead, Freud suggested, they arise ‘in obedience to the 
compulsion to repeat:’ the necessity to bind excess stimulation and thus reinstate the 
pleasure principle.
23
 Lacan comments that, ‘Freud shows that we can conceive here of 
what occurs in the dreams of traumatic neurosis only at the level of the most primitive 
functioning – that in which it is a question of obtaining the binding of energy.’24 Such 
dreams function to relive a traumatic experience as a means of binding it; repetition is 
an attempt to integrate this tuché harmoniously into the automaton of psychic 
organisation. In line with Freud’s subsequent modification of his theory of the dream, 
Lacan’s formulation of the Real as trauma provides further understanding of one of the 
most striking examples from the Interpretation: the dream of the burning child. 
Freud recounted the dream of a father whose son had just died; in the dream, his 
son who ‘was standing beside his bed, caught him by the arm and whispered to him 
reproachfully: “Father, don’t you see I’m burning?”.’25 At which point he awoke to 
find a fallen candle had set fire to his son’s body which lay in the other room. Freud 
suggested that the dream fulfilled both the father’s wish to see his son again and his 
need to sleep. Indeed, to prolong his sleep was to prolong the life of his son in the vision 
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and so the glare of the fire in the other room became the fire with which the child burns 
in the dream. Lacan’s question then is, ‘What is it that wakes the sleeper?’26 It is not 
because the intrusion of the glare became too strong; the dream had transformed this 
into the element by which it sustained itself. Instead, Lacan suggests that what wakes 
him is a missed encounter with the Real, with the psychic trauma of the son’s death. 
There was then more of the Real in the dream image of his son than in the perceptual 
reality of the fire in the next room. He awoke to reality to escape the traumatic Real 
attached to the accusation in the child’s words, which touched upon the father’s guilt 
regarding the death of his son. The automaton of the father’s psyche could not 
assimilate the trauma and so had to present the tuché of the death of his son indirectly; 
his son burned with a ‘fire [that] bears on (...) the real.’27 The glare of the fire became 
the blinding light of the Real. The son’s reproach can illuminate only the very absence 
of this Real itself; it ‘designates a beyond that makes itself heard in the dream.’28 
This relation between tuché qua trauma and automaton leads to Lacan’s 
understanding of the Real as cause. Automaton is the compulsive attempt to integrate 
the traumatic event in the unconscious; Lacan describes this process of automaton as the 
‘subjectifying homeostasis that orientates the whole functioning defined by the pleasure 
principle.’29 It is the network of signifiers woven around the point of impact of the 
traumatic event. The Symbolic is thus a system shaped by the intrusion of the Real. The 
Real therefore appears as an accidental order that functions as cause. It is the pure 
contingency of tuché that founds the framework of the Symbolic and so, as Paul 
Verhaeghe notes, with this theory, ‘Lacan solves the classical question about the cause 
                                                 
26
 Lacan, S11, p. 58. 
27
 Ibid., p. 59. 
28
 Ibid., p. 59. 
29
 Ibid., p. 55. 
98 
 
of the cause. The first cause lacks any determination whatsoever.’30 As such, the Real as 
cause cannot be found directly: it is always disguised. What is found in the dream is a 
placeholder, a stand-in; automaton can represent the trauma only in a veiled form. The 
Real is beyond the dream, what it has hidden. Never present, it is, as Žižek suggests in 
an Althusserian invocation, ‘the absent cause of the Symbolic.’31 This cause can never 
effect its power directly; it must always operate through disturbances within the 
Symbolic and is only detectable as these disturbances. This is why an encounter with 
the Real, such as that in the burning child dream, is always a missed encounter. 
Moreover, the absent cause is associated with an idea of failure; it can be detected 
where the signifying chain is disrupted. It is, for example, the point at which the 
analysand’s discourse falters, where the free association stalls or stops. It reaches a 
certain limit: the Real. The chain halts when it touches upon a traumatic association.  
Lacan suggests that ‘there is cause only in something that doesn’t work;’ this point of 




With these concepts of trauma and symbolisation now explored, Vernet’s 
analysis of film noir narrative can be understood to function in terms comparable to 
tuché and automaton. While it would of course be a profound error of category to assert 
a direct connection between the psychoanalytic theory of trauma and the unconscious 
and the story-telling devices of the cinema, there is nonetheless a certain corollary 
between the structures of disruption and repetition presented in each case.
33
 When 
Vernet describes the “first movement” of the film noir as ‘a narrative machine whose 
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every part is well-oiled and in gear,’ it is impossible not to hear the mechanised clamour 
of the Lacanian automaton.
34
 The opening scenes of the set-up establish a system of 
Symbolic law; a series of exchanges between characters positions them as elements 
within a system of differences, such as “hero”, “victim”, or “dispatcher”. The “hero” 
has a task with precise requirements and agreed remuneration – a missing person must 
be found (The Maltese Falcon), a blackmailer silenced (The Big Sleep), a prisoner 
guarded (The Enforcer) – and the accomplishment of this task will result in the 
restoration of normality – a family reunited, justice served. The contract Vernet 
describes is the guarantee of the big Other; like the “lawful” development of the 
signifying chain, ‘[t]he impossible is not considered therein.’35 Equally, the “signs” that 
make up Vernet’s first movement can be thought of as functioning under a form of 
narrative pleasure principle. The set-up is characterised by a sense of calm, order and 
propriety; it functions as a coherent signifying chain imbued with meaning. The contract 
establishes only a pleasurable tension that orients the film towards ‘the final pleasure, 
the solution of the intrigue.’36 Vernet describes this unfolding of the narrative set-up in 
terms of the determinedness of the inexorable approach of Walter Neff on crutches in 
the title sequence from Double Indemnity; this is the compulsive insistence of the 
automatism of the signifying chain, the rectilinear advancement of a narrative 
characterised by stability and certainty. 
However, just as the signifying chain must come up against an impossibility, so 
too must the set-up meet the black hole. This black hole is a tychic irruption of 
unexpected violence, whose force turns the narrative space inside out. There occurs, as a 
result, a ‘generalized inversion of signs:’ an honest man is revealed to be a criminal 
(Out of the Past), an insurance agent to be a murderer (Double Indemnity), an innocent 
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woman a liar (The Lady from Shanghai).
37
 The normal functioning of the narrative is 
disturbed: all continuity is lost. The intervention of the black hole constitutes then a 
form of narrative trauma. It is an intervention that overwhelms and disrupts the first 
movement. The set-up is placed into doubt by this second movement; the fiction it 
proposed is suddenly ‘flawed, corroded, blown apart.’38 The well-oiled narrative 
machine is stopped dead in its tracks; the ‘agreeable, straight-forward and seamless 
story has now fallen into pieces.’39 Vernet can be understood to describe the impact of 
the traumatic Real upon the Symbolic when he suggests that, ‘the black hole will 
manifest the force of its relation with the set-up by revealing the gaps and marking out 
the absences contained within its own movement.’40 The narrative automaton is 
suddenly opened up; it appears inconsistent. The eruption of the black hole uncovers an 
anomaly, a failure; the pleasures promised by the set-up are now impossible.  
Furthermore, Vernet frames the intervention of this black hole in terms of a 
missed encounter; the violent action often takes the form of a murder, which ‘eliminates 
the first witness and thus the first indices of the truth.’41 A vital element is missing: only 
Rico can testify, only Archer can identify the murderer, only Geiger can explain his 
affairs, and so the narrative thread is broken. The film is suddenly engulfed by a black 
hole and any connection to an originary cause is lost. Instead, the cause must be 
retroactively established by the continuation of the narrative automaton. The tychic 
black hole thus functions as the absent, Real cause that shapes the Symbolic.
42
 The 
fiction might unexpectedly pass from familial squabble to slaughterhouse, romance to 
cataclysm but the film nonetheless continues. If the impact of the black hole marks out 
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the absences contained within the set-up, the films present these gaps in the form of 
questions to be answered by the unfolding of the story: Who is the killer? What is the 
connection? What is going to happen? Vernet implicitly suggests this relation between 
automaton and tuché as cause when he notes that, ‘in uncovering a gap, we have already 
begun to fill it in, and in destroying one line of logic, we have already begun to 
construct another.’43 The narrative automaton weaves its symbolic matrix around these 
gaps caused by tuché; the structure of narrative is shaped by the central void of the 
black hole. It must work to circumscribe the chaos induced by this traumatic tear so as 
to re-establish the narrative pleasure principle.
44
 The black hole threatens the narrative 
with incomprehensibility; its intervention means that ‘the film would lapse into prattle 
without meaning or value.’45 It is therefore the task of the narrative automaton to 
overcome this threat. 
Moreover, Vernet asserts a structural incompatibility between his two fields – 
the set-up and the black hole – which suggests a more general relation between the 
Symbolic and the Real. He describes the connection between the two movements in 
terms of asyndeton – the rhetorical omission of conjunctions between clauses – 
suggesting that there is a gap between the set-up and the black hole. This is experienced 
as ‘a rupture in the chain of significations where the spectator feels as if he has 
somehow skipped a necessary logical step.’46 There is some signifier missing that would 
bridge the two movements. Once again, the encounter with the Real is a missed 
encounter. The Real is this very absence, the impossibility of a signifier that could 
represent the traumatic tuché. This is ‘where the spectator feels the absence of a 
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necessary structural relation;’ however, the necessary Lacanian reversal here is to 
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2. The Fault in the Noir Universe 
The Lacanian theory of trauma qua Real thus presents it as a hard core resisting 
symbolisation: this Real is ‘that which resists symbolisation absolutely.’48 The traumatic 
event is thus a point of failure for the Symbolic order; it is present only as a gap or a 
hole in the signifying chain, an opening around which the Symbolic is structured. The 
Real can be given only as a lack: the lack of a signifier adequate to its signification. It 
cannot be inscribed (the Real is that which ‘doesn’t stop not being written’) it is that 
which escapes inscription.
49
 It upsets the balance of the Symbolic; it is the 
unsymbolisable, incomprehensible, and thus is experienced as trauma. The Real must be 
understood in terms of this relation to the Symbolic: a relation of impossibility, the 
irreducible gap between these orders. The Real is the cause of the repetition of the 
signifying chain, the repeated attempt to signify the impossible. Throughout his middle 
and late work Lacan links the Real with the concept of impossibility; in Seminar XI, he 
states that, ‘we would be led to define the real as impossible,’ and again emphatically, 
in ‘Radiophonie’, ‘my formula: the impossible is the real.’50 This impossibility gives 
rise to failure; the Real is ‘this something faced with which all words cease and all 
categories fail.’51 It is therefore the very point of failure of the signifying chain, what 
Alan Sheridan designates as ‘that over which the symbolic stumbles.’52 It is, moreover, 
this “stumbling” that will be of particular interest in relation to the various critical 
attempts to define film noir. 
The Real thus occupies the place, in the Symbolic, of what cannot be signified; it 
does not correspond to any formulation of “reality” but is instead the very failure of the 
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symbolic order to account for everything.
53
 The Real is itself nothing but this 
impossibility of its inscription; Žižek suggests that it is ‘nothing at all, just a void, an 
emptiness in a symbolic structure marking some central impossibility.’54 Language 
therefore harbours within itself its own point of lack; there is a structural hole or gap in 
the Symbolic that corresponds to this impossibility of the Real. To recall again the 
spontaneous impossibilities in Lacan’s account of the coin toss game, the Real is what 
the Symbolic cannot accommodate. It is a constitutive impossibility in that, just as the 
outcome of the coin toss game is regulated by the combinations that cannot occur, the 
signifying process is predicated upon the exclusion of this Real as traumatic, as what 
cannot be symbolised. 
In order to delimit this impossibility, Lacan introduced the matheme that 
corresponds to this condition in Le Séminaire V as, ‘S of A barred.’55 Like the vase 
Lacan describes in Seminar VII – whose clay encloses a constitutive gap or void – the 
matheme as such designates both the impossibility of the Real and a way in which this 
impossibility can be approached.
56
 This matheme is glossed by Miller – in his capacity 
as the editor of Le Séminaire – as ‘the signifier of the barred Other.’57 The Real is a 
lack, a gap or hole in the middle of the Symbolic order; Žižek – in fact echoing Vernet’s 
‘Filmic Transaction’ – characterises it as a ‘central “black hole” around which the 
signifying order is interlaced.’58 This reiterates the fundamental incompatibility between 
the Symbolic and the Real; it insists that any accordance between the orders is, as has 
already been suggested, structurally impossible. The experience of the traumatic Real is 
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the experience of the failure of the symbolic Law. The traumatic encounter reveals the 
lack in the Other; it points to that which the big Other cannot render meaningful, the 
point of failure necessarily within the Other.  
The key to understanding Lacanian theory is this insistence that the big Other is 
“barred” by this impossibility, that the Symbolic is structured around a traumatic lack. 
Lacan further explains this is in his next Seminar when he states, ‘S(A) means that in 
this locus of speech [le lieu de la parole], in which lies (...) the set of the system of 
signifiers, namely of a language [langage], something is missing. Something which can 
only be a signifier is there missing.’59 The lack in the Other suggests therefore that there 
is a signifier missing; Lacan reiterates this in ‘Subversion of the Subject’ where he 
suggests that the matheme should be ‘read as (...) signifier of a lack in the Other, a lack 
inherent in the Other’s very function as the treasure trove of signifiers.’60 The Real is 
missing; it causes gaps and ruptures in the Symbolic order because it resists 
symbolisation. The signifier of the barred Other marks this lack intrinsic to the 
Symbolic: the impossibility of the Real in the Symbolic. Lacan’s matheme designates 
this point of failure of the Symbolic; the Real itself cannot be signified – the signifier 
adequate to its symbolisation is missing – and so, Lacan suggests, ‘[w]e write S(A), 
signifier of the barred A, to indicate this lack.’61 Lacan’s use of the matheme here aims 
to encircle this point of failure of the big Other, to circumscribe the locus of what 
cannot be symbolised. 
It is here that Lacanian psychoanalysis marks its specificity: the Real is what 
distinguishes Lacan’s theory from a structuralism such as that of Lévi-Strauss. Lacanian 
theory is based upon the recognition of the impossible-Real that ‘has to be sought 
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beyond the dream — in what the dream has enveloped, hidden from us, behind the lack 
of representation of which there is only one representative.’62 Lacan continues, ‘[t]his is 
the Real that governs our activities more than any other and it is psycho-analysis that 
designates it for us.’63 Lacanian psychoanalysis emphasises the instabilities of language, 
the points of failure within the Symbolic and the malfunctions of its Law; as Lacan 
suggests, ‘[i]f linguistics enables us to see the signifier as the determinant of the 
signified, analysis reveals the truth of this relation by making “holes” in the meaning 
(…) of its discourse.’64 Here is the specificity of Lacanian psychoanalysis: structural 
linguistics becomes Lacanian structuralism on the basis of the ruptures of the Symbolic 
engendered by the Real. Rather than as “post-structuralist”, Bruce Fink describes such 
Lacanian theory as a ‘Gödelian structuralism’ that emphasises at every point the 
importance of structure while at the same time insisting upon a necessary lack therein.
65
 
The barred Other (A) designates this lack and thus signifies the distinctive aspect of 
Lacan’s thought and its reformulation of classic structuralism. 
This formulation of the Real in relation to the Symbolic informs Lacan’s work 
throughout; in ‘L’Étourdit’ Lacan suggests that his whole topological endeavour is 
founded upon this lack; it is ‘from a fault in the universe that it proceeds [c’est du défaut 
dans l’univers qu’il procède].’66 Pierre Skriabine takes this declaration to form the basis 
of an excellent discussion of the topology of the lack in the Other. Skriabine explicitly 
draws a connection between this topology and the matheme, stating that ‘Lacan writes 
this fault in the universe [(A)].’67 He suggests that it is language – as a symbolic 
structure – that ‘puts this “fault in the universe” into play,’ and that the function of the 
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lack, the hole, or the fault is strictly equivalent to language.
68
 He notes the structuring 
position of the lack in the Other and proposes that Lacan’s recourse to topology allows 
him to theorise a mode of organisation of the hole in figures such as the Möbius strip 
and the torus that similarly “put the hole in play”, which is to say that they are models 
formed around or founded upon a central lack or gap. Lacan’s formalisation through 
topology – which is derived from the logic of the barred Other – provides another 
means of approaching the impossibility indicated by the matheme (A), of attempting to 
understand the Real as the ‘fault in the universe of the signifier.’69 This signifies the 
shift from the big Other (A) to the barred Other (A) that informs the Lacanian 
understanding of noir in the remainder of this chapter. 
Vernet’s study of the historiography and ontology of noir, ‘Film Noir on the 
Edge of Doom’, again suggests a tacitly Lacanian dimension in his approach. This time 
pursuing a film-historical analysis of noir as a cinematic category – as opposed to his 
structural analysis of narrative explored above – Vernet endeavours to question the 
foundations of noir, to destabilise its very structure. His engagement with noir, it seems, 
proceeds also from a fault in the universe. His critique of the idea of film noir suggests a 
number of ways in which a Real as “point of failure” can be discerned in the 
construction and analysis of the critical category. He identifies in noir what Lacan 
describes as ‘the lack which is at the heart of the field of the Other.’70 Vernet begins 
with an ironic description of noir as an ‘object of beauty’ because it is defined by both 
form (black and white) and content (crime), because Bogart and Bacall are to be found 
there, because it demonstrates the cooperation of European filmmakers and American 
actors, and so on.
71
 It is an object of beauty, he suggests, provided it is not examined too 
closely; as such, Vernet is compelled to introduce a ‘slightly disquieting remark:’ the 
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discourse on noir has remained largely unanalysed, it appears as ‘cinephilic readymade’ 
handed down by film critics and seems ‘impossible to criticize.’72 Such “disquiet” 
points to the presence of a Real within the critical discourse on film noir. 
Already Vernet begins to question this critical structure, to deconstruct it. This, 
he suggests, is something that film critics appear to have been reluctant to do: ‘rare 
being those who venture to say that film noir has no clothes.’73 He identifies Paul 
Schrader, James Damico, Paul Kerr and Foster Hirsch as the figures who ‘have had 
courage to cry out in the desert that the classical list of criteria defining film noir is 
totally heterogeneous and without any foundation but a rhetorical one;’ a group to 
which Vernet thus adds himself.
74
 He characterises the standard work on noir as the 
repeated rehearsal of the same (un)critical gestures: a definition of noir based in Borde 
and Chaumeton and the contribution of a few more films to the category.
75
 The idea of 
noir remains, in each case, unchallenged; it merely becomes further diluted and 
obscured. Vernet’s article suggests, if not insists upon, an understanding in terms of the 
relation between the Symbolic and the Real and (A) with his almost explicitly Lacanian 
invocation; he states that, ‘[t]he cause of this situation seems to me to be a triple lack, 
historical, aesthetic and theoretical.’76 Vernet explains that the “historical lack” 
concerns the American production of the detective film and the appearance in France of 
the notion of film noir: this is the constructionist account of the formation of noir as a 
critical category given in Chapter 1. What is of more interest here are Vernet’s second 
and third points; an “aesthetic lack” that concerns the image of film noir, and a 
“theoretical lack” relating to the detective novel and the crime film. 
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The aesthetic lack which Vernet identifies concerns the “argument over 
expressionism” in film noir. He notes that, beyond the apparently strange coupling of 
America and Germany after the war, the idea that “German Expressionist” style was 
introduced to film noir by European émigrés does not stand up. He reflects upon the fact 
that many “noir” filmmakers in Hollywood were not themselves German or Austrian, 
and inversely, that many émigré filmmakers had no connection with expressionism.
77
 
To give an example (where Vernet does not), while still in Germany in 1930, three of 
the key noir directors – Wilder, Siodmak and Ulmer – collaborated on the proto-
neorealist Menschen am Sonntag (1930), a low budget exploration of the quotidian 
reality of “people on Sunday” in Berlin.78 This film is both manifestly not of the 
Expressionist tradition and very far removed from the dark, cynical and violent films 
noirs they would make in Hollywood. Vernet runs through several complicating factors 
for the expressionist argument, such as the markedly expressive echoes of Peter Lorre in 
Fritz Lang’s M (1931) in Edward G. Robinson’s performance in the final trial scene of 
Mervyn LeRoy’s Two Seconds (1932), but the crucial point in his destabilisation of the 
assumptions regarding a noir visual style is marked by a simple question: he asks, ‘[a]re 
these techniques [for example, chiaroscuro lighting], in 1955, 1945, or 1940, new to the 
American cinema?’79  
It is here that Vernet identifies his lack, the point of failure in the definition of 
noir as an American accommodation of émigré German Expressionism. ‘Absolutely 
not’ is Vernet’s answer; he points to the work of Cecil B De Mille and Alvin Wickoff, 
who – from 1915 onwards – developed systematically the experiments of DW Griffith 
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and GW Bitzer with restricted lighting in A Drun ard’s Reformation (1909).80 De Mille 
referred to this technique as ‘Rembrandt lighting’, suggesting an artistic foundation 
quite distinct from that of German Expressionism.
81
 Vernet thus proposes that the kind 
of high contrast visual style associated with film noir has been typical in Hollywood 
since at least 1915, and gives striking examples of eminently “noir” nocturnal scenes in 
The Big Gamble (1931) and The Penguin Pool Murder (1932).
82
 The effect of Vernet’s 
observations is indeed to reveal the lack at the very heart of the hegemonic definition of 
“noir as style” that originates with Schrader’s ‘Notes on Film Noir’ (about which Vernet 
himself is rather complimentary). Schrader identifies film noir as a style characterised 
by compositional tension, low level lighting, oblique lines and fatalistic heavy shadows, 
which he explicitly compares to ‘German expressionism,’ and explains that this style 
was the result of the ‘German influence:’ the integration into Hollywood of the émigré 
‘masters of chiaroscuro.’83 This basic historiographical and aesthetic assumption 
subtends the common understanding of film noir; as Naremore notes, ‘the standard 
histories say that it originated in America, emerging out of a synthesis of hard-boiled 
fiction and German expressionism.’84 Vernet’s study, however, suggests that no such 
easy assumptions can be made about the determination of noir’s perceived visual style. 
The hegemonic definition is thus found to be barred, lacking; it founders on the rock of 
the Real. 
Vernet’s third blow struck against the noir critical edifice is perhaps less 
decisive. His final lack concerns the “literary argument”. Here Vernet attempts to 
undermine the other pillar of the “standard history” identified by Naremore: the 
connection between noir and hard-boiled fiction. He claims that the ‘narrative and 
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emotional quality of the [film noir] story’ cannot be explained by reference to hard-
boiled detective fiction.
85
 He identifies a number of difficulties: for example, the ten 
year gap between the emergence of the detective novels and film noir, and the further 
gap between Dashiel Hammett and Raymond Chandler; and the numerous films ‘swept 
under the rug in order to attempt to maintain the artificial purity and isolation of film 
noir.’86 With regard to the first point, Sheri Biesen has argued persuasively for the role 
of the Production Code in delaying the transition of major works of hard-boiled fiction 
from page to screen. Challenging and morally ambivalent texts such as James M Cain’s 
The Postman Always Rings Twice and Double Indemnity were rejected by the Breen 
Office when the studios showed interest in adapting them in the 1930s. Biesen shows 
that it was not until the mid-1940s that censorship standards were sufficiently relaxed 
for the adaptation of Double Indemnity to go ahead.
87
 This was a watershed moment; 
following Double Indemnity, Cain’s other embargoed stories – The Postman Always 
Rings Twice and Mildred Pierce (1945) – were adapted in the following years.88 Both of 
these stories were set against the contemporaneous backdrop of the Depression but their 
scandalous content could not be allowed to be filmed for another ten years. In this case 
it appears to be Vernet’s argument that is found lacking. 
Furthermore, this has a bearing on Vernet’s second objection; while it is true that 
the delimitation of the noir category can at times appear arbitrary, it is also true that 
some of the potentially “noir” films that Vernet suggests are unreasonably excluded 
from the category are qualitatively different from those that are included. Vernet asks, 
‘[w]hy could not the first version of Chandler’s Farewell, My Lovely, (...) directed in 
1942 under the title The Falcon Takes Over [(1942)] by Irving Reis, be part of the 
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set?’89 The answer is that Reis’ film has far more in common with the campy farce of 
Satan Met a Lady (1936) – an early adaptation of The Maltese Falcon, but manifestly 
not considered a film noir – than it does with the cynicism and sadism of Dmytryk’s 
1944 version.
90
 The films admitted to the “set of noir” are those that were able, it seems, 
to subvert the Production Code in their depiction of sex and violence rather than erase it 
in deference to the pressures of censorship.
91
 Given this explanation, it seems that the 
second pillar of noir historiography in fact stands firmer than the first. 
However, the historiography of noir is permeable – even flawed – in other 
respects. Vernet comments upon the shadow cast by the Panorama over noir since 
1955. He suggests that it cannot be escaped as long as it remains the unquestioned 
foundation of the category.
92
 In a similar spirit to Vernet’s scepticism, Charles 
O’Brien’s study of the usage of the term “film noir” in France points to a significant 
failing in the standard accounts of the category: an omission that has remained 
unexamined despite the volume of noir criticism. As was briefly highlighted in the 
previous chapter, O’Brien’s study of the French film culture immediately preceding 
World War Two shows that the term did not originate in 1946 in response to a new 
tendency in Hollywood films; rather it was used as early as 1938 to describe the films 
now regarded as Poetic Realism. He contends that, ‘the term film noir had a substantial 
history in France prior to the postwar period,’ with the term appearing in film reviews 
written between January 1938 and September 1939.
93
 All of O’Brien’s examples 
emphasise the pejorative aspects of the term; “noir” has associations of immorality and 
scandal. For example, Quai des brumes is dubbed ‘[u]n film noir, un film immoral et 
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démoralisant [a dark film, an immoral and demoralising film].’94 He notes that this 
rhetoric of moral condemnation contrasts sharply with the post-war valorisation of film 
noir by critics such as Frank and Borde and Chaumeton. 
O’Brien points to a certain blind spot in the post-war French discourse; some of 
the very same critics that had contributed to the condemnation of the French noir 
tradition – Frank included – were now celebrating the American film noir. Most 
significantly, O’Brien’s study suggests the impact that this case of “forgetting” in post-
war culture had upon the subsequent historiography of noir. He notes that Borde and 
Chaumeton’s express aim was to investigate those works that critics had already 
designated as noir, which would seem to insist upon a study of Poetic Realism; 
however, as O’Brien states, ‘Borde and Chaumeton not only applied the term to the 
American cinema but argued that it does not apply to the French films of the 1930s.’95 
This meant the exclusion of Carné and Duvivier from the story of the American film 
noir and, crucially, a misunderstanding of the significance of Nino Frank and Jean-
Pierre Chartier’s use of the term in 1946. 
This is exemplified by Alain Silver and Elizabeth Ward’s introduction to Film 
Noir: An Encyclopedic Reference to the American Style, a key work in Anglophone 
criticism on noir. In a discussion of the antecedents and formation of film noir, they 
admit that it seems strange that a group of what they refer to as ‘indigenous American 
films’ was identified by a French term and explain that, ‘[t]his is simply because French 
critics were the first to discern particular aspects in a number of American productions 
initially released in France after World War Two.’96 Although there is nothing “simple” 
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about this fact, as was seen in the previous chapter, this is the well-rehearsed, standard 
historiographical account of noir encouraged by the Panorama and it leads to the 
familiar discussion of Frank and Chartier. Silver and Ward evoke the critical milieu in 
1946 with reference to Chartier’s piece as ‘a typical article (...) under the title: 
‘Americans are also making “noir” films’ [‘Les Américains aussi font des films 
“noirs”’].’97 What O’Brien’s work suggests here is a failure on the part of such 
historiography to interrogate the word “also/aussi” in Chartier’s title. Apropos of 
O’Brien, should this “aussi” be read as “as well as we the French”? Lack of knowledge 
regarding the French tradition before and after the war and its relation to American film 
noir leads to the commonly found observation – noted in the first chapter – that, ‘[t]he 
actual invention of the term “film noir” is attributed to cineaste Nino Frank.’98 This 
attribution is now found to be mistaken. The “aussi” functions then as a sort of signifier 
of the lack in the structure established by Silver and Ward; it signifies a point of failure 
in the conventional historiography.
99
 
O’Brien makes no such attribution, instead offering a number of examples of 
usage in 1938 which insist that the term “film noir” was not coined by Frank in 1946. 
The established historiography is thus found to be flawed and a new understanding of 
noir proceeds from this gap. However, O’Brien’s insights must also be qualified; 
Chartier does in fact refer to ‘talk of a French school of film noir’ but insists that Quai 
des brumes and Hôtel du Nord offer a ‘glimmer of resistance to the dark side’, whereas 
the American films are entirely without redemptive qualities.
100
 Chartier’s tone of moral 
condemnation thus resonates far more with avant guerre criticism, but his disapproval is 
directed towards the American films celebrated by his colleagues after the Liberation. 
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Here Vernet perhaps sheds light upon the matter; he identifies the paradoxical role of 
America in post-war France as both liberator and occupier and describes the French 
reaction to a perceived American cultural imperialism that would ‘replace red wine with 
whiskey, Marcel Proust with the dime detective novel, and ‘Les Temps des cerises’ with 
jazz.’101 He recounts the French Communist Party’s ferocious opposition to anything 
American, and moral outrage in the face of the ‘disturbed perversions’ of a film such as 
Gilda, which situate Chartier’s article in a cultural climate more complicated than Silver 
and Ward, or even O’Brien describe.102 Chartier’s “aussi” thus functions almost as a 
double point of failure; it is the rock upon which both accounts in some sense stumble. 
It signifies both a link to pre-war French filmmaking of which the conventional 
historiography of noir was unaware and the presence of a sentiment in post-war 
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3. The Lack in the Critical Other 
It thus becomes apparent that such critiques are, of course, themselves susceptible to 
critique and there is a danger here of disappearing along a hermeneutic spiral, but it 
should be remembered that this is Lacan’s key lesson: every structure is founded upon 
lack, the big Other is always barred. It is important therefore to understand all the 
implications of Lacan’s matheme (A) for the constitution of the critical category “film 
noir”, which includes an interrogation of Vernet’s first lack – the constructionist 
account of noir – and identification of the point(s) of failure within the very theoretical 
edifice put forward in the previous chapter. The question arises of what is missing from 
such an account. Emphasis on the role of France and French criticism leaves the 
American tradition under-appreciated: the conditions of production and reception of 
noir in America are a vital element in the understanding of the formation of noir. With 
recourse to the Graph, this suggests a shift in focus from the vector 
     
    (the retroactive 
critical discourse) to the vector 
     
    (the progressive unfolding of contingent historical 
conditions). This consideration is already contained in the bi-directionality of 
Nachträglichkeit described in Chapter 1 and points to the necessity of involving such a 
dimension in the critical understanding of the construction of noir.  
The historical, political, economic, social, technological, industrial determinants 
of American noir are well-documented.
104
 They present themselves as an array of 
contingent events and developments across the spectrum of American life: from the 
Depression and hardboiled fiction to World War Two’s innumerable effects on the 
economy and social structure and the Cold War’s reframing of American politics, all of 
which are considered to be crucial in the formation of the classic film noir of the 1940s 
and 1950s; new lenses and coatings, faster film stock and smaller, more mobile cameras 
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facilitated the high-contrast and extreme angles of noir cinematography; changes in the 
way studios sold and exhibited films led to an increase in low budget B movies, to 
which the production of cheap and simple urban crime films lent itself.
105
 The relative 
importance of each given factor has been and continues to be a subject of debate. For 
example, Richard Maltby is critical of any ‘Zeitgeist theory of film as cultural history’ 
that suggests a phenomenon such as film noir is the direct reflection or creation of a 
general American cultural condition: a theory proffered in its most explicit articulation 
by Kracauer.
106
 Thomas Elsaesser notes that the broad range of determinants identified 
in the historiography of noir is remarkable in that ‘never have so many causes explained 
so few effects.’107 An interesting way in which these conditions could be negotiated is 
suggested by the Althusserian orientation of Paul Kerr’s discussion of the emergence of 
the B film noir; he approaches the emergence of noir with a nuanced understanding of 
the ‘Hollywood superstructure model’ and its ‘relative autonomy from the economic 
base.’108 This suggests a broader understanding of the determination of film noir in 
terms of Althusser’s model of overdetermination and the complex interdependence of 
multiple, often seemingly opposing factors, determined “in the last instance” by the 
economic exigencies of the film industry.
109
 
What is perhaps most pertinent to the discussion of noir as a critical category is 
the treatment of “noir” films in the American cinematic discourse of the time. Naremore 
has suggested that the classic film noir was ‘a type of film for which Hollywood itself 
                                                 
105
 Indeed, on even slighter contingencies are entire careers founded: prominent noir actor Ida Lupino 
(High Sierra (1941), Road House (1948), On Dangerous Ground (1952)) had such an uneasy relationship 
with her studios that she felt compelled to move behind the camera in early 1950s. Her work with 
Edmond O’Brien on The Hitch-Hiker (1953) and The Bigamist (1953) made her the first female director 
of the classic noir period. 
106
 Maltby, ‘Politics’, p. 41. This chimes with Vernet’s criticism of the vast over-simplifications of 
Raymond Durgnat, who suggested,  ‘Late ‘40s Hollywood is blacker than ‘30s precisely because its 
audience, being more secure, no longer needed cheering up’ (‘Paint’, p. 37). Cf. Vernet, ‘FNED’, pp. 14 
& 29n30. 
107
 Elsaesser, WCA, p. 423. Elsaesser’s approach to noir will be explored in the next chapter. 
108
 Paul Kerr, ‘Out of What Past? Notes on the B film noir’, FNR, pp. 107-127 (p. 109). 
109
 See Althusser, ‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’, in For Marx, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: 
Verso, 2005), pp. 87-128. 
118 
 
had no name.’110 This is both true and untrue: the American cinematic discourse had no 
name, singular, for these films; rather, it had an overabundance of names. As was 
observed in Chapter 1, Lloyd Shearer offered a multitude of signifiers to describe noir 
films.
111
 This was matched by New York Times film reviewer Bosley Crowther, who 
provided similarly myriad descriptors for films such as Stranger on the Third Floor, a 
confused and pretentious ‘murder mystery;’ The Maltese Falcon, a ‘sophisticated crime 
film;’ Gilda, a ‘moody love story;’ and The Postman Always Rings Twice, ‘a sternly 
moral picture’ and a ‘crime and punishment saga.’112 One “name” does emerge in this 
account, however: that of “melodrama”. Crowther calls This Gun for Hire, ‘melodrama, 
straight and vicious;’ Double Indemnity and Murder, My Sweet, ‘tough melodrama;’ and 
The Killers, ‘mere movie melodrama.’113 This is not novel vocabulary of course; it 
situates such films within an already-existing discourse.
114
  
Siegfried Kracauer appears as the exception that proves the rule; as was noted in 
Chapter 1, in 1945 he did coin a new term – the “Hollywood terror film” – but it did not 
enter the contemporaneous critical discourse.
115
 Naremore suggests that (pace 
Kracauer), ‘[r]eviewers made vague connections but no-one tried to invent a new 
term.’116 However, recent noir scholarship has attempted to show that there was an 
original, domestic, unifying term for the classic film noir. In Blackout, Biesen makes the 
striking suggestion that the American discourse did have a name for these films: the 
‘red meat crime cycle.’117 Her argument is based on an article by Fred Stanley, a 
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journalist for the The New York Times, entitled ‘Hollywood Crime and Romance’ and 
published on 19 November 1944. It begins: 
HOLLYWOOD, according to present indications, will depend on so-called ‘red meat’ 
stories of illicit romance and crime for a major share of its immediate non-war dramatic 
productions: The apparent trend toward such material, previously shunned for fear of 
censorship, is traced by observers to Paramount’s successful treatment of the James M. 
Cain novel, ‘Double Indemnity’, which was described by some producers as ‘an 
emancipation for Hollywood writing’.118 
This is a fascinating discovery on Biesen’s part; it could suggest the need for a 
wholesale rethinking of the critical category of film noir. It is potentially more radical 
even than Vernet’s deconstruction of noir in that it seems to undo the damage done by 
the constructionist critique and restores to noir its status as the American art form 
described by Silver and Ward. It would seem to be a triumph for the integrity of the 
classic American film noir, and signify the ultimate point of failure of the meta-critical 
account of noir given in Chapter 1. This is, however, not the case. The evidence 
produced by Biesen to substantiate the claims that, ‘the American film industry and 
domestic press recognised these noir pictures as a growing movement before they were 
formally acclaimed in France in 1946,’ and that, ‘[b]y 1944 Hollywood studio publicity 
and critics in the United States had already identified these innovative films as a bold 
new trend’ is altogether unsatisfactory. Given the wealth of archive research evidently 
carried out by Biesen, it is surprising to find only four examples of this usage are cited 
and to realise that, on closer inspection, only two of these instances explicitly invoke the 
term, “red meat”. Beside Stanley’s piece, there is a 1945 review of Conflict (1945), 
which notes ‘no scarcity of red meat’ but beyond this, Biesen can summon only a letter 
from Joseph Breen that describes The Postman Always Rings Twice as ‘strong meat’ 
and a vague allusion to the Warner Bros. pressbook for Casablanca (1942).
119
 While the 
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1945 review from a Los Angeles newspaper does indicate usage of the term outside of 
Stanley’s original article, this is not the widespread and deep-running American critical 
tradition that Biesen evokes.
120
 Her argument is not simply based on the Stanley piece 
but appears almost limited to the Stanley piece. It is founded upon Stanley’s use of the 
term “so-called” and his journalistic references to “observers”. This language does 
indicate usage of the phrase “red meat” beyond the article in some way, but no more can 
be said than this. These two words cannot support such a grand claim about the 
American critical discourse. Biesen’s study cannot be understood to constitute a fault in 
the noir universe in the way that Vernet’s does; it is itself found to be lacking. 
Could Hollywood itself provide the sort of foundations – that would, 
paradoxically, unfound some major assumptions about noir – sought by Biesen? A 
series of interviews conducted by the prominent American noir critics (Silver, Porfirio, 
Ursini) with significant filmmakers associated with the classic period in fact reveal an 
almost uniform unease on the part of these filmmakers when faced with the signifier 
“noir”. Fritz Lang admitted his own lack of understanding of the term; he stated of his 
anti-Nazi thriller, Man Hunt (1941), ‘I don’t know if this is what you would call film 
noir. There are some scenes at night in the fog that are much like the way that [Robert] 
Siodmak liked to shoot. But for me that was just the setting.’121 Samuel Fuller professed 
that, ‘[w]hen I was making these damned pictures, I never knew about film noir.’122 
When the potential noir-ness of his films was put to Billy Wilder, he insisted that, ‘I 
would hope that all my pictures are different. To repeat oneself is boring (...). We didn’t 
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set out to make a particular style of film.’123 He also sought to confound the category, 
suggesting that ‘Caligari was a film noir, as you would call it. But certainly I would 
also think Oedipus is a play noir, right?’124 The composer Miklós Rózsa was equally 
doubtful; he replied, ‘I’ll take your word for that. But what exactly do you mean by the 
term film noir?’ to Robert Porfirio’s suggestion that he had ‘written far more film noir 
scores than any other composer.’125 Edward Dmytryk was particularly hostile towards 
the critical categorisation of his work; he said, ‘[o]f course, the French have a great 
penchant for this kind of categorizing, for putting names which are so ridiculous (...) 
I’ve had the damndest things attributed to me,’ and continued, ‘I really violently object 
to that (...) I have a particular hatred for creating new vocabularies.’126 It thus becomes 
clear that the key figures in the creation of noir had little or no understanding of the 
critical category until it was put to them some thirty years after the fact. This is 




 There was, however, one filmmaker who appeared comfortable with this French 
appellation; Robert Aldrich, it seems, was in possession of the Panorama in the mid 
1950s. Alain Silver has published a photograph of the director with the question, ‘[w]hy 
did Robert Aldrich (...) pose with a copy of the first edition [of] Borde and Chaumeton’s 
book (in which he is not even mentioned) as he stood on the set of Attack! in 1956?’128 
Naremore wonders too what kind of signal the director was trying to send: ‘Perhaps 
Aldrich was trying to tell us something about his work – or perhaps he was merely 
acknowledging the fact that Borde and Chaumeton greatly admired his previous picture, 
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Kiss Me Deadly.’129 However, this cannot be the case: Aldrich was holding a copy of 
the original French edition of the Panorama, which, spanning the years 1941 to 1953 
contains no reference to his 1955 film. It was only in the 1979 Postface that Borde and 
Chaumeton designate Kiss Me Deadly as the ‘fascinating and sombre conclusion’ to the 
noir cycle.
130
 This is then an instance of a Lacanian missed encounter: it is impossible to 
be sure of Aldrich’s intentions in posing for the photo. What can be discerned is the 
effect of this photograph in the structure of critical discourse; it provides another fault 
line, another point of failure in the overarching noir critical narrative. Despite the 
manifest absence of this signifier in the American discourse concerning these films of 
the 1940s and 1950s, there was awareness of the French tradition at least somewhere; 
this raises a larger question of self-reflexivity in Hollywood with relation to the films 
associated with the category of noir. 
One significant point of American noir self-reflexivity is imitation; as Borde and 
Chaumeton note, ‘film noir wouldn’t form a series worthy of the name if it hadn’t given 
rise, in Hollywood itself, to various parodies.’131 A particularly interesting example of 
this self-reflexivity is Bob Hope’s hardboiled crime spoof, My Favorite Brunette 
(1947).
132
 Modelled after Hope’s earlier Hitchcock parody, My Favorite Blonde (1942), 
this film blends “noir” features with the studio-based comedy and showed, as Bosley 
Crowther in The New York Times noted, ‘Paramount knows a good thing when it sees 
one, especially when it earns a pile of bucks.’133 By the summer of 1946 – when Hope 
shot this film – the dark cinema of Wilder, Dmytryk and company had reached a 
sufficient level of popularity and uniformity to suggest the viability of such an 
imitation. Silver and Ward observe, ‘[t]here is very little to laugh at in noir films. As a 
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result the cycle invites parodies,’ and My Favorite Brunette takes up this invitation 
enthusiastically.
134
 The film is narrated as a first person flashback “confessional” from 
death row at San Quentin prison, and the story initiated by an exotic woman entering a 
private detective’s office. The script is filled with mock hardboiled dialogue and 
contains a throwaway reference to The Lost Weekend. It features Peter Lorre as Kismet, 
a parody of his villainous screen persona, and mixes a few low-key lit scenes of intrigue 
and suspense with the standard Hope comedy high-key visual style. A review in Variety 
recognised these now apparently stock figures, noting ‘[o]ne long flashback is the 
device employed’ and identifying ‘that familiar lawbreaker, Peter Lorre;’ the piece 
concludes, ‘it’s familiar stuff but still grist for the yock mills.’135 The most strikingly 
self-referential instance is an early scene in which Hope’s character enters the private 
eye’s office next door to his studio, musing that, ‘All my life I wanted to be a 
hardboiled detective like Humphrey Bogart or Dick Powell, or even Alan Ladd...’. It is 
interesting to note that Hope makes use of the literary term – “hardboiled” – while 
making a specifically cinematic joke with Alan Ladd himself making a self-parodic 
cameo appearance. This suggests that such a “cinematic joke” could be made in its own 
terms, based upon the Hollywood star system – indeed, Bing Crosby also makes an 
ironic cameo – but to make a joke based on the nature of film noir, Hope (or his 
screenwriters Jack Rose and Edmund Beloin) had to reach for a discourse beyond the 
cinematic context.  
What then is the consequence of such a film, which appears to reflect the “noir” 
tradition in Hollywood before it was formalised as such? To shed some light upon this 
question, it is necessary to turn to Miller’s ‘Action of the Structure’. Speaking of the 
relation between the subject and structure, Miller suggests that ‘the presence of an 
element that turns back on reality and perceives it, reflects it and signifies it’ leads to a 
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general distortion of the whole structural economy.
136
 The result of this distorting 
presence is – amongst other things – the production of an absence; the ‘action of the 
structure comes to be supported by a lack.’137 Is there not a similar effect here? My 
Favorite Brunette stands as a self-reflexive point in the cinematic structure of 
Hollywood; it turns back on the “hardboiled crime film” and perceives, reflects, 
signifies it. It could be considered a filmic attempt to define noir – to engage with the 
wider cinematic discourse through the process of filmmaking itself – if not avant la 
lettre, then concomitant with it; the film was shot during that summer of 1946 when 
“noir” was being discovered in Paris. This attempt at definition, to articulate a position 
in the symbolic structure of Hollywood from within this structure, entails a lack. The 
film is situated by a signifier from another discourse – “hardboiled” – but there is no 
metalinguistic point outside of discourse as such that could itself situate these 
structures; the locus of the Other is thus found lacking.
138
 A “noir” parody is therefore 
an attempt to symbolise “noir”; it is an act of cinematic criticism in and of itself. 
Naremore concurs on this point; he suggests that, ‘much like analytic criticism, parody 
helps to define and even create certain styles, giving them visibility and status.’139 
Parody transforms “noir” into an idea that can circulate in the cinematic discourse; thus, 
both parody and criticism give shape to the popular conception of film noir. 
This popular conception, however, is so utterly fraught with contradiction, pock-
marked and fissured to the point of disintegration by critiques such as Vernet’s that it is 
tempting to despair, and conclude with Silver that Vernet ‘offers a void, a noir hole 
where there once was a body of films.’140 It seems necessary to admit that the game is 
up; sixty years of film criticism have been in vain because, film noir doesn’t exist. There 
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are, however, possibilities suggested by a Lacanian understanding of the debate between 
Silver and Vernet that point to a way of moving forward with the understanding of film 
noir: firstly in Silver’s reference to the void and a properly psychoanalytical 
engagement with the statement, “film noir doesn’t exist”, and secondly in Vernet’s 
reference to the “set” of noir and the possibility of adding one film more to this set, 
which would seem to correspond to Miller’s suggestion of ‘the possibility of one 
signifier more.’141 
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4. Approaching the Real (Encore) 
To continue with this investigation of noir, it will be necessary to observe a crucial 
distinction in the Lacanian theory of the Real highlighted by Charles Shepherdson in 
Lacan and the Limits of Language: it is possible to distinguish ‘two versions of the 
real,’ a pre-symbolic Real and a post-symbolic Real.142 As Shepherdson notes, the Real 
is a difficult concept that appears in several guises throughout the development of 
Lacan’s thought. Indeed, this is – if such a statement is not too precarious – the very 
essence of the Real; it is that which is impossible to symbolise, and so, to approach it 
through language, many approaches must be taken (trauma, failure, impossibility, the 
matheme, lalangue) in an attempt to sketch out the space where the Real would be 
found. 
The pre-symbolic Real appears as a primordial reality: the realm of existence 
that precedes the intervention of the signifier. It is the Real “out-there” which is lost 
with the advent of the Symbolic order; recall Lacan’s Kojèvean-inspired declaration that 
‘the symbol firsts manifests itself as the killing of the thing.’143 The intervention of the 
Symbolic bars access for the subject to this unmediated Real, which exists as a brute 
materiality prior to the signifier; again, recall from Chapter 1 the “letter” which 
precedes the signifier as a substratum that is ‘always and in every case in its place.’144 It 
is a sort of being-in-itself that can only reach consciousness through the mediations of 
representation. It is then absent because it is inaccessible. As this always-already 
“missed encounter”, this pre-symbolic Real evokes also the traumatic intrusion of tuché 
as something from the outside; an unsymbolisable and disruptive element entering the 
Symbolic. Such a formulation of a pre-symbolic Real invites a conceptualisation of the 
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relation between the Symbolic and the Real in terms of Euclidean space, as realms that 
could be mapped by simplistic notions of, for example, inside and outside. Indeed, 
Lacan’s designation of tuché as a real ‘beyond automaton, the insistence of the signs’ is, 
as Roberto Harari notes, a ‘risky statement’ because it invites a conception of the Real 
in terms of Kant’s Ding an Sich: the noumenal, inapprehensible thing behind all 
phenomena.
145
 This would then fall back into traditional questions regarding the reality 
outside the Symbolic, of the possibility of achieving a “full” existence beyond the 
limitations of the signifier. As Shepherdson acknowledges, there is some textual basis 
for this characterisation of the Real in Lacan’s work, particularly in the earlier stages; 
however, Shepherdson concludes that, conceptually, this first formulation must be 
rejected as inadequate to the task of approaching the Real, and demonstrates how the 
second formulation – the post-symbolic Real – presents a more nuanced rendering of 
the problematic of the Real.
146
  
To present an example from the realm of noir criticism, Dale Ewing’s article 
‘Film Noir: Style and Content’ gives voice to this pre-symbolic Real in its approach to 
the ontology of film noir. Ewing contends that, ‘the term film noir has been applied too 
loosely to give us an accurate definition of the subject,’ which he attempts to prove 
through a meta-critique of the literature on film noir.
147
 So far so good, it may seem; 
Ewing appears as another brave soul who deserves admission to Vernet’s pantheon of 
critics who dare to say that “film noir has no clothes”. However, Ewing continues, and 
it is here that the situation changes. He states, 
a particular film cannot be defined as film noir because it reflects one aspect or several 
aspects of the film noir spirit; it has to reflect every aspect of the film noir spirit or it is 
something other than noir.
 148
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To comply with Ewing’s declaration would mean that there would be no films noirs 
whatsoever. Any given definition of film noir would exclude, in some respect, those 
films most commonly heralded as the very quintessence of the category: Double 
Indemnity has no private detective; Gilda ends with the elimination of the villain and 
the union of the hero with the femme fatale; The Big Sleep has a studio look; in The 
Maltese Falcon Spade is as sentimental as he is tough. Again, this might appear to 
chime with the deconstruction of the category of noir and the limitations of the function 
of definition explored below, but it is Ewing’s assertion that ‘a film noir cannot be 
defined adequately until the movie in question is evaluated as a complete work,’ that 
this “film noir spirit” can be captured, which indicates a reliance on the pre-symbolic.149 
It is as if Ewing believes that, with enough labour, the Symbolic could adequately 
render the Real; if he can meta-critique a sufficient number of texts on noir and view 
enough noir films he can go beyond the limitations of the signifier and apprehend a sort 
of film-noir-in-itself. Ewing strives for an essentialist definition of noir that relies on 
what could be considered, in Lacanian terms, a psychotic totality.
150
 This is not to 
diagnose Ewing himself; rather it points to the structure at work in his article and the 
approach to film noir that it suggests. If the clinical structure of neurosis is characterised 
by gaps, faults, the very lack in the Other (the topology of the cross-cap, for example), 
then psychosis – in particular, paranoia – involves a full and complete Other in which 
nothing is lacking and everything is explained (the topology of a sphere). There is a 
‘lack of a lack:’ the pure plenitude of the Real.151 Ewing’s article seems to express the 
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structure of a delusion of absolute mastery; it aims to constitute film noir as a totality in 
which every aspect of the film noir spirit is reflected.
152
  
Furthermore, there is, in Ewing’s insistence that the Symbolic could capture the 
Real, what Žižek describes as a confusion of the ‘order of “words” and the order of 
“things”, which, precisely, is the most elementary and succinct definition of 
psychosis.’153 Like Lacan’s madman – the king that believes he truly is a king, that his 
symbolic mandate is indexed to his being – Ewing’s text expresses a belief that the 
“adequate definition” of noir would capture noir itself; it would correlate to noir’s very 
being. Ewing’s simple assertion that ‘film noir means “black film”’ suggests that the act 
of rendering the term into English is sufficient to explain the phenomenon; this 
forecloses what Žižek calls ‘the radical contingency of naming.’154 He suggests that 
such instances of naming take the form of a tautology: ‘a name refers to an object 
because this object is called that – this impersonal form (“it is called”) announces the 
dimension of the “big Other”.’155 The signifier must therefore sustain itself. As Lacan 
notes, in the locus of the Other ‘[n]o authoritative statement has any other guarantee 
here than its very enunciation, since it would be pointless for the statement to seek it in 
another signifier, which could in no way appear outside that locus.’156 In other words, 
there is no metalanguage, no Other of the Other; the signifier must act as its own 
guarantee. It is the naming itself that constitutes its reference retroactively. It is only the 
signifier “film noir” that supports the identity of the object “film noir”. Any French-to-
English dictionary will show that “film noir means black film” but it will explain 
nothing of the films themselves. Tracing the signifier back to its origin will reveal only 
the contingent emergence of the name “film noir” itself; the retroactive naming, the 
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constituting gesture made in 1946. To emphasise the utter contingency of the signifier 
involved, the case of Italian film noir should be considered: as Mary P Wood explains, 
the films of the Italian cinema that would correspond to those designated as “noir” in 
Hollywood are referred to as “giallo” or “yellow” films because the Italian publisher 
Mondadori printed its detective fiction in books with yellow covers.
157
 These films are 
no less dark but they are “giallo” rather than “noir”; a different historical constellation 
resulted in a different signifier. 
Ewing’s insistence on definition pushes it to its breaking point, and perhaps 
suggests an inherent limit or fault in the Symbolic that points towards the second 
conception of Lacan’s Real: the post-symbolic. At first, Lacan’s discussion of das Ding 
in Seminar VII would appear to be the most explicit formulation of this pre-symbolic, 
pre-discursive noumenal beyond; it is the prehistorical and unknowable absolute Other 
that ‘was there from the beginning.’158 However, Lacan suggests that this primordial 
field of das Ding is a ‘void at the centre of the real,’ an ‘excluded interior.’159 It is not 
simply “out there”, it is somehow “in here”, present as a gap. As suggested above, the 
relation between the Real and the Symbolic cannot then be conceptualised in terms of a 
straightforward inside and outside; instead a topological relation is required. What 
Lacan describes as ‘the central place, as the intimate exteriority or “extimacy,” that is 
the Thing’ can be expressed by the topology of the torus: a form constructed around a 
central void, whose “inside is outside” because its centre of gravity falls outside its mass 
yet is within this structuring interior absence.
160
 This “extimate” relation between the 
Symbolic and the Real expresses a void within the structure; the Real should not be 
considered an external entity but rather excluded from within. It appears as an internal 
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point of failure or an inherent limit. This recalls the crucial qualification of trauma as 
Nachträglichkeit; it is not simply the sudden intrusion that disrupts the Symbolic but the 
retroactive movement of the signifier that determines this intrusion as such as traumatic. 
The Real thus appears as an effect of the Symbolic. This presents a paradox whereby, as 
Žižek, observes, ‘the Real as external, excluded from the Symbolic, is in fact a symbolic 
determination — what eludes symbolization is precisely the Real as the inherent point 
of failure of symbolization.’161 Indeed, any conception of the pre-symbolic Real can 
only be a post-symbolic determination; it is a left-over, the caput mortuum of the 
Symbolic.
162
 Recalling once again the coin toss game, it is an impossibility generated by 
the signifier.  
Thus, the Real qua post-symbolic is an internal limit rather than an external 
boundary (which would be a pre-symbolic Real). It is therefore possible to situate the 
version of the Real qua point of failure presented earlier in the chapter: the Other was 
deemed to be lacking in part because it stumbled over some external obstacle – the rock 
of the Real – that caused it to fail. This is what Žižek calls ‘the anamorphic view of the 
Real;’ the impossible is distorted so that it appears as a form of boundary.163 Lacan is 
precise, however, in his formulation: ‘the real is the impossible. Not in the name of a 
simple obstacle we hit our heads up against, but in the name of the logical obstacle of 
what, in the symbolic, declares itself to be impossible. This is where the real emerges 
from.’164 The Real manifests itself as an internal, logical limit. The impossible-Real is 
thus not the opposite of the possible, instead the post-symbolic effect is such that the 
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“impossible happens”; as Lacan notes, ‘[t]he real is distinguished (...) by the fact that its 
economy (...) admits something new, which is precisely the impossible.’165 
To this end, the lack in the Other must be reconsidered: it can be calculated 
logically from what is known about the signifier. As Skriabine observes, ‘[t]he fault in 
the universe, in the universe of the signifier (...) is based on this: that the signifier is 
only defined by difference.’166 The signifier is nothing but a differential element; it is 
defined only by its difference from other signifiers, and it therefore ‘is in the nature of 
each and every signifier not to be able in any case to signify itself.’167 The Symbolic 
order is thus made up of a collection of non-self-identical elements and Lacan insists 
that, ‘insofar as the battery of signifiers is it is complete,’ which is to say that these 
signifiers constitute a set.
168
 However, the question arises as to whether this set of non-
self-identical signifiers can form a totality and this leads to a logical problem, Lacan 
suggests, comparable to Russell’s paradox, or ‘the set of all elements which are not 
members of themselves, X ∉ X.’169 Signifiers qua non-self-identical can be compared to 
sets that are “not members of themselves” and the big Other is thus the set of all such 
elements. The big Other, (A), itself is then a paradox because ‘[e]ither it contains itself 
or it fails in its definition, or it does not contain itself and in that case it fails in its 
task.’170 This is why Lacan writes it as barred, (A). The S(A) – the signifier of the 
barred Other – could then be considered in an extimate relation to the big Other; it is 
contained as an interior exclusion and ‘can be symbolized by the inherence of a (-1) in 
the set of signifiers.’171 This suggests to Lacan ‘the fact that language could not 
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constitute a closed set [un ensemble fermé],’ which he restates in typically aphoristic 
fashion as, ‘there is no universe of discourse.’172 
In this sense, each attempt to totalise the set of signifiers would engender 
another signifier, an (A1) to signify the set that contains (A), an (A2) to signify the set 
containing (A1) ad infinitum. The “logic of the signifier” thus points to its inherent limit: 
the lack in the Other, which means the eternal possibility of adding another signifier. 
Lacan comes to formalise this deadlock of the Real ultimately in the logic of 
sexuation.
173
 It has already been established that this project will not be a Lacanian 
exploration of sexual difference in film noir, and so this recourse to Lacan’s theory of 
sexuation might seem out of place. However, as Russell Grigg argues, the theory of 
sexuation presents logical categories which therefore ‘have no intrinsic link to the field 
of sexuality but are independent of it.’174 In fact, Lacan himself points to such a 
possibility when he states that, ‘[t]he sexed being of these [not-all] women does not 
involve the body but what results from a logical exigency in speech;’ sexuation does not 
entail biological differences but structural categories.
175
  
Lacan’s structures of sexuation are ‘two ways to make the sexual relationship 
fail;’ a masculine way and a feminine way; “masculine” and “feminine” structures are 
thus two modalities of failure.
176
 In the terms of Encore they are two responses to the 
impossibility of the sexual relationship; however, in logical terms, these formulae can 
be read as two responses to Russell’s paradox in the Symbolic order – the impossibility 
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of forming a totality from the big Other – that correspond to two types of sets. “Man” 
and “woman” are then but the names of these sets. In brief, the logical formulae for 
“man” render the paradox of the big Other in terms of incompleteness; it makes an “all” 
of the set of signifiers (    ) predicated on an “exception that proves the rule” 
(        ). The masculine structure does make a universe of discourse but only on the 
basis of an excluded signifier; the (-1) inherent to the set becomes a marker of its 
incompleteness – which no subsequent signifier can fill – but allows the set to function 
as if it were closed.
177
 Masculine sexuation thus suggests a “closed ontology” of noir 
that will be explored in the next chapter. The approach to noir here requires instead 
feminine sexuation and the set of “woman”. 
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5. The Set of “Woman” 
In order to take further Vernet’s approach to noir, it will therefore be necessary to 
approach Lacan’s theory of feminine structure.178 Lacan characterises the set of 
“woman” with the formula ‘     , a never before seen function in which negation is 
placed on the quantifier, which should be read as “not-whole” [pas-tout].’179 A first 
point must be made here regarding this “pas-tout”; this concept must be read very 
carefully and understood in very specific terms. Both Russell Grigg and Bruce Fink 
comment upon the difficulty of rendering “pas-tout” in English. Grigg prefers to leave it 
untranslated so as to preserve to polysemy of the French term.
180
 This is often best 
practice in relation to Lacanian terminology; the French terms – like mathemes – retain 
a specific theoretical designation in the context of Lacanian psychoanalysis. While he is 
perhaps the foremost translator and theorist of Lacan in the Anglophone tradition, 
Fink’s solution is much less satisfactory; his translation of “pas-tout” into the English 
“not-whole” has profound theoretical implications. In a footnote to Encore he explains, 
‘[p]as toute, and pas-tout (...), can, in certain instances, be rendered as “not all,” but 
Lacan is not—in my view—primarily concerned here with quantity (all or some).’181 
However, a reading of Lacan’s Seminar suggests that this pas-tout cannot be reduced to 
“not-whole”; indeed, not-whole would seem equally to indicate a quantification and a 
question of incompleteness not compatible with Lacan’s formulation.182 The “pas-tout” 
is not involved in a dialectic of all and some, or even part and whole, but quite literally 
as all and not-all. It is perhaps useful to consider this in terms of Žižek’s discussion of 
the Kantian distinction between the negative and the indefinite judgement: a given 
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proposition – for example, “The soul is mortal” – can be modified in two ways. In the 
first case – the negative judgement – it can be negated: “The soul is not mortal”. The 
predicate “mortal” is denied by the modifier “not”.  In the second case – the indefinite 
judgement – as Žižek describes: ‘instead of negating a predicate (i.e., the copula which 
ascribes it to the subject), we affirm a certain non-predicate – “The soul is 
notmortal”.’183 Similarly then, the “not-all” should be considered the affirmation of a 
non-predicate; it is not a negative judgement regarding the all or even the whole but the 
insistence of a quality (rather than a quantity; the quantifier is negated) that is called 
not-all. 
To return then to the formulae of sexuation, it should be remembered that the 
masculine set of all is so considered because it is defined by a limit that contains it. The 
universe of man is possible only on the condition that something be excepted from it; 
however, the same is not true for woman. Lacan suggests that there is no exception, no 
limit point or boundary to the feminine set that would constitute it as a universe. He 
explains that on the basis of      , glossed as ‘not-every (pas-tout)   is inscribed in 
  ,’ it could be deduced that there must be some   that contradicts   .184 This would 
suggest an equivalence between       and         . However, this is not the case 
because the set is modified by a different existential proposition,          , that insists 
there is no   that contradicts   . This is because the set of woman as not-all involves 
the infinite.  Lacan explains that ‘as soon as you are dealing with an infinite set, you 
cannot posit that the [not-all] implies the existence of something that is produced on the 
basis of negation.’185 As a result, feminine structure is conceptualised in relation to a set 
that does not exist on the basis of constitutive exception. It is because ‘there is no figure 
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who founds a group of women: no woman [who] constitutes an exception to the rule’ – 
no “primal mother” to partner the primal father for whom the Exception stands in 
relation to the universal set of man – that the set of woman cannot be considered in 
terms of the universal.
186
 The universe of the masculine closed set of all can be 
considered in terms of the limiting function of signification; the point where signifier 
meets signified and meaning is produced. Conversely, the feminine open set of not-all is 
equivalent to the potentially infinite chain of signifiers, which is not determined by a 
limit and does not – in itself, without the introduction of an exception (recall the -1 of 
the set) – constitute a universe.  
Furthermore,       should not be understood to suggest that because woman is 
“not all in the phallic function” that there is some part of the feminine subject that 
escapes the phallus. This is the fatal misreading that gives rise to the absolute 
mystification of woman as Other.
187
 Rather       is to be considered in terms of the 
set, not a single subject; because there is no exception to the function    (         , there 
is no   not subject to the phallic function), woman as a set of not-all is subject to the 
function without exception. Woman as qualitatively, rather than quantitatively, pas-tout 
is subject to the function   : this is how       should be read. Woman relates to the 
big Other as a set of not-all (and not not-whole); she discerns the lack in the Other, that 
which renders it barred and renders her barred. The not-all thus correlates directly to (A) 
as the matheme for Lacan’s statement, “there is no Other of the Other”; there is no 
exception, no transcendental point of guarantee. The set of woman is then, in Lacanian 
terms, an open set; or to put it another way, woman, in relation to the Symbolic order, is 
constituted as an open set. 
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Lacan defines open sets as ‘sets that exclude their own limits.’188 It is obligatory 
at this point to note that this has been the source of much debate; in their critique of 
Lacan, Sokal and Bricmont insist that this is ‘an incorrect definition of open set’ and go 
on to suggest that such instances are indicative of wider abuse of mathematical and 
scientific terms and concepts in Lacanian psychoanalysis.
189
 While it is true that 
Lacan’s terms do not correspond directly to the mathematical terms of set theory, what 
Lacan is establishing here is a Lacanian theory of sets. Lacan borrows mathematical 
terminology to construct a complex yet precise theory of the relation between the 
Symbolic and the Real, impossibility and sexuation.
190
 It is not so much the relation 
between psychoanalysis and set theory as such that is of interest here, it is rather the 
work to which Lacan puts such terms in the theoretical elaboration of psychoanalysis 
itself. And it is here worth noting a possible point of contradiction; a set that “excludes 
its own limit” is in fact Lacan’s definition of the set of all. This set is constituted by an 
element that is not contained within it; the exception is a limit point external to the set 
that confers upon it its closure. It is in fact the lack of a limit – understood as boundary 
rather than internal limit (it is in fact the inherent limit of the big Other, (A), that makes 
it not-all) – that characterizes the set of woman as open, that makes woman not-all. 
Lacan’s description of a set that “excludes its own limit” is then in the sense that it is 
not delimited or defined; it is in the realm of the potentially infinite and cannot be 
saturated. Recall Lacan’s insistence that an “infinite set” cannot be based on negation. 
To reiterate, there is no exception to the open set of woman:          . The set is open 
because it is not limited by some transcendental Other – some One – that would be 
        . 
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It is for this reason that Lacan suggests, ‘woman does not exist, woman is [not 
all] (pas toute).’191 Again, the French is more instructive here than the English: Lacan 
states that “La femme n’existe pas”. Fink notes that the emphasis should be on the 
definite article “La”, to indicate ‘that Woman with a capital W, Woman as singular in 
essence, does not exist; Woman as an all-encompassing idea (a Platonic form) is an 
illusion. There is a multiplicity of women, but no essence of “Womanhood” or 
“Womanliness”.’192 Lacan is explicit in this regard; reflecting upon the formulae for 
feminine sexuation, he asks, What do they define? Answer: 
Woman precisely, except that Woman can only be written with a bar through it. There’s 
no such thing as Woman, Woman with a capital W indicating the universal. There’s no 
such thing as Woman because (...) she is [not-all].
193
 
Fink notes that he was compelled to modify the text in this instance to convey, in 
English, Lacan’s insistence upon the definite article “La” as indicator of universality; 
Lacan writes a bar through it – L – to indicate this non-universalisability.194 The open 
set will not allow for any such universality because it is not determined an exception 
(that proves the rule). Lacan suggests that as soon as the set of woman is determined as 
not-all ‘it is improper to call her Woman (La femme), because (...) the W cannot be 
written. There is only barred Woman here.’195 This is not a radically anti-feminist 
gesture; rather it is a question of definition. “La femme n’existe pas” or “Woman does 
not exist” does not mean that women do not exist; it means that there is no generalisable 
category or signifier within the Symbolic order capable of defining the set of woman.
196
 
As Joan Copjec suggests, the collectability of women is not ‘imperilled by the external 
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collision of definitions’ but by the lack in the very function of definition as such.197 The 
open set is a plurality that cannot be generalised, universalised, or defined because the 
Symbolic order is itself not-all; there is no signifier that could render it whole. Instead 
of the One, this set must then be taken one by one: Lacan invokes the myth of Don Juan 
to suggest that even if ‘there are mille e tre of them, it’s clear that one can take them one 
by one – that is what is essential. That is entirely different from the One of universal 
fusion.’198 The members of the open set are thus individual and particular, without 
totality or essence: women rather than Woman. They do not participate in a general 
category; their category is not-all, a potentially infinite series in an open set. The field 
cannot be universalised because there is no exception (         ).199 
Before returning to the question of noir, it will be necessary briefly to consider 
the implications of the open set for the Lacanian theory of language. As suggested 
above, the characterisation of the set of woman as not-all puts it into a relation, if not a 
direct correlation, with the lack in the Other; as Lacan notes, ‘[w]oman has a relation 
with S(A), and it is already in that respect that (...) she is [not-all].’200 This relation to 
the fault in the symbolic universe is indicated in the lower portion of the table where the 
non-universalisable L is shown to be connected to the signifier of the lack in the 
Other, S(A). This suggests a relation to the Symbolic order as lacking, a correlation 
between the not-all open set and the not-all chain of signifiers. What emerges from such 
a relation is Lacan’s notion of lalangue; indeed, as he suggests in Le Séminaire XXIII, 
‘it is the set of women which generated what I called lalangue.’201 The lower portion of 
the table relates, in Lacanian terms, to the type(s) of jouissance associated with the 
structuration identified in the upper portion of the graph; feminine jouissance is thus 
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related to the barred Other. Indeed, lalangue can be formulated as the point at which the 
signifier and jouissance – heretofore mutually exclusive: ‘jouissance is prohibited to 
whoever speaks’ – are brought together.202 As Jean-Claude Milner suggests, ‘[lalangue] 
enjoys.’203 However, to continue the exploration here of sexuation in logical and 
structural terms, lalangue can be considered in terms of the impossible relation between 
the Symbolic and the Real, even as a formulation of a Real-in-the-Symbolic. The 
apparently external opposition between jouissance (qua Real) and the signifier (qua 
Symbolic) becomes, as Mladen Dolar observes, ‘the internal split of language as 
such.’204 The Real is “integrated” into the Symbolic ‘in such a way that their divergence 
is what drives lalangue.’205 
 This Lacanian term “lalangue” – formed by the contraction of the French 
“langue” (language, in Saussure’s sense of “language system”) with its definite article 
“la” – is a conceptualisation of language as open, faulty, lacking. Lacan suggests that, 
‘[o]ur recourse in llanguage (lalangue), is to that which shatters it (le brise).’206 It is the 
impossible complex of language effects; the erratic, polysemous and equivocal effects 
of the signifier. The term itself is formed at the acoustic level where homophony gives 
rise to these ambiguities – “la langue” is acoustically indistinguishable from 
“lalangue”. Fink suggests that it is ‘the level at which language may “stutter”.’207 
Langue derives from the Latin lingua or tongue; here, the tongue trips over the double 
phoneme “la-la”, which Fink attempts to render into English with the neologism 
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“llanguage”. Lalangue works at the level of wordplay and homonymy.208 Indeed, 
Lacan’s own later work is ever more densely populated with neologisms and puns, such 
as lalangue. Dolar notes that it is ‘the concept of what in languages makes puns 
possible, and the very word lalangue is the first specimen of its kind.’209 To recall the 
“purloined letters” from Chapter 1, lalangue is found in the play of the phoneme “rat” 
across Ratten, Raten, Spielratte, heiraten and the ambiguity of the “glance/shine on the 
nose”. Puns and neologisms in psychoanalysis suggest new understanding and more 
nuanced theoretical constructions. 
 Lacan’s lalangue refers to non-communicative aspects of language; it ‘serves 
purposes that are altogether different from that of communication.’210 The broken and 
equivocal language of lalangue refuses the transmission of meaning; it refuses to make 
sense because it is radically open. It is the failure of language itself, the very expression 
of the lack in the Other; there is no metalanguage that could render it complete. Lacan 
insists that, ‘[w]hat I put forward, by writing lalangue as one word, is that by which I 
distinguish myself from structuralism, insofar as the latter would like to integrate 
language into semiology.’211 This recalls his “Gödelian structuralism”; it proceeds from 
the very gaps, breaks or faults within language itself. Lalangue is where the ticks and 
stutters of the signifier cause language to stumble; they are the inherent limitation of the 
Symbolic, the impossible-Real of the lack at the heart of the Other that renders it 
meaningless in its very profusion of potential meaning. Lalangue is not-all and so it 
relates to Truth: ‘[n]ot the whole truth, because there’s no way to say it all. Saying it all 
is materially impossible: words fail. Yet it is through this very impossibility that the 
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truth holds to the real.’212 The impossibility of “saying it all”, finding some final 
signifier that would render the open set of signifiers closed is the Lacanian Truth of 
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6. A Topology of Noir (I) 
The conclusion drawn above – that “film noir doesn’t exist” – can now be understood in 
its properly Lacanian context. If Vernet’s approach to noir proceeds from a fault in the 
universe, is it then possible to formulate a “topology of noir”? Vernet’s suggestion that 
“there is always another film to add” seems to correspond to the condition of the barred 
Other, the lack that permits “the possibility of another signifier”. As such, it might be 
possible to construct two ways of approaching the problem of noir that correlate to two 
modalities of failure – or two responses to the impossibility of totalisation – suggested 
by Lacan’s theory of sexuation: a “masculine” way and a “feminine” way of forming a 
set. The intricacies of the masculine way will be explored in the next chapter; it should 
by now be apparent here that the feminine way correlates to Vernet’s approach to the 
(de)construction of the category of noir.
214
 
Just as Woman does not exist because the not-all, open set of woman will not 
allow for any universalisation, film noir – or perhaps more accurately here, Film Noir – 
does not exist because it is deemed to be not-all.
215
 Like “Woman”, the Symbolic (qua 
critical discourse) fails to constitute the existence of “Film Noir” as a defined or 
delimited set. In the absence of a limit point to the set – a metalinguistic point of 
reference that could grant closure – Copjec suggests, ‘we are restricted to endless 
affirmation, that is, to affirming without end – and without being able to negate any – 
the contingent series of phenomena that present themselves to us.’216 The question then 
of which films do not belong to the set of “noir” – Vernet’s question, “Why could The 
Falcon Takes Over not be part of the set of noir?” – is a question of masculine structure; 
it is a phallic question regarding the makeshift closure of definition provided by the set 
of all, the set constituted by exclusion. The not-all set of noir is an endless unfolding of 
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its members. Films noirs belong to the set but are not “contained” by it, insofar as this 
set has no boundary that would delimit inside from outside.
217
 The not-all set concerns 
only those films which are elements thereof. This would correlate to Borde and 
Chaumeton’s predicate nominalist approach to noir: a film is noir because – and only 
because – it is subject to the noir signifier or function. The set of “noir” as not-all is thus 
a product of the barred Other. The set cannot be totalised; it is open and potentially 
infinite. The unfolding of the chain of signifiers and the enumeration of particulars of 
the set of noir is thus inexhaustible but must be taken “one by one”. Kenneth Reinhard 
observes that, ‘the relationship between particular elements of the open set (...) is 
metonymic rather than synecdochal: one [element] cannot substitute or stand for another 
(...) but can only stand next to another, in an unending series that has no characteristics 
that unify it.’218 
Such an approach to (the impossibility of) defining film noir is suggested in 
Mark T Conard’s ‘Nietzsche and the Meaning and Definition of Noir.’ Conard notes the 
widespread disagreement about what film noir is and which films are in fact noir.
219
 He 
discusses definition in terms of Platonic forms: universal (category) and particular 
(thing), the form being the essence of the particular; and Socratic definition as the 
description of form, an enumeration of its essential properties. Echoing Ewing, he asks, 
‘is there, in fact, a way of identifying the form of film noir? Can we pick out its 
essential properties and articulate them in a definition?’220 Conard then goes on to detail 
the attempts at defining noir, running through a similar discussion to the development of 
the two stages of the ontology of noir set out in Chapter 1: noir is a genre, or noir is not 
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a genre but a style, or a trans-generic phenomenon; noir cannot be defined.
221
 He then 
has recourse to Nietzschean flux metaphysics to bring into question the notion of stable 
and enduring being: in agreement with Socrates, Nietzsche insists that definition must 
capture essence, but for Nietzsche there can be no essence and therefore no 
definition.
222
 This is a result of the “death of God”; there are no transcendental values 
that could provide stable foundation for meaning. And it is here that the point of contact 
with Lacan is to be found; Lacan renders the death of God with his aphorism, there is no 
Other of the Other.
223
 And furthermore, this recalls Copjec’s comments on definition in 
relation to the set of woman; what Conard presents is the external collision of different 
definitions, but this points to the internal limit of the function of definition as such. 
Definition – in the classic sense; for example, Ewing’s approach above – seeks to 
constitute a totality that would give form to an essence or spirit. Lacan’s structure of 
“femininity” demonstrates one mode of the Symbolic’s failure to constitute such a 
totality. The Symbolic can never provide an account of an essence because it is 
internally barred; the task of unfolding fully the conditions of film noir is impossible. 
The function of definition is limited from within by the Real. 
Noir is thus an open set, a potentially endless series of particulars infinitely 
unfolding. Vernet evokes this not-all of noir when he comments, ‘[o]ne can only be 
struck by the enlargement of the notion of film noir in the course of the years.’224 He 
notes that Borde and Chaumeton’s Panorama initially presented but twenty two titles in 
their list of films noirs and that the list has now swelled – in, for example, Silver and 
Ward’s Encyclopedic Reference – to several hundred titles. In fact, the set of noir had 
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even more humble beginnings and continues to admit new elements, one by one. The 
originary set of film noir, it should be remembered, was constituted by Nino Frank in 
1946. His article enumerated but four elements of the set: The Maltese Falcon, Laura, 
Murder, My Sweet and Double Indemnity. This would seem to form a perfect, closed set 
of films. As a chronological series, it could be expressed – like a set on the line of real 
numbers – as a closed interval: [The Maltese Falcon, Double Indemnity].225 However, 
Jacques Bourgeois and Jean-Pierre Chartier introduced further elements to the set: The 
Woman in the Window, The Lost Weekend and The Postman Always Rings Twice. 
Frank’s closed set, or interval, thus becomes a half-open interval, which could be 
expressed [The Maltese Falcon, Double Indemnity); the set of noir now becomes [The 
Maltese Falcon, The Postman Always Rings Twice]. In the next decade, Borde and 
Chaumeton’s list of twenty two ‘Film noirs’ ran from The Maltese Falcon to The 
Window (1949); the closed set [The Maltese Falcon, The Postman Always Rings Twice] 
now becomes [The Maltese Falcon, The Postman Always Rings Twice) and the set of 
noir, [The Maltese Falcon, The Window].
226
 But this list is accompanied by five further 
lists: Criminal psychology, Crime films in period costume, Gangsters, Police 
documentaries, and Social tendencies. The apparent boundaries of the set of noir 
continue to slip. In each instance, the transformation of the closed into the half-open 
interval should be considered not only a progressing unfolding of the series but also the 
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 Reaching the era of modern criticism, the noir set has swelled to include – as 
Vernet suggests – several hundred elements: Silver and Ward’s aforementioned 
Encyclopedic Reference numbers three hundred and three, Borde and Chaumeton’s 
reissue of the Panorama lists four hundred and eighty seven titles in its filmography, 
and more recently, Paul Duncan lists some 1,028 films noirs in his Pocket Essential 
guide.
228
 There came an attempt then to form a subset “classic American film noir” that 
would organise the films of the 1940s and 1950s into a closed set. Borde and 
Chaumeton determine this set as [The Maltese Falcon, Kiss Me Deadly], describing the 
latter as the ‘desperate flipside’ to the former.229 However, the enduring formulation of 
this set is Paul Schrader’s: classic American noir is a series that ‘can stretch at its outer 
limits from The Maltese Falcon (1941) to Touch of Evil (1958)’ and therefore could be 
expressed as [The Maltese Falcon, Touch of Evil].
230
 But even this set must be opened 
up; the seemingly immutable Maltese Falcon must also give way to another film. As 
Vernet indicates, the series must be ‘stretched back a bit’ to accommodate Stranger on 
the Third Floor (1940).
231
 The interval must now open in the other direction, (The 
Maltese Falcon, Touch of Evil], to incorporate yet another film and constitute a set 
[Stranger on the Third Floor, Touch of Evil]. This would, finally, seem to put an end to 
the question of the set of noir; it can remain closed, the neatly contained “object of 
beauty” that Vernet invokes in the opening to ‘Edge of Doom’. Indeed, there is a very 
obvious and concrete historical limit (in the sense of boundary) to the set of noir: only a 
finite number of films were produced during the period designated as “classic” and so 
eventually, it would seem, the set of noir could in fact be exhausted, delimited, when the 
final film is discovered. The point is that the open set is potentially infinite – it does not 
constitute “an infinity” itself. This is where the notion of noir as a trans-generic and 
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trans-historic phenomenon is important.
232
 For example, the horror Cat People (1942) 
and the sci-fi Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956) are films contemporaneous to the 
classic period that seem to display the trans-generic effect of noir; furthermore, 
Fantômas and Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari (1920) are “early noir”; and moreover, as 
Billy Wilder indicated above, Oedipus is a “play noir”, so too Macbeth; Paradise Lost 
then an “epic noir”.233 Moving in the other direction, Naremore points to the now 
postmodern condition of noir; it is ubiquitous – ‘part of a worldwide mass-memory’ – 
from high fashion to the graphic novels of Frank Miller and computer games such as 
Max Payne and LA Noire.
234
 The boundaries of such a set could never be delimited; it is 
ineluctably open. 
Furthermore, the critique of noir suggested by Vernet’s work can be related to 
lalangue: the open modality of the Symbolic itself. If Lacan’s theory of lalangue traces 
the contours of the not-all complex of signifiers not bound by the logic of the universal, 
attendant to the ways in which language stutters and fails to “say it all” (because ‘saying 
is of the order of not-all – “all cannot be said”’) then so too does Vernet’s approach to 
noir emphasise the category as a non-universalisable and open complex; it is attendant 
to the ways in which noir fails, and that criticism cannot “say it all” about noir.235 Alain 
Silver derides Vernet’s ‘The Filmic Transaction’ as a ‘simplistic, structuro-semiological 
rush to judgement,’ and his article ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’ as ‘pointless 
deconstruction’ that demonstrates ‘a solipsistic arrogance that can presume to “correct” 
anomalies which it does not understand.’236 On the contrary, both of Vernet’s articles 
demonstrate his ability to draw out the “anomalies” of film noir, of its narrative and 
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critical constructions. He rightly offers a Lacanian void where there was once a body of 
films. Vernet could thus be considered – in a Žižekian manner – the film noir critic of 
the Real.
237
 Such an approach to the question of noir, that proceeds according to the 
principles of the theory of lalangue – not as in the mode of Lacan’s late Seminars, 
where the discourse itself takes on a performative aspect, being constructed as lalangue 
through puns and homonyms; rather taking the theory of lalangue at a structural level, 
as an appreciation of the internal limitation of the Real-in-the-Symbolic – this approach 
could be considered an “open ontology” of noir. This ontology investigates the field of 
noir insofar as it is barred by this internal limit, which renders it not-all; it takes as its 
point of departure the “second stage” of the ontology of noir – the self-reflexive, 
metacritical understanding – and develops a fully theoretically-informed project only 
hinted at by the second ontology itself. This does amount to a sort of discursive 
constructionist ontology but the emphasis should be on the “lalinguistique” nature of 
discourse: the gaps and ruptures of the Real, the void at the heart of the Symbolic. A 
Lacanian account of discursive construction must be predicated upon an understanding 
of the inherent limit of discourse, on the manner in which it fails: not because it is 
inadequate to some external reality but because it is barred from within. 
It is tempting therefore to suggest a matheme for lalangue: s(A), the 
signification – or even signifiance (as the refusal of signification) – of the barred Other. 
Lalangue resists the meaning effects of signification. This has profound implications for 
the function of the point de capiton. David Metzger observes that writing “lalangue” 
places the definite article in the position where a space would be expected between it 
and the noun: ‘[w]ithout this space, la is no longer the promise that a noun is sure to 
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follow; the predictive function of a grammar is thereby disabled.’238 Lalangue thus 
betrays the radical contingency of the unfolding of the signifying chain, and this entails 
a further elaboration of the vector 
     
   . As described in the previous chapter, the 
signifier (S1...) anticipates it completion by a second signifier (S2); the anticipation 
being signified by the ellipsis. In a sense it determines or “predicts” the signifier that 
will follow it; for example, a construction such as “not only” requires the precipitation 
of a subsequent “but also”. However, such anticipation can of course be frustrated or 
denied: the predicted S2 may never arrive. In fact, the final signifier – S2 as such – can 
never arrive because there is in the Symbolic always a signifier missing; recall that the 
S(A) indicates a lack in the Other’s very function as the treasure trove of signifiers. 
This could be conceptualised at the level of the sentence as the eternal possibility of 
there being one more signifier to be added; the sentence is never complete, even given 
the intervention of the point de capiton, because another signifier can be appended that 
would (re)determine the whole chain that preceded it. The signifying chain is always 
subject to a further signification, and the point de capiton is therefore opened up and 
emptied out.
239
 It cannot be the last word because – and this is the paradox of its 
function – it is always possible retroactively to modify the signifier through the 
intervention of another signifier. There is no Other of the Other that could serve as 
ultimate guarantor of the definitiveness of the point de capiton. It can only have the 
semblance of a final signifier: a preliminarily final signifier. 
This can be discerned at the filmic level in the examples of retroactive noir 
narrative given in Chapter 1. The contingency of the function of the point de capiton is 
suggested in those instances where the scene which acts to quilt the film is not itself the 
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final scene. A case in point is Sunset Blvd.: the “meaning” of the floating body in the 
opening scene is determined ex post facto when Norma, in a jealous delirium, shoots 
Gillis and he plunges into her swimming pool. However, this is the penultimate scene of 
the film; Sunset Blvd. ends with Norma’s line, ‘All right Mr. DeMille, I’m ready for my 
close up’, and her deranged and inexorable approach towards the camera. The burden of 
meaning thus shifts from the murder to Norma’s delusion: from the crime film to the 
wastes of a tale of faded Hollywood glamour.
240
 Billy Wilder’s other retroactive noir, 
Double Indemnity, presents a perhaps more complicated case. It too positions its 
narrative point de capiton in the penultimate scene; the meaning of Neff’s confession in 
the opening sequence is determined by his climactic betrayal and murder of Phyllis. 
This scene is followed by a return to the insurance office where Neff, on the verge of 
death, is confronted by his friend and colleague Keyes. There is again a shift signalled 
by this final scene; the emphasis moves from the relation between the anti-hero and the 
femme fatale to the homosocial bond between the hero and the morality figure. In an act 
of desperation Phyllis tells Neff that she loves him, but it is to Keyes that – with the last 
line of the film – Neff declares, ‘I love you too’. What makes the film more interesting, 
however, is the fact that this itself was not the original last scene. There is a “lost 
ending” – cut or excluded from the film – that depicts Neff’s execution in the gas 
chamber and ends with a forlorn and lonely Keyes leaving the prison, and would, as 
Naremore suggests, ‘have thrown a shadow over everything that preceded it.’241 This 
lost ending thus performs a resignification of the point de capiton; it insists that the 
signifying chain must always be open to the possibility of the next signifier. 
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 Norma’s delusion in fact sustains itself through this possibility of one signifier more; she insists, “And 
I promise you I’ll never desert you again because after Salome we’ll make another picture and another 
picture.” 
241
 Naremore, MTN, p. 93. 
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The status of this lost scene as excluded does, however, point to the logic of Exception 
that constitutes the set of all. This provides the point at which to turn to the next chapter. 
Having opened up the void of the Real within the Symbolic, it will now be necessary to 
understand the way in which the Imaginary can serve to close this gap, to suture the 
wound. Lacan asserts the logical priority of the not-all with respect to the all: language 
emerges from lalangue on the basis of an exclusion, the transformation of the internal 
limit into an external boundary. This requires the imaginary function of “relative 
absolutes” such as the square brackets or the point de capiton to make an all of the not-
all. Lacan’s conceptualisation of not-all does not foreclose the possibility of the 
Universal, rather it points to the specific conditions that have to be met with regards to 
its construction: masculine structuration. This points to a “closed ontology” of noir that 
investigates the relation between the first and second stages in the understanding of the 





Chapter 3. The Boundaries and Meaning of Noir: Suture, Metaphor and the 
Historical Imaginary 
 
James Naremore provides the perfect schema for an understanding of how a “closed 
ontology” of film noir can proceed. In his introductory discussion of the category of 
noir, he states that: 
It has always been easier to recognize a film noir than to define the term. One can 
imagine a large video store where examples of such films would be shelved somewhere 
between gothic horror and dystopian science fiction: in the center would be Double 
Indemnity, and at either extreme Cat People and Invasion of the Body Snatchers. But 
this arrangement would leave out important titles.
1
 
The “film noir shelf” does in fact provide a distinct and defining boundary to the set of 
film noir but, as Naremore realises, such an articulation must necessarily exclude certain 
films. Lacan’s theory of the masculine provides an invaluable account of an ontology 
predicated upon these processes, which can be read together with the Anglo-American 
film noir criticism of the 1970s to establish the “imaginary borders” of the film noir 
category. The concept of the Lacanian Imaginary will then be taken up in Thomas 
Elsaesser’s account of the “historical imaginary” to investigate the conventional 
historiography of film noir as a descendent of German Expressionism. 
 
1. The Set of Man 
In order, therefore, to take further an understanding of the ontology of noir, the other 
aspect of Lacan’s theory of sexuation must be addressed. The masculine side of the 
graph is constituted by the logical formulae,      and         . To recall the reading of 
the feminine formulae, the universal proposition describes the kind of set involved in 
masculinity and the existential proposition the manner in which it is determined. This 
first formula,     , should be read, Lacan states, as suggesting that, ‘it is through the 
                                                 
1
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phallic function that man as whole [comme tout] acquires his inscription.’2 Here again 
Fink translates tout as “whole” rather than “all”, and again – as with the pas-tout – the 
translation is problematic. To say “man as whole” suggests that the formula,     , 
refers to a single subject who is rendered “whole”. Repeating this on the feminine side 
would render the individual subject woman “not-whole”: something escapes the phallic 
function, something is missing.
3
 As noted in the previous chapter, this chronic 
misreading leads to the mystification of woman as an absolute Other who somehow 
escapes the Symbolic order.
4
 Instead, and as with the formulae of feminine sexuation, 
the masculine formulae refer to the constitution of the set of man rather than to an 
individual subject; the masculine and the phallic are concerned with the wholeness (and 
by extension incompleteness) of a set, as opposed to all or some of a given individual. 
In L’Étourdit, Lacan glosses this formula again, as, ‘for all  ,    is satisfied.’5 Man 
should thus be considered a set of all:     . 
 This set is modified by this second proposition,         , or “there is one   for 
whom the phallic function is not valid”. To this set,     , Lacan thus adds a proviso; it 
is ‘limited due to an   by which the function    is negated.’6 Here the formula does 
refer to an individual of some sort: there exists some   who is not subject to the phallic 
function, who refuses castration, and in doing so acts as a limit to the set of man. In fact, 
man can only be considered as a set of all because there is something that delimits him: 
Lacan states that, ‘[t]he [all] here is thus based on the exception posited as the end-point 
(terme), that is, on that which altogether negates   .’7 The set is founded on a logical 
exception, on the foreclosure of the phallic function from the very set that it determines. 
                                                 
2
 Lacan, S20, p. 79. 
3
 There is a difference between “man as whole” and “man as all”, as a set of all; and even “man as a 
whole [comme un tout], which would indicate a fortiori a complete individual. 
4
 See Žižek on “how not to read the formulae of sexuation”, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on 
Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 2007), pp. 156-158. 
5
 Lacan, ‘L’Étourdit’, p. 458. 
6
 Lacan, S20, p. 79. 
7
 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
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This suggests the commonplace assertion that every universal is grounded in the 
existence of the exception that proves the rule. Lacan states that this           is the 
‘father function’ and as such this non-castrated   is to be understood as the Freudian 
primal father of Totem and Taboo.
8
 This mythical leader of the primal horde is a non-
castrated Exception who is therefore able to enjoy fully – he is the père-sévère whose 
jouissance is not limited by any transcendental law – and, translating Freud’s myth of 
origins into a Lacanian theory of sets, whose function it is to constitute all men as a set.  
In adding the proposition          to     , Lacan shows that the masculine is 
characterised by a finite logic: it is a closed set determined by an external limit (which – 
as noted in the previous chapter – should be understood as a “boundary”).9 This might 
seem straightforward enough, but the relation between the two formulae of the 
masculine side leads to a number of complex, even contradictory conclusions. Lacan 
suggested in Le Séminaire XIV that there can be no universe of discourse; it is 
impossible to construct a totality because there lacks a transcendental point of 
guarantee. It seems then that by Seminar XX Lacan had located the guarantor in the 
father function because the set of man does in fact produce a universe in the universal 
proposition of “all men”.10 Lacanian theory does not suggest, in that quasi-universal 
manner, that “there are no universals”; instead, the formulae of sexuation point to the 
specific conditions that must be met in order to construct a “universal”. An absolute, a 
totality, remains impossible as was suggested in the previous chapter. The masculine 
universal is a failure; the universe succeeds only ‘in making the sexual relationship fail 
(faire rater) in the male manner.’11 The universe of man, the universal notion of man is 
based in the Exception – the One,          – so that it is not simply that the exception 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., p. 79. 
9
 This will be further explored in the next section. 
10
 Lacan in fact began to theorise the phallic function and the masculine set earlier, in Le Séminaire XIX: 
...ou pire, 1971-1972, unpublished manuscript. See, for example, the session of 08/12/1971. 
11
 Lacan, S20, p. 56. 
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proves the rule but more critically that it in fact provides the very basis for the rule. To 
return to the Freudian image, men are constituted as a set by the sons’ murder of the 
primal father; this exclusion of the limit point – the tyrannical jouisseur – does not 
liberate them but binds them together as a “band of brothers”, defined as or by not being 
the primal father. Men are part of the group of all men insofar as they are all equivalent 
in that they are not the primal father. As Kenneth Reinhard suggests, ‘a man belongs to 
and is included in the subset of humanity called “all men”, a set that constitutes a 
unified group, guaranteed by the transcendental exceptionality of the primal Father.’12 
The set of man as all thus requires a negative judgment (as opposed to the indefinite 
judgment required of the not-all) regarding that which cannot be included in the series 
of men; indeed, Lacan insists that ‘there is no universal that does not have to contain 
itself by an existence which denies it.’13 To reiterate, Lacan states here that the universal 
is contained by its exception; man is constituted as a set of all by a fixed limit that takes 
the form of the exception to the set. Therefore, it would seem that, if, in relation to the 
Symbolic order, woman is not-all – an open set – then, it follows, man as all is a closed 
set. 
This does, however, lead to a problem in the reading of Lacan’s theory of 
sexuation; it suggests that there is perhaps some sort of complementarity between the 
sets of men and woman. Indeed, set theory proper states that the closed set is a 
complement of an open set. On this point Lacan is unequivocal: there is and can be no 
complementarity between the sexes, and thus no complementarity between the sets.
14
 
The two sets, masculine and feminine, do not form a whole or totality in the mode of 
Aristophanes’ myth of perfect spherical beings. In Seminar XI Lacan refers to this 
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 Reinhard, Neighbor, p. 52. 
13
 Lacan, ‘L’Étourdit’, p. 451. 
14
 On the different types of jouissance associated with the masculine and feminine poles of sexuation 
Lacan states, ‘If I had said “complementary” what a mess we’d be in! We would fall back into the whole’ 
(S20, p. 73). 
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notion of the primordial androgyne torn asunder by Zeus and the misleading ‘pursuit of 
the complement,’ who, he insists, is emphatically not one’s ‘other half.’15 Lacan’s 
subsequent theorisation of the failure of sexual relation – there is no rapport between the 
sexes [il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel] – is a continuation and extension of this rejection 
of the primal myth.
16
 
The formulae for masculinity and femininity present two mutually exclusive 
logics and constitute two incompatible sets. What then of the masculine “closed” set, if 
it is not the open set’s complement? Is this just another case of “bad Lacanian 
mathematics”, a corrupted and misunderstood version of set theory? The strategic 
answer would be the one offered in the previous chapter; the Lacanian theory of sets 
borrows from set theory for its own purposes and should therefore not be understood in 
the same terms. There is, however, here a very precise theoretical point at stake, one 
that reveals the specificity of the Lacanian theory of sets and the necessity of reading 
both sides of the Graph of Sexuation but understanding them as different. If it is true 
both that, for all men,    is satisfied and that there is one for whom    is not satisfied, 
for whom it is negated (      ) how can the set be considered “closed”? The addition of 
         to      is not to be understood  as an instance of a totalised set plus a given 
exception; the Exception is not added to a set of all, it is, as Alenka Zupančič notes, 
‘something subtracted from an indefinite set to make it a set as such.’17 The father can 
never be part of the set of men – he must be subtracted from the group of men to 
function as the limit to the set. The Exception constitutes a closed set determined by a 
fixed limit that remains outside itself: it can in this sense be thought of as extimate. The 
Exception can be said to ex-sist because, although it does not exist within the set, it can 
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 Lacan, S11, p. 205. 
16
 Lacan, S20, p. 12. 
17
 Alenka Zupančič, ‘The Case of the Perforated Sheet’, in Sexuation, ed., Renata Salecl (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000), pp. 282-296 (p. 284). 
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still be written, as         . It functions as a limit against which man as a set of all is 
defined; it allows the function of definition as such. 
On the side of the all, the series of men no longer appears open-ended because it 
somehow contains “the law and its exception”; it becomes a closed set because, as Joan 
Copjec suggests, ‘it now includes – albeit in a negative form – that which is excluded 
from it: that is, it now includes everything.’18 Or at least, that is how it appears. Just as 
the set of woman is a theory predicated on a relation to the set of signifiers, so too is the 
set of man.
19
 As such, it can be suggested that the “closure” of the set of man can be 
achieved only through the inclusion in the set of the signifier of something excluded 
from it, and that this is the paradoxical role played by the signifier of the big Other (A) 
and its lack (A) discussed in the previous chapter.
20
 The very signifier of its closure 
points to its lack.
21
 This is the realm of Miller’s theory of suture. In his reading of 
Fregean number theory, Miller assigns “zero” to the concept ‘not identical with itself’ 




Miller suggests that it is the inclusion of this concept “zero” that ‘sutures logical 
discourse’ because, as a singular category, the zero can be counted as “one”.23 The one 
thus emerges from the void of the zero, which it serves to cover over or sutures. Suture 
thus refers to the paradoxical presence of an element that signifies the lack in a system 
or set that grants a certain closure to that set. This can (and should) be read as the 
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 Copjec, Read, p. 230. 
19
 Indeed, Gilbert Chaitin suggests that, ‘[s]ex is thus another name for the failure of meaning, the gap in 
the Other which renders it incomplete’ (Rhetoric and Culture in Lacan (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1996), p. 222). 
20
 Apropos of Russell’s paradox, Lacan notes in S14 that, ‘the Universe of discourse does not close itself 
[l’Univers du discours ne se ferme pas]’ (14/12/1966). 
21
 Characteristic of Lacan’s transliteration of Freud into his own structural linguistic terms, the primal 
father of Totem becomes a signifier in S20. 
22
 Miller, ‘Suture’, p. 29. The object being then , “that which is identical to itself”. 
23
 Miller, ‘Suture’, p. 30. Thereby is the entire number line generated via Frege’s “successor function”: 0 
and 1 can  be counted as 2,  0, 1 and 3 as 3, and so on, so that each number      . 
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presence of the Real in relation to the Symbolic; the lack in the Other outlined in the 
previous chapter (A). That this zero designates the Real becomes clear as Miller 
elaborates his theorisation: 
The zero which is inscribed in the place of the number consummates the exclusion of this 
object. As for this place, marked out by subsumption, in which the object is lacking, there 
nothing can be written, and if a 0 must be traced, it is merely in order to figure a blank, to 
render visible the lack. 
From the zero lack to the zero number, the non-conceptualisable is conceptualised.
24
 
The zero thus marks the place of lack; like the matheme (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) it points to the topology of the Real with its contradictory, impossible 
conceptualisation.  
Copjec provides the clearest explanation of the implication of the concept of 
suture for the chain of signifiers when she suggests that the chain is ‘allowed to function 
“as if” it were a closed set through the inclusion of an element that acknowledges the 
impossibility of closure.’25 The presence of the signifier of the lack in the Other S(A) 
allows all other signifiers to function in a set as if it were closed. This “as if” is crucial: 
the set of men (    ) is allowed to function as if it were closed by virtue of the 
function of an exception (        ) that is extimate to the set, included as excluded.26 Thus 
there is no risk of complementarity because the set of man is not a closed set – a closed 
set would suggest once again a “whole” – it does not and cannot form a totality with the 
open set.
27
 This is the aforementioned specificity of the Lacanian theory of sets. The 
formulae of sexuation present a precisely defined theory; the Lacanian sets can be 
determined in two, logically articulated ways – the masculine and the feminine – that 
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 Miller, ‘Suture’, p. 30. 
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 Copjec, Read, p. 174. This also the chapter that appears in the Shades of Noir compilation; Copjec 
theorises a certain type of noir detective film in which the crime scene is not-all and the narrative is 
rendered “as if” closed. 
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 Indeed, the father function declares – as Samuel Goldwyn famously (never) said to the MPPDA – 
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27
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must be understood together but are, in relation to each other, in no way 
complementary. There is in fact, no rapport between the sets.
28
 
If the masculine is a finite logic, then the masculine formulae also suggest that 
this finitude is based on a semblance of being whole. The “as if” points to the function 
of the Imaginary: this is the realm of the falsifying ego, which is formed by a productive 
méconnaissance, the choice of identification with the complete and coherent mirror-
image over the dissatisfactory experience of the corps morcelé. While Miller’s concept 
of suture is reliant on the presence of the Real within the Symbolic, the resultant closure 
– the stitches themselves – are an imaginary effect of wholeness vis-à-vis the Symbolic. 
Indeed, in Seminar XI, which is to say, a year before Miller’s presentation, Lacan 
explicitly designates a suture as ‘a conjunction of the imaginary and the symbolic.’29 
The set of man takes on a similar illusion of wholeness in order for it to function. 
Furthermore, if the women’s set is shaped by a relation to the (A), then the lower 
portion of the Graph of Sexuation shows that man’s set is shaped by the relation of 
fantasy $ <> a: the imaginary prop for everyday, fragmentary reality.
30
 The Exception 
does not in fact present a transcendent point of guarantee. The primal father is but an 
imaginarised face of the big Other – an other of the Other, what Althusser called the 
“Absolute Subject”, and where Spinoza situated the personalised notion of “God” – a 
place-filler for the lacking Other. It does not give rise to the possibility of a 
metalanguage but covers over its lack. 
                                                 
28
 This further supports the reading of the (non-)relation between the pas-tout and the tout presented in the 
previous chapter: the “not-all” is not a negation of the “all”, nor is the “all” the positive inverse of the 
“not-all”. 
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 Lacan, S11, p. 118. 
30
 Lacan also defines fantasy as a conjunction of the Imaginary and the Symbolic when he characterises it 
as ‘the imaginary taken up in a certain signifying usage [l’imaginaire pris dans un certain usage de 
signifiant]’ (S5, p. 409). Meaning is also situated at this conjunction in the Borromean knot; this will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
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Apropos of the lack in the Other, there emerges a further point of apparent 
contradiction when considering the set of man as a set of signifiers. In ‘The Subversion 
of the Subject’ Lacan comments upon the unique status of the signifier of the lacking 
Other S(A): 
Now insofar as the battery of signifiers is, it is complete, and this signifier can only be a 
line that is drawn from its circle without being able to be counted in it. This can be 
symbolized by the inherence of a (-1) in the set of signifiers.  
It is, as such, unpronounceable, but its operation is not[.]
31
 
This is a recasting of the Russell’s paradox-like dilemma that faces the constitution of 
the set of signifiers, as described in the previous chapter. The relation between the 
suturing S(A) and all other signifiers – equivalent to the relation between men and the 
Exception – is, as mentioned above, an extimate one: it is excluded from within. The set 
of all or battery of signifiers is “complete”: it is a set of all men or all signifiers, but 
there is one signifier (  ) that cannot be counted within the circle of the set (      ). This 
results in a certain lack within the set that is inexpressible but whose function can be 
expressed as the inherence of (-1), or in symbolic logic as         .32 As Lorenzo Chiesa 
observes, ‘S (A barred) is both different from other signifiers S2 insofar as it represents 
the missing signifier, and not separated from them insofar as this missing signifier is 
counted within the set of signifiers as -1.’33 It persists, therefore, in its presence as a gap 
within the Other. 
The set of all, therefore, does not form a whole but a (w)hole; there is a hole 
within the whole, the absent presence of the exception to the rule. The set of signifiers is 
then incomplete, or “decompleted” by the presence of a signifier, S(A). It would seem 
then that it is in fact the masculine set, the set of all, that is not all or not whole rather 
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 Lacan, ‘Subversion’, p. 694. 
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 The mathematical terms might appear confused and confusing: to be clear, Miller’s conceptualization 
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than the feminine set.
34
 This lack has the effect that, despite being considered “all” and 
being determined by an external limit, the set of man still permits the inclusion of 
further, new elements. The set of signifiers is missing a signifier and is thus able to 
accommodate one signifier more.
35
 The Lacanian theory of the all suggests therefore 
that every purported whole is incomplete and can be supplemented. Lacan presents two 
distinct and asymmetrical sets: sexuation is thus a choice between the incomplete and 
the open.
36
 This question of the one signifier more will now have to be taken up in 
relation to a certain type of film noir criticism to examine the way in which the critical 
category functions like the as-if-closed circle of the set of signifiers to admit new 
members. 
  
                                                 
34
 Miller in fact suggests that, ‘in English one could perhaps say “no whole without a hole”,’ but then 
unhelpfully adds, ‘I would be inclined to translate Lacan’s “pas-tout” – one of his categories – by 
(w)hole’ (Television, p. xxiii). 
35
 Indeed, Paul Verhaeghe offers the image of the set of signifiers as a sliding tile puzzle: the gap is 
necessary for the functioning of the toy. See Beyond Gender: From Subject to Drive (New York: Other 
Press, 2001), p. 77n36. 
36
 Lacan’s “mis-definition” of the open set noted in the previous chapter – a set that excludes its own 
limits – would seem to correspond to the set of all, which does indeed seek to exclude its limit; the as-if-
closed set does, however, does also include its own limit as (-1). 
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2. A Topology of Noir (II) 
How then does the Lacanian theory of masculine sexuation relate to film noir? Is there 
some film that stands as an Exception to the set, that can found a universal notion of 
noir? Casablanca might seem like a good candidate. It has many of the hallmarks of a 
film noir: a cast featuring Bogart and Lorre, a plot infused with sex, intrigue and moral 
ambiguity, tenebristic interior shots and a smoky bar, and yet it is generally not 
considered noir.
37
 For example, it features in neither Borde and Chaumeton’s Panorama 
nor Silver and Ward’s Encyclopedia. There are of course obvious historical reasons for 
this omission: the depiction of collaborationism and the film’s dimension as propaganda 
meant it was rejected by French critics.
38
 However, Casablanca, while an omission 
from the set of noir, does not stand in relation to the set as some excluded One, an ur-
film against which all other films noirs are defined. Casablanca is not then the          to 
the noir all. Perhaps Fritz Lang’s M fulfils this function; as a precursor, it is positioned 
outside the set of classic film noir and yet it is accorded great significance within the set 
by film noir critics. Neither, however, is M the “One” of noir; it has been subsumed into 
a larger critical set of noir, having been designated, retroactively, as “proto-noir” (a 
process that will be explored in the final section of this chapter). Instead, it will be 
necessary to look briefly at another theorist, whose work suggests a more general 
possibility for what can be achieved with the Lacanian theory of the masculine, and 
points to another way in which to approach noir. 
 As noted in the previous chapter, Lacan’s conceptualisation of sexuation as a 
logic permits, if not necessitates, its extension into other discourses. An example of this 
is the work of Jean-Claude Milner, who takes Lacanian theory into the realm of 
linguistics proper and thereby suggests a new possibility for the understanding of noir 
                                                 
37
 Curtiz did of course go on to make films such as Mildred Pierce and The Unsuspected (1947), which 
generally do fall under the signifier “noir”. 
38
 See Naremore on this point, MTN, p. 317n43. 
165 
 
and the masculine. In For the Love of Language, Milner utilises the categories of 
Lacan’s Encore to theorise linguistics as a science of language: a discourse that comes 
up against the Real. Milner establishes a distinction between grammar and linguistics, 
suggesting that the former constitutes language as an imaginary ‘totality’ whereas the 
latter treats language as a symbolic ‘all.’39 Grammar, for Milner, is considered complete 
because it contains both the grammatical and the ungrammatical within its system; it is 
a unified whole, a Gestalt image of language that can be perceived in a glance and 
permits no exterior. In contradistinction to this, Milner compares linguistics to a 
‘symbolic writing’ that accounts only for that which can be formalised, while at the 
same time permitting the existence of the non-formalisable: something that escapes 
linguistics which Milner associates with the Real.
40
 This “exterior” Milner formulates in 
a classically masculine or phallic way; he assigns to this ineffable the category of the 
not-all, establishing it as the excluded partner of the all and thereby participating in the 
kind of mystification of the not-all described above. In Lacanian terms, it is not the not-
all that must be excluded; rather – to recall Zupančič – something must be excluded 
from the indefinite to make a set as such. 
 There is in fact a very similar process at work in the constitution of both 
grammar and linguistics as Milner describes them. The “imaginary grammar” is 
constituted by a logic of exclusion – the distinction grammatical/ungrammatical – that 
establishes a limit or boundary to language. The grammatical is thus defined by what is 
excluded and is thereby made whole. Similarly, the “symbolic linguistics” is defined by 
its exterior – Milner’s “not-all”, the Lacanian Exception – that constitutes it as an “all”. 
As suggested above, Milner overlooks the necessarily imaginary dimension of the 
symbolic all and misrecognises the Gestalt image as a “totality”, which can only exist in 
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the Real. Grammar and linguistics as Milner formulates them therefore take the form of 
two responses to the lack in the Other. Grammar has the structure of perversion: the 
grammarian claims a totality where there is none. The “complete” grammar is a 
disavowal: “I know very well that the Other is lacking, but still...”.41 Linguistics has a 
neurotic (and specifically masculine) structure: Milner suggests that, ‘[i]n order to 
succeed, linguistics must simply ignore the lack.’42 In other words, the linguist must 
repress the lack in order to constitute an all. The question then arises of whether the “as 
if” is a perverse mode too. Is it a case of, “I know very well... but I will act as if...”? The 
answer must be no. The sutured/suturing “as if” is a neurotic mode because, as Miller 
states, it also depends upon a repression of the zero-lack.
43
 What is at stake then, pace 
Milner, is a symbolic-imaginary all that is distinct from the real totality and an 
imaginary whole. And what Milner’s work with Lacanian theory thus emphasises is the 
logic of exclusion that characterises masculine structure. It is from here that another 
topology of noir can proceed. 
It is the first movement, the original attempts to answer the question, “What is 
noir?” that constitutes such a masculine topology. In his introduction to the second 
volume of the Film Noir Reader, which reproduces those originary pieces of criticism 
by Lloyd Shearer, Nino Frank and Jean-Pierre Chartier, Alain Silver states that, ‘the 
definition of [the noir] sensibility is the purpose of this collection.’44 He continues to set 
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out the logic at work in such efforts, noting that ‘the writers herein may approach that 
definition either directly (what film noir is) or indirectly (what it is not).’ 45 Lacan’s 
masculine topology suggests that these approaches are indeed two sides of the same 
coin. The first attempt to formalise those insights of Frank et al. – Borde and 
Chaumeton’s gesture ‘Toward a definition of film noir’ – begins with a negative 
judgement that serves to establish noir in opposition to another set: they insist that, ‘a 
film noir is not a police documentary.’46 They continue with an enumeration of the 
differences between the two series. First is the ‘angle of vision:’ the police procedural 
considering a crime ‘from without,’ from the position of law enforcement, and the film 
noir ‘from within,’ which is to say from the position of the criminal.47 Second is a moral 
difference: the heroes of the police documentary are incorruptible, whereas in the film 
noir the police are ‘of dubious character’ and, inversely, the lawbreakers ‘rather 
personable.’48 Borde and Chaumeton’s method here suggests Lacan’s statement in 
‘L’Étourdit’ that, ‘the false is not only seen as being the other side of the truth, it 
designates it as well [le faux ne s’aperçoit pas qu’à être de la vérité l’envers, il la 
désigne aussi bien].’49 The police documentary is established as the “false other side” of 
the film noir, and in their delineation of noir, Borde and Chaumeton would thus be in 
agreement with Lacan when he adds, ‘[i]t is correct therefore to write it as I do: 
        .’50 The Exception, the excluded, is the “other side” of the all; therefore, in not 
being the police documentary, the noir set is in some way delimited for Borde and 
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Chaumeton. The process of exclusion – the negation of the police documentary – also 
designates its inverse, which is to say, that which is included in the set of film noir.
51
  
Continuing in this vein, there is a masculine dimension to be found in Marc 
Vernet’s enquiry in ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, which – as discussed in the 
previous chapter – more broadly presents a feminine topology of noir.52 In a discussion 
of the relation between hard-boiled fiction and film noir, Vernet asks why Frank 
Tuttle’s The Glass Key (1935) and Herbert Leeds’ Time to Kill (1942) are not noir, 
given that they are adapted from stories by Hammett and Chandler. Crucially, Vernet 
continues, ‘[w]hy could not the first version of Chandler’s Farewell, My Lovely, (...) 
directed in 1942 under the title The Falcon Takes Over by Irving Reis, be part of the 
set?’53 This – albeit in a non-Lacanian or even theoretical manner – explicitly raises the 
question of which films do not belong to the set of noir. This puts into play a logic of 
exclusion and differentiation that serves to delimit the set: a logic that is found again 
when Vernet notes that ‘the term film noir allows us to believe we can contain a certain 
form of detective fiction within the pages of a book written to describe it,’ and which 
leads him to ask, ‘what American detective films of the 1940s and 1950s are excluded 
from the proposed surveys?’54 These excluded films serve to contain the set of film noir 
in the same way that the Exception (        ) serves to contain the set of all (    ). 
Furthermore, Vernet expresses a desire ‘to try and make an encyclopaedia of detective 
films not included in the encyclopaedias of films noirs’ that would, in a sense, be the 
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masculine activity par excellence: instead of the feminine, positive unfolding of the noir 
series – a process of endless affirmation of members of the set – the masculine entails 
the endless, obsessional task of searching for some final S2 that could, through a 
negation, finally constrain the set of signifiers. 
This endeavour to define film noir could thus be considered a “closed ontology” 
insofar as it seeks to divide and exclude to constitute noir as – following the masculine 
logic – a set of all. It might seem obvious to state, but the Lacanian theory of masculine 
sexuation suggests that the act of definition is a process whereby a boundary to a 
concept (or set) is established through a negative judgement: the designation of what is 
not included in the set. Against the method of Socratic definition outlined in the 
previous chapter and promoted in relation to film noir by Dale Ewing, which relies on a 
Platonic ontology of the forms of virtues and would thus have the structure of a 
psychotic discourse of “totality”, a “masculine definition” would function as a modality 
of the “as if” and its closed ontology. As was shown in the previous chapter, it is always 
possible to add another signifier to the set of film noir: Vernet’s ‘enlargement of the 
notion of film noir.’55 In Millerian terms, the sutured, apparently closed set [   ] must 
be at the very least a half-open interval [   ) because it is always possible to add one 
more to any number appearing at the end of the series: the (   ) of the successor 
function. The elements   and   always imply  , and so on; just as, for example, the 
series [The Maltese Falcon, Kiss Me Deadly] always implies Stranger on the Third 
Floor or Touch of Evil.  
Moreover, if the film noir (or the masculine set) has been articulated as closed – 
Alain Silver suggests that ‘[f]ilm noir is a closed system’ and characterises noir as ‘a 
self-contained reflection of American culture and its preoccupations at a point in time’ 
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and ‘the unique example of a wholly American film style,’ determinations which are 
predicated upon a closed ontology – the masculine topology insists that, as Copjec 
notes, ‘this must mean that some limit has been applied to the series of numbers’ or 
set.
56
 It will therefore be necessary to introduce here an important theoretical feature: in 
For They Know Not What They Do, Slavoj Žižek observes ‘the Hegelian distinction 
between boundary and limit.’57 The boundary Žižek suggests, is ‘the external limitation 
of an object, its qualitative confines which confer upon it its identity;’ whereas the limit 
‘is what the object ought to (although it never actually can) become,’ which ‘results 
from a “reflection-into-itself” of the boundary.’58 He takes the example of national 
boundaries and national identity to show that ‘every boundary proves itself a limit.’59 A 
nation is first defined through its difference from its neighbours, a geographical border 
or external boundary. However, no individual can live up fully to a paradigm of 
national identity; it thus becomes an unattainable point, an internal limit to the concept 
of nation.
60
 The closed ontology, however, involves a movement in the opposite 
direction. If the theory of sexuation presents two responses to the impossibility of 
totalisation as an inherent limit to the Symbolic order – indeed, Žižek explicitly 
connects the limit to the barred Other and the notion of lalangue – then feminine logic, 
as suggested in the previous chapter and above, is an assumption of this limit or lack to 
constitute an unbounded, open set.
61
 Masculine logic stands in a different relation to the 
lack: since no exterior limit is conceivable – there is no Other of the Other – the 
inherent limit, the fault at the heart of the field of the Other (A), is turned outwards; it is 
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projected into an imaginary, unlimited Exception whose exclusion serves to erect an 
external boundary to the set.
62
  
These imaginary boundaries can be detected in the expression of film noir as a 
series or list: Schrader’s determination of noir as an interval that ‘can stretch at its outer 
limits from The Maltese Falcon (1941) to Touch of Evil (1958)’ or [The Maltese 
Falcon, Touch of Evil].
63
 The “outer limits” are the borders signified by the square 
brackets, which divide off the set from other films; Schrader’s series excludes, for 
example, The Window, which serves as a boundary point for Borde and Chaumeton’s 
original set of twenty two films noirs. James Naremore’s image of the “film noir shelf” 
in a video shop – referred to at the start of this chapter – presents an even more vivid 
realisation of this imaginary bounding; the square brackets become the bookends of the 
shelf, containing Cat People at one extreme and Invasion of the Body Snatchers at the 
other, while still, Naremore admits, leaving out important titles.
64
 To the set there must 
inhere therefore the (-1) that permits the inclusion of further, new members. The noir set 
is thus constituted as a (w)hole or set of all. Masculine logic presents another way in 
which to conceive of the possibility of one signifier more; instead of being simply open, 
the set contains a certain gap, while at the same time being allowed to function as if it 
were closed.
65
 The closed ontology of noir – at work in the criticism of, for example, 
Borde and Chaumeton, and Schrader – serves to constitute film noir as a set of all, a 
sutured universal that is constructed, or extracted from the multiplicity of films. There 
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can in this ontology be many universals; as Schrader himself notes, ‘[a]lmost every 
critic has his own definition of film noir, and personal list of film titles and dates to back 
it up,’ which chimes with Milner’s observation that, in linguistics, ‘universalising 
propositions are possible for one language among others.’66 A totality of noir is 
impossible but the construction of a universal is not; the masculine topology provides 
the conditions of its possibility. 
It is here that a new relevance for the theory of suture in Film Studies can be 
found. That suture can name this process – the turning outwards of the internal limit 
(zero), and into an external boundary (one) – can be seen when it comes to defining the 
signifier “noir” itself. The process of definition in the closed ontology functions 
according to the logic of making an all. As noted in the previous chapter, Mark 
Conard’s Nietzschean reading of noir emphasises the impossibility of a Socratic 
definition, and yet definitions of film noir are proffered – as Schrader suggests – by 
every critic. In Lacanian terms then, definition is possible, despite the lack in the Other 
because these definitions function in the mode of the “as if”. Out of Conard’s 
Nietzschean flux – the multiplicity of films and signifiers that face the critic – the 
masculine logic of exclusion extracts the signifier “noir” and sutures the set to constitute 
it as an all. The closed ontology defines in the sense of determining the boundary and 
extent of a concept; it is a word that derives ultimately from the Latin finis, which 
means of course “end” but also “boundary”. The masculine is a topology in which – 
through the logic of exclusion – imaginary boundaries (imaginary in the fully Lacanian 
sense that the ego is imaginary: a necessary effect of cohesion and completeness) are 
erected to allow a concept such as “film noir” to be treated as if it were encircled, so 
that it can signify, for example for one critic: 
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a body of films (for this study only American films noirs are examined, but they were also 
produced in England and France), made roughly between 1940 and 1958. The tone and 
mood of the film noir was overwhelmingly black, hence its name. The main protagonists of 
these films were usually people who were suffering from existential angst. Life was 
conceived to be a hopeless proposition, with people having no control over their fates. 
Despair, alienation, disillusionment, moral ambiguity, pessimism, corruption, and 
psychoses carried the day. The film noir portrayed a world where people were not 
essentially good, but deceitful and rotten. It is a world where the opposite sex, especially 
women, was to be distrusted, often with good reason.
67
 
In order to make a definitive critical statement such as this, the “lack in the function of 
definition as such” must be repressed; the masculine, closed ontology turns it outwards 
and into the boundaries that act of definition establishes. The zero is thus counted as 
one, as the limit becomes a boundary and impossibility becomes the very condition of 
possibility in film noir criticism. 
Nowhere is this function expressed more clearly than in Frank Krutnik’s study, 
In a Lonely Street.
68
 Krutnik begins with an analysis of what could be considered the 
masculine topology of the Hollywood genre system as a form of cinematic taxonomy, 
suggesting that genres ‘serve as frameworks for mediating between repetition and 
difference.’69 Krutnik suggests that, unlike other industries that rely on uniformity of 
product, the classical Hollywood film industry required each product/film to be 
different. The genre system allowed Hollywood to ‘regulate the parameters of 
difference’ in its product by determining the horizon of expectation, by delimiting what 
a fiction film was supposed to be.
70
 To explain this process, Krutnik points to Steve 
Neale; Neale states that ‘[g]enres produce a regulated variety of cinema, a contained and 
controlled heterogeneity that explores and exploits the optimum potentiality of cinema’s 
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resources and, in particular, the narrative system it has adopted as its aesthetic and 
ideological basis.’71 The process of generic distinction produces boundaries that 
“contain and control” the multiplicity of films in the manner of a closed ontology. That 
genre is a limiting or bounding discourse becomes clear when Krutnik notes that ‘a 
genre cannot simply be defined in terms of the elements it contains’ and that ‘[g]enres 
function as intertextual systems which assert a forceful pressure upon the channels and 
limits of readability.’72 A genre serves to contain films only in relation to other genres, 
which is to say as a function of exclusion. Like a signifier in the differential Symbolic 
order, it only has significance in relation to (and hence in its difference from) other 
genres, or what Krutnik calls ‘its place as part of the genre system.’73 
Krutnik notes that the discourse of film noir presents a slightly different 
arrangement because it was not part of an industry-led taxonomy but a post hoc critical 
construction; nonetheless, for Krutnik it still served ‘to locate multiple and 
unsystematised forms of differentiation’ and was consolidated into a critical category by 
Borde and Chaumeton.
74
 He emphasises what he considers the lack of unity in the noir 
corpus as compared to recognised genres such as the Western, and suggests – like 
Naremore, Vernet, et al. – that this heterogeneity makes noir a much more slippery 
category. He notes the “lack” in the work of critics such as Schrader and Raymond 
Durgnat; there is little agreement across critical and historical accounts as to what film 
noir is and which films it concerns to the extent that the category risks incoherence. His 
stated aim would therefore be ‘to construct a viable generic framework for the study of 
the noir phenomenon, one which pivots around the 1940s “tough” crime thriller.’75 
Krutnik establishes imaginary boundaries to the set of noir by defining the “tough 
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thriller” as a crime story that is derived from hard-boiled fiction and features a male 
protagonist. He explicitly acknowledges the masculine logic of exclusion here at work 
when he admits that, ‘[t]his stress upon the “tough” thriller will inevitably marginalise 
other 1940s crime film cycles which have traditionally either been included within or 
related in some way to the “noir corpus”.’76 The gangster, police procedural and gothic 
suspense film are all excluded from the set of noir as Krutnik determines it. That this 
move is a productive suturing of film noir is suggested by Krutnik’s admission that 
given the multiplicity at work, ‘it becomes impossible to divide up the 1940s film noir 
into tidy, mutually exclusive categories.’77 He adds that ‘the advantage of focusing upon 
the “tough” thriller is that it allows many of the key (...) features associated with noir in 
general to be located within a context whereby one can interrogate more adequately 
their ideological effectiveness.’78 Krutnik’s mode is therefore neurotic; his closed 
ontology represses the lack in the function of definition to produce a sutured universal, a 
definition of noir that allows his discourse to function.
79
 It bounds film noir as a concept 
and constitutes it as an all: an as-if-closed set. Such a set depends upon imaginary 
boundaries to cohere: moving now from an ontology to an historiography of noir, the 
function of the Lacanian Imaginary will be explored in relation to the work of Thomas 
Elsaesser. 
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3. Film Noir and the Historical Imaginary 
In his study, Weimar Cinema and After, Thomas Elsaesser identifies a certain 
historiographical function, which he describes, in an explicitly Lacanian invocation, as 
the ‘historical imaginary.’80 Elsaesser finds in the work on pre-war German cinema of 
Siegfried Kracauer and Lotte Eisner two traditions – ‘Expressionism’ and ‘Weimar 
Cinema’ respectively – that, in responding to the German national trauma of World War 
2 for Kracauer and the legacy of Romanticism for Eisner, provide a retrospective 
coherence for the German cinema from the vantage points of New York and Paris.
81
 
Already this begins to sound rather like a psychoanalytic discourse, and this sense is 
compounded when Elsaesser adds that, in From Caligari to Hitler and The Haunted 
Screen he sees ‘mirror relations at work, providing an occasion for 
recognition/miscognition effects, which in turn favoured discourses and perspectives on 
their subject that necessarily occluded other, equally well-founded film-historical 
approaches and film-aesthetic evaluations.’82 For example, Elsaesser notes that émigré 
journalist HH Wollenberg’s Fifty Years of German Film, published in the same year as 
From Caligari – but arguing against the psychological reading of Das Cabinet des Dr. 
Caligari – has been all but forgotten.83 Studies such as those by Kracauer and Eisner 
succeeded because they reinforced the prejudices of their host countries towards West 
Germany as the successor to the Third Reich. In America for example, Kracauer’s 
criticism of the 1920s German cinema reflected the general feeling of unease towards 
Germany as a whole following the war. The categories that Kracauer and Eisner 
produced – Expressionism and Weimar Cinema – presented readymade identities “for 
Western eyes” and against which, Elsaesser suggests, it is difficult to argue. 
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This, for Elsaesser, is the function of the “historical imaginary”. He clarifies his 
terminology, by explaining that he does indeed mean “imaginary” ‘in the Lacanian 
sense,’ which is to say, ‘the field of representations that a subject lives as his/her 
identity across self-images, alienated because structured by an (invisible) symbolic, and 
determined by the (inaccessible) presence of the significant other(s).’84 He suggests that, 
with the notion of the historical imaginary, he identifies a ‘dynamic of miscognition’ in 
the construction of generic and national identity, with history functioning as a 
Symbolic, and the cinema as the field of representations. Elsaesser suggests that in this 
miscognition, the intervention of an imaginary order promulgated by Kracauer and 
Eisner allowed the German cinema to become the mirror or the shadow of the German 
historical trauma that was the Third Reich. The function of this historical imaginary was 
to permit a first attempt at understanding such trauma, as ‘unrepresentable history found 
less its “objective correlative” than its negative image and thus the illusion of a hidden 
truth’ in the field of representations.85 In this way, German cinema becomes cast almost 
as automaton: the imaginary-symbolic machinery that crashes into motion in response 
to the tychic irruption of a traumatic event. The result was the production of certain 
master narratives with respect to the German film industry: for example, that the UFA 
became synonymous with the decadence and grandeur of the period, and it was 
commonly understood as a ‘child of the Wehrmacht’ and thus little more than an 
extension of the propaganda wing of the Nazi party.
86
 
Elsaesser goes on to explain that he finds this historical imaginary also at work 
in the historiography of film noir – inextricably linked as it is to the history of “German 
Expressionism” in Hollywood – and finds similar master narratives in play. He suggests 
that, ‘the history of film noir derives its semblance of cogency from the mirror-
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confirmation (i.e. the imaginary relations) which its images and concepts entertain with 
the economic, linguistic and political (i.e. symbolic) factors structuring this history.’87 
There is in film criticism, Elsaesser observes, a broadly presumed German ancestry of 
noir that involves a relationship between Hollywood and Europe that entails the 
‘circulation of cultural cliché and backhanded compliment’ and that provides ‘mutually 
sustained imaginaries of “otherness”.’88 Some of the intricacies of this trans-Atlantic 
cultural dialectic will be explored in the next chapter; what is of interest here is what 
Elsaesser identifies as the function of the historical imaginary with respect to film noir 
as  ‘simultaneously “covering up” and “preserving” the inconsistencies, multiple 
realities and incompatible entities named by German Expressionist style, political exile 
and the Hollywood film industry, constructing an effect of self-evidence by giving them 
a single name and a cause-and-effect “history”.’89 Indeed, like the retroactive nature of 
the critical category of film noir, it is a commonplace of film historiography to assert 
the connection between German Expressionist cinema and American noir. However, 
this connection seems to stand on less stable foundations than that other truism of film 
criticism. Elsaesser wonders whether the two histories – noir and Expressionism – are in 
fact both largely “imaginary”. He asserts that, ‘[b]y placing them back to back, across a 
listing of German émigré directors, the histories are made to mirror each other in an 
infinite regress that has tended to produce a self-validating tautology,’ and suggests that 
it is for this very reason that they continue to be of interest to film criticism and 
historiography.
90
 This, for Elsaesser is another instance of the German historical 
imaginary; what he calls ‘a veritable history of the false’ in cinema, and an enduring 
aspect of cinematic discourse.
91
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Elsaesser points to Paul Schrader as the principal raconteur in the case of the 
master narrative of the German influence on film noir; he suggests that it was he who 
‘explicitly and at length, associated film noir with German Expressionism and its 
cinematic legacy, pointing to its “unifying” force.’92 Schrader is indeed an enthusiastic 
proponent of this supposed genealogy of noir: in the seminal ‘Notes’, he declares that, 
‘when, in the late Forties, Hollywood decided to paint it black, there were no greater 
masters of chiaroscuro than the Germans,’ and that, ‘[l]ike the German expatriates, the 
hard-boiled writers had a style made to order for film noir; and, in turn, they influenced 
noir screenwriting as much as the German influenced noir cinematography.’93 Thus the 
visual style of noir is – for Schrader – as determined by the ‘German expressionist 
influence’ as the noir narrative structure by the fiction of Chandler, Hammet and Cain.94 
Elsaesser rightly singles out Schrader as a significant figure in this discourse but he is 
by no means alone: Higham and Greenberg’s Hollywood in the Forties, which predates 
the ‘Notes’ by four years, suggested that film noir was characterised by ‘grim 
romanticism, developed through U.F.A. and the murky, fog-filled atmosphere of pre-
war French movies, [which] flowered in Hollywood as the great German or Austrian 
expatriates – Lang, Siodmak, Preminger and Wilder – arrived there;’ and Raymond 
Durgnat’s ‘Paint it Black: the Family Tree of Film Noir’ of 1970, notes that, ‘German 
expressionism heavily influenced American films noirs, in which German directors 
(Stroheim, Leni, Lang, Siodmak, Preminger, Wilder) loom conspicuously.’95 This 
“German connection” constitutes a fundamental assumption running through film noir 
criticism; for example, Foster Hirsch’s assertion of the influence of Expressionism in 
those moments where ‘the [noir] film becomes overtly subjective, entering into the 
hero’s consciousness to portray its disordered fragments;’ or a more recent study such 
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as Andrew Dickos’ Street with No Name, which acknowledges the difficult nature of 
such a connection but still asserts the “German influence” on film noir’s chiaroscuro 
lighting and quotes approvingly from both of Elsaesser’s agents of the historical 
imaginary, Kracauer and Eisner.
96
 The key filmic players in such a discourse are of 
course, Fritz Lang’s M (the prototypical study of tormented subjectivity in a tenebrous 
and labyrinthine city), the Weimar Strassenfilme of Karl Grune and GW Pabst (such as 
Die Strasse (1923) and Die freudlose Gasse (1923)), and von Sternberg’s Der blaue 
Engel (1930) (with Marlene Dietrich as the original femme fatale).
97
 
Against such an imaginary configuration, Elsaesser offers a number of points of 
critique. He notes firstly that there is a ‘peculiarly French element embedded in the 
origins of the idea of German Expressionist cinema itself,’ in that it was Eisner’s book, 
published in Paris in 1952 as L’Écran démoniaque, that shaped European understanding 
of German cinema (and in fact coincided with the work of the French critics such as 
Borde and Chaumeton at the birth of film noir).
98
 Elsaesser, however, does not appear to 
take the extra step of noting that the Panorama itself offers “German Expressionism” as 
‘the most marked and persistent influence on film noir.’99 More significantly, Elsaesser 
offers a deconstruction of the Expressionist myth both after the fashion of and explicitly 
referring to Marc Vernet’s ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, which was discussed in 
the previous chapter. On closer inspection, Elsaesser suggests, the “historical 
arguments” for the German influence on noir have very little credibility; for example, 
Hollywood – as already noted – had its own chiaroscuro or “Rembrandt” lighting 
                                                 
96
 Foster Hirsch, Dark Side, p. 57; Andrew Dickos, Street with No Name: A History of the Classic 
American Film Noir (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 2002), pp. 9, 11 & 13. Apropos of Dickos, see the 
previous chapter for the American tradition of “Rembrandt lighting”. 
97
 On the Strassenfilm, see Janice Morgan, ‘Scarlet Street: Noir Realism from Berlin to Paris to 
Hollywood’, Iris, 21 (1996), 31-53).  This issue of Iris, featuring Elsaesser and Ginette Vincendeau, was 
devoted to the topic of European precursors to American film noir. Die Strasse. Dir. Karl Grune. 
Germany, Stern-Film, 1923; Die freudlose Gasse. Dir. GW Pabst. Germany, Sofar-Film, 1923; Der blaue 
Engel. Dir. Josef von Sternberg. Germany, UFA, 1930. 
98
 Elsaesser, WCA, p. 422. 
99




technique, actors such as Peter Lorre were relegated to minor roles as perverts and 
foreigners, and Ernst Lubitsch’s reputation for femmes fatales led to a dead-end in 
Hollywood with Rosita (1923).
100
 Similarly, among the émigrés to Hollywood, 
Elsaesser notes that it was the ‘wrong Germans’ who ended up making films noirs; it 
was not Pabst or Grune (who went to Britain) but the Menschen am Sonntag 
filmmakers, Siodmak, Wilder and Ulmer.
101
 Elsaesser’s most devastating critical blow, 
however, is to push the historical imaginary to its absurd conclusion; he simply lets the 
historical narrative of the German influence and émigré creators of film noir play out. 
He works through a number of “what-if” scenarios in a ‘virtual film history,’ where 
‘William Dieterle directs The Maltese Falcon and not Satan Met a Lady’ and Robert 
Wiene becomes a successful noir director in Hollywood, instead of fleeing to Budapest, 
London and then Paris.
102
  
Furthermore, Elsaesser indulges in a long historical fantasy that rewrites Robert 
Siodmak’s career in light of his Hollywood films noirs. Siodmak’s oeuvre crosses both 
continents and genres; from Menschen am Sonntag and Abschied (1930), to La Vie 
Parisienne (1934) and Pièges (1939), Elsaesser suggests that, ‘not much seems to lead 
to Phantom Lady [(1944)] and The Killers, even if one leaves aside Son of Dracula 
[(1943)].’103 However, if Phantom Lady is taken as central to Siodmak’s work:  
it is as if his whole previous film making rearranges itself, around a certain kind of 
coherence that, however is less due to the benefit of hindsight, and rather follows the 




In the light of Phantom Lady, a film such as Pièges appears as part of the filmic 
explorations of an auteur, but, Elsaesser notes, ‘Pièges, looked at in its own film-
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historical context, does not anticipate Phantom Lady half as much as Phantom Lady 
implies Pièges.’ 105 Without the “benefit” of such hindsight, Pièges remains a 
thoroughly French film of high pedigree. And it should be remembered that, in this 
historical fantasy, in moving from Menschen in Germany to The Killers, ‘[i]t is as if, in 
exile, Siodmak “remembered” the lighting style of Murnau, Pabst and Dupont.’106 Thus, 
Elsaesser lays bare the inadequacies of the discourse of the historical imaginary. 
There are a number of striking aspects to Elsaesser’s discussion here – the 
dimension of Nachträglichkeit at work will be discussed below – but what is of 
particular interest in the first instance is the term “virtual history” because it points to a 
crucial dimension of Elsaesser’s effort to work against the historical imaginary.107 It 
evokes an aspect of his approach to historiography that coincides with Žižek’s 
discussion of a Deleuzian “pure past”.108 Beyond a straightforward critique, Elsaesser 
offers something of a positive project that aims to undo the effects of the historical 
imaginary: to uncover other, potential histories that have been obscured by this 
discourse. He suggests that, ‘[i]f in their deconstruction, the false histories have one 
advantage, it is that they let us glimpse so many different “other” histories.’109 Through 
Elsaesser’s intervention in the history of the German cinema, the past is opened up to 
the possibility of an understanding less influenced by the historical imaginary. In the 
case of noir, Elsaesser points to the role of the B-feature and the independent studios, 
the introduction of colour cinematography, and ‘the single, irreducibly individual and 
unique fate of each and every German film maker [who left in the 1920s and 1930s]’ 
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that suggest another history of noir.
110
 In a lecture given in 2006, Žižek comments on 
the term “virtuality”, suggesting that it is ‘possibility which is not simply cancelled once 
it is not actualised; it [is that which] continues to haunt what happens.’111 Already the 
correlation between Elsaesser’s “other histories” and the “virtual” becomes apparent: 
the discourse of the false histories (that which is actualised) does not erase other 
possibilities but obscures them. The other histories remain “virtual”. Žižek goes on to 
suggest that, ‘[i]n order to understand what happens, you have to include its echo, it 
reverberates the possibilities.’112 This is for what, in a metaphorical way, Elsaesser 
aims; as he deconstructs the historical imaginary he listens for the “echoes” of other 
possibilities, the other histories of film noir and émigré filmmakers. Like Elsaesser, 
Žižek states that, apropos of the past, ‘[i]t’s not enough to know what happened, what 
might have happened is part of what happened.’113 The alternative histories are part of 
the history of film noir and their place in the cinematic discourse must be discerned.  
Further to this, Žižek points to TS Eliot, who, in ‘Tradition and the Individual 
Talent’, sets out his notion of ‘the historical sense’ as ‘a perception, not only of the 
pastness of the past, but of its presence.’114 When read via Žižek, Eliot’s injunction that, 
‘[n]o poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. You cannot value him 
alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead,’ can be 
understood as such an insistence on the appreciation of the virtual.
115
 Elsaesser has a 
very keen “historical sense”; he is all too aware that it is ‘a sense of the timeless as well 
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as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together.’116 An engagement 
with the historical imaginary puts complex temporalities into play, as was seen with the 
case of Robert Siodmak. And in the retrospective movements of his historiography, 
Elsaesser attempts to bring out the virtual conditions of a history, the “present-ness of 
the past” in the history of film noir. Michael Wedel suggests that Elsaesser’s notion of 
the historical imaginary provides a useful tool in the deconstruction of cinematic myths, 
while at the same time acknowledging ‘their very determining power as the founding 
impulse and ultimate justification of why we should care for not only writing but 
“doing” and even “living” and “experiencing” the history of the cinema.’117 Elsaesser’s 
intervention is thus both a redoubling and an undoing of the original retroactive gesture 
of the historical imaginary; it follows a similar retrospective trajectory but it uncovers 
the virtual field of history rather than occluding its possibilities. 
As such, the most powerful weapon in Elsaesser’s struggle against the historical 
imaginary is the historiographer’s ability to insert new possibility into the past. He 
wonders whether it is possible to “revive” Weimar films (or film noir, for that matter), 
asking, ‘[w]hat would it mean, for instance, to “give back” to them some of their other 
possible futures, rather than keep them the ones that history (the historical imaginary) 
seems to have locked them into?’118 Again this coincides with Žižek’s theorisation of 
the relation between the past and the present. Addressing this point in The Parallax 
View, Žižek turns to Bergson and the possibility of changing, in a formal manner, the 
virtual dimension of the past. Žižek suggests that, ‘the emergence of a radically New 
retroactively changes the past – not the actual past, of course (we are not in science 
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fiction), but past possibilities.’119 As an example, he points to Bergson’s experience of 
the outbreak of a war that previously had seemed ‘simultaneously probable and 
impossible’ and which then became both real and possible in its actualisation.120 
Bergson explains that, with the retroactive appearance of possibility, ‘I never pretended 
that one can insert reality into the past and thus work backwards in time. However, one 
can without any doubt insert there the possible, or, rather, at every moment, the possible 
inserts itself there.’121 Elsaesser effects a similar formal transformation; his 
historiography performs a reconfiguration of the elements of the past so that it, in 
Žižek’s terms, ‘remain[s] factually the same but the virtual dimension of possibilities 
changes.’122 Elsaesser describes his move as a ‘brutal revisionism’, but such violence is 
necessary to break through the barrier of the imaginary relation.
123
 
He suggests that, in the light of the historical imaginary, ‘[f]ilm noir is thus in a 
sense a textbook example of how not to write film history’ and points to a more 
rigorous historical analysis of each and every case of individual filmmakers in Germany 
and America.
124
 Elsaesser notes that such scholarship allows for the consideration of 
historiographical possibilities ‘that otherwise – even with the best intentions – would 
remain hidden, blocked out and lost to history by such a blanket term [as “film 
noir”].’125 Through his restructuring of the possibilities of the past, Elsaesser finds that 
Hollywood tended to use European cinematic movements such as Expressionism and 
Surrealism to depict disorder and pathology: consider the dream sequences in Stranger 
on the Third Floor and Spellbound. This ironic cultural appropriation returns Elsaesser 
to Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari, which constituted Expressionism as the depiction of a 
                                                 
119
 Žižek, The Parallax View (London: Verso, 2006), p. 202. 
120
 Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (Paris: PUF, 1991), pp. 1110–1111, quoted in Žižek, Parallax, p. 202. 
121
 Bergson, Oeuvres, pp. 1340, quoted in Žižek, Parallax, p. 202. 
122
 Žižek, ‘Lateral Introduction’. 
123
 Elsaesser, WCA, p. 9. 
124
 Ibid., p. 423. 
125
 Ibid., p. 429. 
186 
 
disturbed mind, leading him to conclude, ‘[s]uch, then, might be the “real” history of 
the German origins of film noir.’126 The new possibility introduced into the past is that, 
far from the valorisation of émigré filmmaking styles by the classical Hollywood 
tradition, film noir presents a difficult terrain of mutual, trans-Atlantic cultural 
scepticism. 
There is clearly a dimension of what was identified in Chapter 1 as 
Nachträglichkeit at work in the relation to the past expressed in both Elsaesser’s 
discussion and its corollary in the notion of a “pure past”.127 Bergson continues his 
reflection on the status of the past with an expression of this “afterwardsness”. A ‘new 
reality,’ he suggests, ‘reflects itself behind itself in the indefinite past;’ it is found in the 
past as a possibility only after it has emerged as a reality, so that, ‘its possibility, which 
does not precede its reality, will have preceded it once this reality emerges.’128 Its 
emergence determines its own possibility in the past retroactively, so that it ‘begins to 
always have been’ in the same way that, to recall for instance the examples of Chapter 
1, the Wolfman’s symptom-dream always will have been a primal scene, or the stain on 
Walter Neff’s shoulder a wound.129 Furthermore, Elsaesser in fact states explicitly 
(although almost in passing) that, apropos of film noir, what is ‘[m]ost noticeable is the 
term’s historical imaginary as deferred action (Nachträglichkeit).’130 This brief 
reference is principally in relation to the cycles of film noir criticism – what Elsaesser, 
quoting Vernet, refers to as the ‘unanalysed discourse of (...) predecessors’ – however, 
the effect of afterwardsness is found at a much more profound level in his exploration of 
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the noir historical imaginary.
131
 There is a fluidity to the past in, for example, the long 
discussion of an imaginary history of Robert Siodmak that is characteristic of the 
psychoanalytic concept. It has already been noted that to focus on Phantom Lady has an 
effect on his previous films such that they rearrange themselves around this point – 
indeed a sort of point de capiton – in a new configuration. Moreover, the logic of 
Elsaesser’s historical imaginary retroactively transforms the history of émigré 
filmmakers in Paris in the 1930s. Accordingly, Siodmak’s Pièges ‘should really have 
been made in Hollywood, and by Ernst Lubitsch (...) because it illustrates to perfection 
the “miscognition” factor of Austro-Germans as directors of Hapsburg decadence or 
Parisian operetta;’ and his La Crise est finie (1934) and La Vie parisienne ‘should have 
been directed by Max Ophuls, who was already in 1936 inescapably associated with 
Vienna, musicals, operetta, (...) the Hapsburg monarchy or Parisian fin de siècle.’132 
Elsaesser also suggests that Ophuls himself expressed awareness of the workings of the 
historical imaginary when he suggested that he should have directed Fritz Lang’s Liliom 
(1934) in exchange for his own On a volé un homme (1934).
133
 Such a reorganisation of 
the past evokes both Eliot’s observation that, ‘the past should be altered by the present 
as much as the present is directed by the past,’ and its echo in Lacan’s insistence that, 
‘[h]istory is not the past. History is the past in so far as it is historicised in the present – 
historicised in the present because it was lived in the past.’134 
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Moreover, Elsaesser’s work suggests that the retroactive movement of the 
historical imaginary has a particular effect: that of repression. Indeed, Weimar Cinema 
and After is replete with references to the notion of repression and the repressed. 
Elsaesser comments upon ‘the “repressed” of which Lang’s film cannot speak’ and 
Lubitsch’s treatment of classical subjects ‘to show that tragic inevitability or a tragic 
ending was often a matter of the author having repressed materialist motivations for the 
sake of aesthetic coherence or ideology,’ and more generally, ‘the systems of repression 
and displacement characteristic of the German art cinema.’135 Most interesting, 
however, are the points at which Elsaesser connects repression with the historical 
imaginary itself; he suggests that the categories of the post-war historiographies of 
German cinema tended to present oppositional pairs – such as Expressionism and Neue 
Sachlichkeit – that have a ‘symmetry [that] seems to repress something.’136 There was 
something lost in or by the discourse of the historical imaginary – which Elsaesser aims 
to recover – that points to a way in which the conceptualisation of the historical 
imaginary can be expanded, taken further, in perhaps another or a new direction through 
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4. The Noir Metaphor 
Lacan articulates the mechanism of repression through the structure of metaphor: via a 
brief detour through Lacan’s elaboration of this structure in relation to the Oedipus 
complex, it will become clear how further significance can be granted to the notion of 
the “noir metaphor” first identified in Chapter 1 and what implications this has for the 
historiography of film noir. As was noted in that chapter, Lacan – taking up Jakobson – 
suggests that metaphor is a process of substitution. A crucial step in Lacan’s 
transliteration of Freudian metapsychology into the terms of structural linguistics was 
the metaphorisation of the Oedipus complex: both the rendering symbolic of its terms 
and its expression through the structure of metaphor.
138
 The precise permutations of 
“Les trois temps de l’Œdipe” are not here the concern; instead, certain key aspects of 
the navigation through and resolution of the complex can elucidate this mechanism of 
substitution and repression. In this work on the Oedipus complex, Lacan presents what 
he calls ‘the formula for metaphor, or for signifying substitution’ thus: 
 
    
   
   
 




Lacan explains that capital Ss are signifiers, x is an unknown signification, and 
the lower case s the signified ‘induced by the metaphor, which consists in the 
substitution in the signifying chain of S for S'.’139 He adds that bar through the signifier 
S' represents its ‘elision,’ which is ‘the condition of the metaphor’s success.’140 In other 
words, the signifier S' has been repressed, it has fallen below the bar, and so is written 
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$'. This formulation can be understood when worked through Lacan’s theorisation of the 
Oedipus complex and ‘the metaphor of the Name-of-the-Father, that is, the metaphor 
that puts this Name in the place that was first symbolized by the operation of the 
mother’s absence.’ 141 
Name of the Father
              
   
              
                        
   Name of the Father  
 
       
  
To situate these terms briefly, the “signifying chain” on the left is the “father 
function”, which replaces the “signifying chain” on the right, which could be considered 
the “maternal signifier”; or, as Lacan states, ‘[t]he function of the father in the Oedipus 
complex is to be a signifier substituted for the signifier, that is for the first signifier 
introduced into symbolisation, the maternal signifier.’142 That which is produced – the 
right hand side of the formula – is a phallic signification and will be explored in a 
moment. The “maternal signifier” represents Lacan’s discussion of frustration through 
which he draws the Fort-Da game into the Oedipus complex. The mother is the one who 
comes and goes – symbolised by the “there” and “gone” – and her absence raises a 
question: 
what is the signified? What does she want, that one? I would really like it to be me that 
she wants, but it is quite clear that it is not only me that she wants. There is something 
else at work in her. What is at work is the x, the signified.
143
  
The mother is therefore found to be desiring (of something other than the child), and the 
“Mother’s Desire” is thus an x, an unknown signified. The child cannot make sense of 
this absence, it becomes an abyssal question: “Che vuoi?” What do you want? The 
mother can be considered the first Other – the first terrain of symbolisation and thus 
incarnation of the Symbolic order – and it is found to be lacking.144 
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 The child attempts to be the object of the mother’s desire – attempts to be the 
“phallus” – and the resolution of the Oedipus complex comes as the child accepts that it 
is instead a question of having the “phallus”, and it is the father who is in possession. 
This is the “paternal function” of substitution: the Nom du Père stands in for the Desire 
of the Mother. To be clear, it is not that the father himself supplants the mother; it is a 
question of an exchange of signifiers in the child’s Symbolic order. In the resolution of 
the Oedipus complex, ‘the father is a metaphor;’ quite literally it is ‘a signifier that 
comes in the place of another signifier [un signifiant qui vient à la place d’un autre 
signifiant].’145 The paternal function is, as François Regnault suggests, ‘a metaphor 
which puts a name in the place where the mother is absent.’146 The traumatic question – 
the epistemic trouble of the mother’s absence – can be “repressed”; the signifier of the 
mother’s desire is pushed under the bar as it comes to be signified by the Nom du 
Père.
147
 Charles Shepherdson notes that, ‘[t]he “father” is thus a metaphor, in the sense 
of being that which the child substitutes as an answer to the enigma of maternal 
desire.’148 This metaphorical substitution is the “primal repression” upon which all 
subsequent signification is dependent. The “secondary repression” of everyday 
metaphor has the same structure; it involves the substitution of one signifier for another 
in a vertical relation, where the substituted signifier is not erased but repressed. Lacan 
states that, ‘the occulted signifier [remains] present by virtue of its (metonymic) 
connection to the rest of the chain.’149 It is contained in the metaphor as an unspoken 
element.
150
 It is in this way that Lacan’s insistence on an equivalence between metaphor 
and Freud’s condensation remains consistent. In his reading of Freud’s dreamwork, 
                                                 
145
 Lacan, S5, pp. 174-175. 
146
 François Regnault, ‘The Name of the Father’, in Reading Seminar XI, pp. 65-74 (p. 69). 
147
 In Lacan’s second “formula for metaphor”, the signifier “Mother’s Desire” should in fact be written as 
barred so as to signify its “elision”. 
148
 Shepherdson, Vital Signs: Nature, Culture, Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 127. 
149
 Lacan, ‘Instance’, p. 422. 
150
 Metonymy – as the precondition of metaphor – involves the movement from one signifier to another in 
a horizontal relation. 
192 
 
Lacan conceptualised metaphor as the condensation of two signifiers into one 
concept.
151
 Metaphor is based upon an unspoken common trait between these two 
signifiers; something must be repressed in metaphor for meaning to be produced. To 
take an example such as “the sky is weeping”, this metaphor is based upon a 
comparison between raindrops and teardrops but it is a comparison that exists only at 
the unconscious level of language; it is never stated in the metaphor itself.
152
 Such 
connections do not even have to be so simple; jokes and puns often rely upon entirely 
irrational unconscious connections that, when spoken out loud, do not make “sense” but 
nonetheless carry a linguistic effect as metaphor.
153
 
When this structure is read together with Elsaesser’s reflections on the virtual 
history of the past, a new aspect of the “noir metaphor” emerges. In Elsaesser’s 
formulation, the obscured “other histories” – the virtuality of the history of film noir – 
can be considered to be repressed; the historical imaginary carries these potentialities 
“under the bar” as an unspoken element of its discourse. The historical imaginary 
“represses” the role of the discourses of the B-movies and technological advances in the 
development of film noir, as well as the specificities of the story of each émigré 
filmmaker that arrived in Hollywood.
154
 Indeed, to return to the discussion of the 
historical conditions of noir in the previous chapter where an investigation of the 
archive revealed a certain function – described as a lack in the Other, a fault inherent to 
the critical structure – these discourses too can be understood as being repressed by the 
conventional historiography of the Anglo-American work on film noir in the 1970s. It is 
perhaps ironic that one of the agents of the historical imaginary identified by Elsaesser – 
Siegfried Kracauer, whose Caligari to Hitler cast such a shadow over the understanding 
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of German cinema, that, in Elsaesser’s view, served to repress other possibilities with 
relation to understandings of German cinema – should himself have fallen victim to the 
repressive power of the film noir historical imaginary.
155
 With the emphasis on the role 
in the 1940s and 1950s of the French critical tradition in the creation of noir, a 
contemporaneous possibility such as Kracauer’s “terror films” – which appeared in the 
American magazine Commentary – was obscured, repressed by Durgnat, Schrader et al. 
So too were the possibilities of Hollywood’s own discourse relating to these films – 
Biesen’s “red meat” crime cycle – occluded by the “master narrative” of film noir made 
in America, invented in France. In Chapter 2, such historical possibilities were 
identified with Lacan’s matheme for the signifier of the lack in the Other, S(A), and this 
notion can be returned to the Oedipal configuration of repression here being discussed. 
In Le Séminaire VI Lacan brings together the barred Other and the enigmatic “Che 
vuoi?” in his discussion of desire in Hamlet.156 The repression of the Mother’s Desire in 
the paternal metaphor can thus be considered a pushing under the bar of the lack in the 
Other; the problem of her desire is replaced by the signifier of the father. Similarly then, 
the “noir metaphor” represses the epistemological trauma or trouble – this lack in the 
noir structure, manifested by the work of Kracauer or Biesen – to produce a discourse 
on film noir. The effect is an historiography as an imaginary whole; it is a discourse that 
can be compared to the effect of the phallic signification in the paternal metaphor, 
where an Other as whole (the unbarred Other as One, identified by the 1 and the A on 
the right hand side of the formula of metaphor) comes into the place of the troubling 
lack in the (m)Other, which can be reinscribed here as (A).157 
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The insistence of the Nom-du-Père provides for the child an answer to the 
mystery of the desire of the mother; the signifier of the father’s name is substituted for 
that of her desire. He accounts for her “comings and goings” as he is presumed to have 
the “phallus”, that mysterious   for the subject, and thereby gives meaning to the 
maternal signifier. The signification of the phallus is thus, Lacan states, ‘evoked in the 
subject’s imaginary by the paternal metaphor.’158 This “castrating” realisation marks the 
entrance proper of the subject into the Symbolic because, as Charles Shepherdson 
explains, it ‘transforms the enigma of the lack in the Other into a relation between the 
“mother” and the “father,” or more precisely, into a relation between maternal desire 
and the symbolic function.’159 The child works out a signifying relation between these 
signifiers by situating the cause of the troubling absence of the mother beyond itself, by 
giving it the name of the father and thus giving a “signification of the phallus”, which 
allows meaning as such to enter the world. The intervention of the father provides a 
point of reference; Lacan suggests that ‘the Nom-du-Père has the function of signifying 
the whole signifying system, of authorising its existence [le Nom-du-Père a la fonction 
de signifier l’ensemble du système signifiant, de l’autoriser à exister].’160 It establishes 
a set of symbolic coordinates for the child by retroactively conferring signification upon 
those proto-signifiers of frustration: the mother is “Fort” and then “Da” because of the 
father.
161
 His signifier fills out the void opened by the Mother’s Desire by providing an 
answer to the question, Che vuoi? It gives structure to the subject’s universe, regulating 
the Symbolic order to provide what Bruce Fink describes as ‘a compass reading on the 
basis of which to adopt an orientation.’162 As the primary support of the Symbolic order, 
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the Nom-du-Père should thus be understood as the originary point de capiton without 
which there would be no Symbolic as such. 
Apropos of this, the discussion in Chapter 1 therefore suggested that it was the 
work of Frank and Chartier that first established the critical coordinates of film noir, 
upon which the discourse of the historical imaginary depends. Their act of picking out 
certain films – such as Murder, My Sweet and The Woman in the Window – and 
establishing a relation between them made these films part of a structure of cinematic 
meaning, and gave them a new significance: a “noir signification”. What this enabled, 
in terms of the historical imaginary, was an ability on the critics’ part to give history 
itself such a signification. From the first gesture of consolidation by Borde and 
Chaumeton to the enthusiastic uptake of noir by Durgnat and Schrader – a trans-Atlantic 
crossing enabled, in part, by the “interruption” of the French New Wave, which was of 
course influenced by American noir – a film critical and historiographical discourse was 
established through a movement from the films themselves to the conditions of their 
production and reception. This allowed critics to read film history retroactively in terms 
of noir, to give aspects of the development of Hollywood in the 1940s and 1950s a noir 
signification. The historical imaginary – the narrative of émigré filmmakers turning 
continental “expressionism” into American noir – imbues everything, from 
developments in lens coatings and the importance of the B-feature to the geo-political 
cataclysms of the rise of Nazism with such significance. This configuration then became 
the coordinates of work on film noir. The contingent events of what Žižek calls ‘the 
confused multiplicity of historical experience’ were thus arranged, ordered into a 
discourse.
163
 Elements that did not fit into this historiographical narrative – the virtual 
histories of noir – were “repressed”, obscured by the critical signification “noir”. 
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The discourse of the historical imaginary thus has a certain durability – 
recognised by Elsaesser, when he suggests that, ‘one doubts that these [virtual] histories 
will ever retain in quite the same way as does film noir’s imaginary history’ – that arises 
from this ordering.
164
 Noir historiography – as a retrospective gaze – is an interpretive 
act; it is an endeavour to “read” the contingent multiplicity of history, to introduce the 
boundaries of meaning therein in order to account for the critical status quo, the fact that 
there is a thing called “noir”. Such a process can be compared to Lacan’s approach to 
the Oedipus complex. In her discussion of Lacan and Hegel in The Vestal and the 
Fasces, Barbara Schroeder makes an interesting comparison between the Lacanian 
theory of Oedipus and the Philosophy of Right, the latter of which she describes as ‘the 
Bildungsroman of personality (…) the story of the self-actualization of the abstract 
person into the complex individual located in the modern state.’165 Both Lacan and 
Hegel ask the question, “How did we get from there to here?” and conclude – in a 
movement, as it were, “from here to there” – not that it had to happen this way, but that 
it must have happened this way. Schroeder uses the (Oedipal) example that, from her 
position today, it is logically necessary that her parents must have had sex at some point 
in September 1953; this did not have to happen, in the sense that it was, at the time, a 
free and contingent event, but from the perspective of the present it must have 
happened.
166
 The description is logical, working back from “adulthood” to “childhood” 
and imbuing certain events with significance. This is how the Oedipus complex should 
ultimately be understood; it is a retroactive (re)interpretation of primal events, which 
gives them significance after the fact. Its expression as a series of “moments” is a 
logical, rather than chronological, articulation: Lacan states that, ‘the very originality of 
psycho-analysis lies in the fact that it does not centre psychological ontogenesis on 
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supposed stages – which have literally no discoverable foundation in development 
observable in biological terms.’167 Such an articulation is a useful pedagogical tool for 
exploring the Oedipus complex from the standpoint of its resolution; it retroactively 
orders its “progression” just as each stage restructures the experience that preceded it.168 
To “read” history in this way is then to constitute it, retroactively, in the present. 
Recalling both Eliot and Lacan, it is a process of “the presentness of the past” or 
“historicisation in the present”. Film noir, as a retroactive critical category, “makes 
sense” of certain films such as Double Indemnity and The Maltese Falcon in that it 
introduced a new order into the classical Hollywood discourse. The attendant 
historiography of noir seeks to historicise these films by working back from a “noir 
adulthood”, as it appears in the present (relative to the given critic), to the primal events 
that led up to its emergence in the 1940s. And so, while the historical imaginary is, in 
Elsaesser’s view, a particularly egregious example of film history, a degree of such 
retroversion is inherent to any possible relation to the past: particularly a relation to the 
past that seeks to constitute a discourse thereon.
169
 
It is the truth of any such retroactive intervention that it must necessarily provide 
the appearance of a teleology, a determined progression towards an end point: in this 
case, noir. Žižek suggests that what is involved in such an instance is the ‘dialectic of 
contingency and necessity.’170 The “durability” of the historical imaginary is provided 
by the capacity of such a retroactive movement to collapse contingency into necessity. 
After the fact, history appears as if governed by a set of laws, an Oedipal “succession of 
stages” that brought about the present. History cannot be reduced to this ex post facto 
dimension: events were, at the time, a chaotic, contingent multiplicity of undetermined 
happenings. It is, however, understood in this manner. As Žižek notes, ‘an act of 
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interpretation which is in itself thoroughly contingent – non-deducible from the 
preceding series – renders the preceding chaos readable anew by introducing into it 
order and meaning, that is to say: necessity.’171 This gesture constitutes the past as such, 
and reveals once again the complex relation between past, present and future in 
psychoanalytic temporality: the past, from the perspective of the present, is necessary 
because insofar as an event took place, it could not not have taken place, and the present 
therefore, from a retrospective position in the future, will have been necessary. 
Necessity thus emanates from the future – via the unfolding of the contingent present – 
to emerge retroactively in the past.
172
  
The discourse of the historical imaginary, in Elsaesser’s specific sense, endures 
because it represses contingency. It represses, for instance, the fact that the critical 
discourse on film noir could conceivably have been a discourse on “terror films” or “red 
meat” crime films, giving its own discourse the appearance of necessity; the contingent 
“could have happened otherwise” remains in the virtual field of imaginary histories. It is 
here, however, that a more general sense of the historical imaginary could perhaps be 
conceived. Could the emergence of historical necessity from contingent events be 
considered the imaginary of history in the way that, for example, meaning is the 
imaginary of language? Meaning is the consistency of discourse, the determination of 
its structure and the significance of its elements. Žižek notes that, ‘when, out of the 
contingent external conditions, their Result takes shape, these results are retroactively – 
from the viewpoint of the final Result itself – perceived as its necessary conditions.’173 
To recall the language of Chapter 1, the “full stop” of the “Result” thus makes the past – 
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the contingent unfolding of events – appear retroactively as the necessary progression 
towards that point. Taking noir as such a result, its historiography – understood with 
this more general sense of the historical imaginary – thus functions to make “history” 
appear as necessity. The historical accidents of the 1930s and 1940s retroactively 
become the story of noir; a confluence of socio-political, economical, technological and 





5. The Noir Point de Capiton (Reprise) 
Moreover, Žižek states that, ‘the passage of contingency into necessity is an act of 
purely formal conversion, the gesture of adding a name which confers upon the 
contingent series the mark of necessity.’174 This suggests that such a transformation can 
only occur in the presence of a point de capiton, an end term that retroactively confers 
consistency upon that which came before it.
175
 Such a term establishes a discourse – in 
this case the history of film noir – that must be read through and given significance by a 
name. This is the dimension of the point de capiton – familiar to readers of the Lacanian 
political theorists, such as Laclau and Mouffe, Yannis Stavrakakis and Žižek – as nodal 
point or master signifier. A nodal point is defined by Laclau and Mouffe as ‘a particular 
element assuming a “universal” structuring function within a certain discursive field.’176 
And it is in fact upon the notion of discourse coming from Laclau and Mouffe’s theory 
of hegemony that the usage of the term throughout this discussion has implicitly 
depended. Stavrakakis provides a neat summation of the concept: ‘discourse should be 
conceived as an articulation (a chain) of ideological elements around a nodal point, a 
point de capiton.’177 Žižek in particular tends to conflate the point de capiton and the 
master signifier, using the terms interchangeably.
178
 This is not wholly illegitimate; 
however, it is worth noting the distinction between the terms in Lacan’s work. The point 
de capiton plays a crucial role in his early Seminars (The Psychoses and Les Formations 
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de l’inconscient in particular) as well as in the crucial écrits, ‘The Subversion of the 
Subject’ and ‘The Instance of the Letter’. The term appears sporadically throughout the 
1960s – for example, in Problèmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse Lacan connects the 
point de capiton to the notion of suture – and has, for the most part, the quite specific 
sense given to it by the image of the full stop.
179
 The precise point at which the point de 
capiton becomes the master signifier in Lacan’s thought can be found in The Other Side 
of Psychoanalysis. Here Lacan recalls the reading of Jean Racine’s Athaliah he gave in 
1956 at the Saint-Anne Hospital; he remarks, ‘[a]ll they heard were the quilting points. I 
am not saying that it was an excellent metaphor. In the end, it was this S1, the master 
signifier.’180 It is here that the point de capiton is itself retroactively transformed into 
the master signifier, in Lacan’s discussion of Athaliah.181  
He continues, ‘[i]t was a master signifier. It was a way of asking them to notice 
how something that spreads throughout language like wildfire is readable, that is to say, 
how it hooks on, creates a discourse.’182 It is this transformative and productive function 
of the master signifier that is of interest to the theorists of discourse. In his reading of 
Athaliah – as part of his discussion of the point de capiton in The Psychoses – Lacan 
suggests that it is the term “fear” that functions as a master signifier; more specifically, 
it is that ‘[a]ll fears – I have no other fear – are exchanged for what is called the fear of 
God.’183 The substitutive-metaphorical dimension of the point de capiton is very much 
in evidence here but it is the result, the transmutation effected by the signifier that is 
most significant for its dimension as master signifier.
184
 The capitonnage, or “quilting” 
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as it sometimes translated, of discourse by the point de capiton qua master signifier is 
the process by which a field of “floating signifiers” is unified, given identity. In the 
same way that, for Žižek, signifiers such as “justice” and “freedom” are read through 
the master signifier “Communism” so as to determine retroactively their ‘(Communist) 
meaning,’ here films such as The Killers and Out of the Past are read through the master 
signifier “noir” and so their cinematic meaning is retroactively determined.185 “Noir” 
thus functions as Lacan’s ‘concrete point around which all analysis of discourse must 
operate.’186 It is the element which enables a film-critical discourse – from Frank and 
Chartier to the present – to function; it makes possible the production of a certain 
cinematic meaning through the construction of a discursive critical reality. 
The intervention of such a signifier – in the form of a “name”, be it Communism 
or film noir – effects a restructuration of the past. Žižek connects this action of the point 
de capiton to JL Borges’ remarks on Kafka; he notes that ‘some writers have the power 
to create their own precursors,’ adding, ‘a truly creative act (…) restructures the past, 
resignifying the past contingent traces as pointing towards the present.’187 The 
introduction of such a novel element into the past can be compared to the introduction 
of a “new” signifier into the Symbolic order. Recall that Lacan suggests, ‘insofar as the 
battery of signifiers is, it is complete,’ while at the same time there inheres a (-1) to the 
set.
188
 It is this gap, this (-1), that can never be filled which forever permits the addition 
of one signifier more. And yet the set of signifiers that constitutes the Symbolic is 
“complete”; Lacan describes it as a “battery” and Alfredo Eidelzstein points out that, 
like a batterie de cuisine, it is ‘always complete, no matter how many pieces it 
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contains.’189 A new signifier, for example a Lacanian neologism such as “lalangue”, is 
introduced into the Symbolic: the set of signifiers was complete before its introduction 
and it remains complete afterwards, and so the all is maintained.
190
 It is only the relation 
between the elements contained therein which changes; existing signifiers – for 
example, those that make up the neologism, “la” and “langue” – take on retroactively 
new significations. Once again, this is formulated very precisely in TS Eliot’s ‘Tradition 
and the Individual Talent’: 
what happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens 
simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The existing monuments form 
an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the 
really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new 
work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing 
order must be, if ever so slightly, altered[.]
191
  
In terms of film noir, there is, in this regard, a sort of double movement of 
retroactivity. “Film noir” was a signifier new to the critical discourse on Hollywood 
films of the 1940s and 1950s; as such, it was introduced into the battery of signifiers 
that made up this discourse. Settling alongside those of, for example, “western” and 
“musical”, it established new relations between signifiers such as “gangster” and 
“melodrama”, which were given new significance – a noir signification – as they 
became part of the film noir critical structure. This also had an effect on the films 
themselves: following the naming of Murder, My Sweet, Laura and The Woman in the 
Window as noir, other films – such as This Gun for Hire and Shadow of a Doubt – were 
transformed into noir as well. As Žižek notes, ‘when a new point de capiton emerges, 
the socio-symbolic field is not only displaced, its very structuring principle changes.’192 
The films of course remain the same at the level of content: it is a formal 
transformation, in which a new signifying relation is established.  
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Moreover, as a result of the new signifier, “noir”, a wide variety of films is 
reinscribed in the critical discourse: films such as M and Der blaue Engel become 
resignified, as “proto-noir”, and it is this effect that insists upon the question of the 
“precursor” as raised by Borges. In his essay, ‘Kafka and his Precursors’, Borges 
describes his attempt to identify the literary forefathers of the work of Franz Kafka and 
suggests that he finds them in the figures of Zeno, Kierkegaard and Robert Browning. 
Reflecting on their work, he remarks, ‘[i]f I am not mistaken, the heterogeneous pieces I 
have enumerated resemble Kafka; if I am not mistaken, not all of them resemble each 
other. This second fact is the more significant.’193 Kafka, like noir, begins to function as 
a master signifier for Borges: it orders a heterogeneous multiplicity of authors into a 
discourse on precursors. But crucially, he continues: ‘[i]n each of these texts we find 
Kafka’s idiosyncrasy to a greater or lesser degree, but if Kafka had never written a line, 
we would not perceive this quality; in other words, it would not exist.’194 Borges 
identifies the retroactive effect that Kafka’s work has upon that of Kierkegaard or 
Browning; like Eliot’s poet, “set amongst the dead”, Kafka transforms Borges’ 
understanding of, for example, Browning’s ‘Fear and Scruples’, which must now be 
viewed through the prism of the “Kafkaesque”. Borges concludes that, ‘[t]he fact is that 
every writer creates his own precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past, 
as it will modify the future.’195 Browning is thus reinscribed, retroactively, as Kafka’s 
precursor. This paradoxical formulation positions Borges’ thought on this point in line 
with the psychoanalytic theorisation of causality, structure and temporality where the 
past is modified – (re)constituted – by the intervention of the present. 
Nowhere is this reinscription more clearly expressed than in Ginette 
Vincendeau’s essay, ‘Noir is Also a French Word’. Like Elsaesser, Vincendeau 
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challenges the historiographical master narrative of film noir, this time insisting upon a 
French rather than German heritage.
196
 Vincendeau notes that Borde and Chaumeton 
dismiss the European influence on American noir, and while she acknowledges that 
certain critics – such as Durgnat – do mention the French cinema as a source, 
subsequent writing has not explored this possibility. As such, Vincendeau insists that, 
‘[a] more thorough look at the French cinema of the 1930s reveals strong intertextual 
links with American film noir, via film-makers’ careers, filmic reworkings and more 
diffuse cultural references.’197 As discussed in Chapter 1, Vincendeau notes that while 
there is of course a direct lineage, recognised in passing by Borde and Chaumeton, 
between the French cinema and American noir in that some of the films were either 
remade by or were the first adaptations of Hollywood features – La Chienne became 
Scarlet Street and Le Dernier Tournant was the first version of Cain’s The Postman 
Always Rings Twice – the importance of Poetic Realism to American noir has been 
underestimated, and overlooked in favour the German Expressionist historical narrative. 
Vincendeau thus recasts Durgnat’s argument that ‘Poetic Realism could be considered 
to fill the gap between impressionism in painting and realism in literature’ to suggest 
that Poetic Realism in fact ‘filled the gap between German Expressionism and classical 
Hollywood cinema.’198 She notes that many émigré filmmakers sojourned in Paris 
before travelling to America and in that time made films of a distinctively Poetic Realist 
type: a sensibility which then could have also crossed the Atlantic. However, what is 
most interesting about this suggestion is the way in which it begins to reinscribe the 
entire French cinematic movement as a precursor to film noir. Already the way in which 
film noir could create its own precursors starts to become apparent; the intervention of 
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the American category has given rise to a reconsideration of the past: this “new” 
element has begun to transform that which came before it. 
First, the urban setting of Poetic Realism is reread as proto-noir. Vincendeau 
compares the Poetic Realist city, ‘illuminated by shiny cobblestones and pierced by 
gleaming neon signs’ to the dark and light of the noir city in Out of the Past and The Big 
Sleep; she finds in the flashing letters “Chez Michèle” in La Nuit du Carrefour (1932) 
the ‘precursors of the American genre’s “Alphabet City”.’199 Moreover, Poetic Realism 
as a whole becomes reread in terms of the visual motifs of film noir when Vincendeau 
suggests that, for instance, ‘[b]lackness and rain, two key elements of film noir, are 
repeatedly inscribed in Poetic Realist films through this motif;’ and the strange 
highlights across the face in a film such as Mildred Pierce – so often associated with 
German Expressionism – are ‘found systematically adorning the face of the most iconic 
of Poetic realist actors, Jean Gabin.’200 The effect becomes totalising: Jean Gabin is 
reinscribed as the precursor to Burt Lancaster as his visual treatment in Le Jour se lève 
(1939) is compared to the The Killers, as is Gabin’s relation to the space around him: 
‘trapped in his bedroom,’ he is the prototype for Lancaster imprisoned in his own room, 
waiting for his death.
201
 Another of Gabin’s characters, Pépé le Moko, becomes the 
precursor to Robert Mitchum’s Jeff Bailey in Out of the Past, as the noir trope of the 
doomed hero who can never escape his past finds its echo in the myth of escape dreamt 
by Pépé in Algiers. The retroactive, “precursor effect” becomes all the more striking 
when Vincendeau cites pessimism as a direct link between noir and Poetic Realism; she 
states that, ‘[i]f “post-war disillusion” is often quoted as a determinant of film noir, then 
“prewar lack of illusion” is a determinant of Poetic Realism’ and thus an entire period 
of French history – the precarious years of the avant-guerre – is reread, reinscribed as it 
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is understood in terms of America’s own post-war social history.202 The effect is 
completed as Vincendeau continues her discussion of Gabin; she notes that, ‘[t]he most 
striking visual image of Jean Gabin – from one film to another – is that of his face 
trapped behind a window,’ and continues, ‘[i]n an early scene in La Bandera [(1935)], 
this is even underlined by what became a cliché of film noir: his face crossed by the 
diagonal shadows of a Venetian blind.’203 Here a crucial element of Poetic Realism’s 
own iconography – the image of Gabin behind a window – is reread as a noir cliché; a 
defining feature of the French cinema is retroactively transformed into a hackneyed noir 
motif. 
To echo Borges’ reflections on Kafka, without the emergence of noir – if, for 
example, Wilder or Siodmak had never shot a reel of film in Hollywood, or, more 
crucially, Frank or Chartier had never put pen to paper – Poetic Realism would not be 
read in this way. The intervention of the critical category “American film noir” – 
because as Charles O’Brien suggests, the French category “film noir” had a very 
different signification – has restructured the past. It has effected a formal transformation 
of film history, reinscribing its elements in relation to the critical structure so that, 
retroactively, Jean Gabin is made the precursor to Burt Lancaster, Le jour se lève the 
precursor to The Killers, and Poetic Realism as a whole the precursor to film noir.  
This of course raises an important question, which can be related to the problem 
of causality in psychoanalysis. If the subject’s relation to the past can only be a 
retrospective sense of ordering and meaning making, or of introducing new possibility, 
what legitimacy can such constructions have? If film noir is no more than a retroactive 
discursive category, why is it so important? It is the dilemma at the very heart of 
Freud’s theory of Nachträglichkeit. Recall that Freud agonised over the ontological 
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status of the primal scene in his analysis of the Wolf Man and ends the study with a 
“non liquet”: it is not clear, there is no applicable law. It is Borges that provides the 
(very Lacanian) answer. Žižek in fact turns to the passage from Borges in his discussion 
of the “pure past”, as being amenable to the changes of the present, and apropos of this, 
he reframes this dilemma as, ‘Is it really there in the source, or did we only read it into 
the source?’204 Is Jean Gabin really the precursor of Burt Lancaster; can a film really be 
considered “proto-noir” or is it a case of “reading too much into it”? To which Žižek 
offers the ‘properly dialectical solution’ thus: ‘it is there, but we can only perceive and 
state this retroactively, from today’s perspective.’205 John Forrester insists upon 
remembering that ‘the Wolf-man’s sight of his parents copulating is not an event until it 
is linked to something that comes after’ and points to Freud’s declaration that, ‘what 
emerges from the unconscious is to be understood in the light not of what goes before 
but of what comes after.’206 There must be a minimal gap between the event and its 
comprehension – Lacan’s “time for understanding” that comes between the “instance of 
the gaze” and “the moment of concluding” – and so, what the construction of the 
category of noir shows is that all that can be counted on is the retroactive construction 
of the past, which does necessarily involve an imaginary dimension of ordering to 
produce a discourse. This returns to the fundamental principle of the point de capiton: 
meaning is an historical effect, or rather, the past is an effect of meaning. 
 
Lacan situates meaning in the Imaginary; it is, he suggests, ‘by nature imaginary.’207 
This is the realm of apparent cohesion, seeming wholeness, as-if closure. In light of the 
discussion that runs through this chapter, Elsaesser’s understanding of an historical 
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discourse on noir as “imaginary” is entirely appropriate: the story of noir as a 
Hollywood appropriation of German Expressionist style is a myth, a fantasmatic 
support for critical discourse. It presents a compelling narrative – an American story of 
immigrant success in the New World – and is for that reason difficult to escape; as 
Lacan suggests, meaning ‘is tightly bound to what interests you, that is, to that in which 
you are ensnared.’208 It has been promulgated for decades as a helpful and easily 
understandable explanation for the apparent “dark turn” in Hollywood in the 1940s, and 
as such – as both Vernet and Elsaesser have shown – has remained largely unexamined. 
It is a discourse of the Imaginary because it “makes sense”, and as Bruce Fink argues, 
‘something makes sense when it fits into the pre-existing chain. It may add something to 
the chain without fundamentally altering it or rocking the boat.’209 It fit with a certain 
Hollywood self-image – which will be explored towards the end of the next chapter – of 
European, avant-garde and modernist filmmaking. Moreover, such smooth discursive 
sailing has been maintained at the expense complicating factors or details – the lack, 
(A), identified in the previous chapter – which have been, as shown above, “repressed” 
by this imaginary narrative. As Fink again explains, the Imaginary relates to the ego and 
thus, ‘meaning excludes that which does not fit in with our own self-image.’210 The next 
chapter will explore further ways in which the effect of the Imaginary is to allow things 
to “fit” or to “work” through, for example, the construction of a mathematical “fiction” 
such as the square root of minus one; Lacan’s discussion of this “imaginary number” 
will be compared to both the idea of noir and the function of a noir narrative.  
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Chapter 4. The Idea of Noir: Narrative, Signifier, Genre 
 
The idea of noir can, as James Naremore suggests, ‘accommodate many different 
things.’1 This final chapter will explore how Lacanian some of these “things” can be. As 
narrative structure, film noir presents a way in which the relation between the “open” 
and “closed” structures explored in the previous chapters can be comprehended. 
Through an extended discussion of The Maltese Falcon and Lacan’s use of the square 
root of minus one (√-1), noir can be considered in terms of the signification of the 
phallus, and then in terms of the rapport between Jeremy Bentham’s Theory of Fictions 
and the Lacanian Imaginary. And as a genre, noir – and then neo-noir – will be explored 
in terms of repetition and the master signifier. This will constitute the necessary, 
concluding stage in the development of this Lacanian study, where a final distinction 
can be made in the formulation of noir qua point de capiton. 
 
1. Open Endings, Sutured Narratives: Tying Up Loose Ends 
In Looking Awry, Žižek describes ‘[o]ne of the best-known Hollywood legends’ 
concerning the final scene of Casablanca: it is often suggested that even during 
principal photography the ending of the film had not been decided upon.
2
 While the film 
adaptation does change the ending of the source material – Everybody Comes to Rick’s, 
in which Rick gives himself up to the authorities – and Hal Wallis had Bogart dub in the 
famous final line (‘Louis, I think this is the beginning of a beautiful friendship’) after 
the scene had been shot, Žižek points out that, ‘[l]ike most such legends, this one is 
false’ and that all discussion had in fact been resolved in advance of filming.3 What 
Žižek finds interesting is the effect that the chosen ending has in relation to the 
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preceding narrative; he notes that, ‘[w]e experience the present ending (...) as something 
that “naturally” and “organically” follows from the preceding action, but if we were to 
imagine another ending (...) it, too, would be experienced by viewers as something that 
developed “naturally” out of earlier events.’4 This, as he describes, is a narrative 
capitonnage, similar to the function of the point de capiton in narrative structure that 
was discussed in Chapter 1. In Žižek’s example it is the very last scene of the film – as 
opposed to the revelatory, penultimate scenes of the “retroactive noirs” such as D.O.A. 
and Double Indemnity – that brings about this transformation, but in both cases it is the 
après-coup effect of this intervention that is crucial.  
Žižek insists that, ‘the experience of a linear “organic” flow of events is an 
illusion (albeit a necessary one) that masks the fact that it is the ending that retroactively 
confers the consistency of an organic whole on the preceding events.’5 In both cases, the 
point de capiton gives coherence to the narrative when – to recall Vernet’s analysis – 
the answer finds its question and the uncertainties opened up throughout the film are 
closed down by their retroactively conferred meaning. The ending qua point de capiton, 
must serve to contain these possibilities. The closure of the narrative collapses such 
potentialities – often with an insistent title, “The End” – to maintain that this ending is 
the only possible ending: the necessary S2 to complete the S1 provided. The very fact 
that there are such possibilities points to a certain contingency in the appearance of any 
given ending whatsoever. As Žižek notes, what is masked here ‘is the radical 
contingency of the enchainment of narration, the fact that, at every point, things might 
have turned out otherwise.’6 This is the effect of “repressed contingency” identified 
previously in relation to Elsaesser’s notion of the historical imaginary in the last 
chapter, and this notion can now be extended from the cinematic to the filmic in this 
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discussion of narrative structure.
7
 This would appear to be the sine qua non of an ending 
in the classical Hollywood cinema, which Rashna Wadia suggests was motivated by a 
desire for closure and order; she notes, ‘[o]ften resolution occurs only through the 
elision of all ambiguities.’8 All the virtual, potential narrative outcomes must be 
repressed at the last as the point de capiton establishes itself as the “necessary 
conclusion” to events; the number of “alternate endings” included on DVD releases 
points to the many possible “necessities” with which a film narrative can conclude. For 
example, to consider again the possible and “lost” endings to Double Indemnity – 
Cain’s original conclusion in which Walter and Phyllis commit suicide (an eventuality 
forbidden by the Hays Code), and the filmed but unused gas chamber ending – is to see 
in effect three different films: the chosen one ending on a note of male camaraderie, 
Cain’s existential despair, and the explicit crime-and-punishment story. All three 
endings would have “worked”, seeming to have emerged from different aspects of the 
very same narrative, and casting a slightly different shadow on the preceding film but in 
each case giving the Aristotelian sense of an ending as ‘that which does itself naturally 
follow from something else, either necessarily or in general, but there is nothing else 
after it;’ such an ending thus brings with it a sense of “closure”.9 
The opposite is true of The Maltese Falcon: instead of a closing down, the 
revelatory narrative point de capiton here effects a radical opening up. This film thus 
presents the theoretical inverse to D.O.A. or Kiss Me Deadly, where the retroactive 
narrative structure confers meaning on events after the fact, because The Maltese 
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Falcon in fact retroactively confers unmeaning on the narrative at its close. The statue is 
revealed to be an imitation – ‘Fake! It’s a phoney! It’s lead, it’s lead! It’s a fake...’ – and 
all the blood that has been spilt for its sake has been spilt in vain. Archer, Thursby and 
Jacoby, who eventually all died for the “black bird”, have died for nothing. With this 
revelation it becomes clear that Sam Spade’s whole endeavour was, from the start, 
meaningless. There is a complete narrative décapitonnage. This realisation requires a 
complete re-evaluation; it necessitates a total reconsideration of the preceding plot. 
Indeed, Wadia points to the numerous ‘loose ends’, the unanswered questions that 
remain at the end of The Maltese Falcon, such as, where was Iva Archer on the night of 
her husband’s murder, how did Gutman trace the Russian general, was Wilmer really 
just “careless with matches”, and so on.10 Such questions persist at the film’s end but 
Wadia argues that all this is lost with the ending of the film, suggesting that, ‘the viewer 
is not allowed to confront or question the chaos.’11 More interestingly, Wadia ends with 
another question: ‘What would a film theory of loose ends look like?’12 One possible 
answer could necessitate a return to the Lacanian set theory explored in the previous 
chapters, this time moving from considerations of cinematic discourse to notions of 
“open” and “closed” in the filmic narrative. 
Žižek gives an excellent example of the sort of narrative closing that can be 
brought about at the end of a story in his discussion of the role of the classic deduction-
sleuth detective – such as Holmes, or more appropriately, Dupin – as Lacanian “subject 
supposed to know”. “Supposed to know what?” Žižek asks. ‘The true meaning of our 
act (…). The detective’s domain, as well as that of the psychoanalyst, is thus thoroughly 
the domain of meaning.’13 The detective’s apparent omniscience is akin to the image the 
analysand has of the analyst as the one who knows what is wrong: the meaning of the 
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 Žižek compares the scattered, seemingly undecipherable clues at the crime 
scene to the analysand’s free associations: a chaos that, through the process of analysis, 
acquires order and significance because the detective-analyst, ‘solely by means of his 
presence, guarantees that all these details will retroactively acquire meaning.’15 For 
example, at the end of The Murders in the Rue Morgue, Dupin explains the bizarre and 
seemingly impossible events – the strange voice, the hair that wasn’t human, the locked 
room, the body in the chimney – to the narrator, offering a perfectly logical reason for 
each feature – the sailor, the orang-utan, the straight-razor – so that everything is 
accounted for, the meaning of everything is explained.
16
 The detective’s reconstruction 
grants the story closure, organising it into a meaningful whole.  
Gilda would seem to present a paradigmatic example of the closed ending: in 
melodramatic fashion, the villain-obstacle (Mundson) is removed, allowing The Couple 
(Johnny and Gilda) to come together in the final scene, and then leave the film arm-in-
arm, followed by an emphatic “The End” title. Furthermore, the detective, Obregon, 
functions in the classical mode identified by Žižek, as guarantor of meaning: a phallic 
figure, an imaginary authority to preserve the integrity of the symbolic system. The film 
is structured around Gilda’s image as dangerous, promiscuous woman, and in the mode 
of the “retroactive noir”, a penultimate scene finally quilts the meaning of this image: it 
was nothing but a performance designed to make Johnny jealous. The question of 
meaning continually raised throughout the film – as discussed in Chapter 1 – is 
answered; the S1... finds its final S2 as Detective Obregon restores order. He tells 
Johnny, ‘Gilda didn’t do any of those things you’ve been losing sleep over, not any of 
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them. It was just an act, every bit of it. And I’ll give you credit, you were a great 
audience Mr. Fallon.’ Gilda then, like the Maltese Falcon, is revealed to be a “phoney”. 
But unlike the Falcon, this bird has a heart of gold instead of lead. The detective reveals 
her to have been “good” all along, finally imbuing her “performance” with meaning. 
Mary Ann Doane in fact situates the ending of Gilda under just such a phallic function, 
which she describes as  ‘the ultimate gesture of recuperation’, offered by the male 
characters ‘Johnny, the detective, Uncle Pio – who surround Gilda with their 
benevolence, who accept her into the fold – of meaning, of knowledge, of sense.’17 
Obregon in particular confers a sense of consistency on the narrative, ensuring that the 
social order is restored at the end by bringing Johnny and Gilda together. He sanctions 
their relationship – despite the crimes committed – admitting, ‘I’m certainly a pushover 
for a good love story.’ Žižek states that, ‘[t]he very presence of the [classical] detective 
guarantees in advance the transformation of the lawless sequence into a lawful 
sequence; in other words, the reestablishment of “normality”,’ and in Gilda it is the Law 
itself that ensures the pair’s survival, protecting Johnny and Uncle Pio from punishment 
for Mundson’s death: ‘Besides, didn’t you ever hear of a thing called “justifiable 
homicide”?’ 18 
 However, this final order is perhaps not enough to overcome or contain the 
uncertainty, the openness that Gilda has presented. Doane’s analysis of the film is in 
fact sensitive to the fallibility of the phallic function. It cannot wholly contain what has 
gone before; the normative function of closure has been undermined. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, she persuasively argues this in terms of an ‘epistemological trouble’ that is 
indexed to Gilda’s femininity, her “unknowability” as femme fatale: the film thus 
becoming almost an extension of ‘Put the Blame on Mame’, a song which blames 
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female sexuality for a number of disasters.
19
 On their reconciliation Gilda tells Johnny, 
‘Isn’t it wonderful, because nobody has to apologise, because we were both such 
stinkers, weren’t we? Isn’t it wonderful?’ But it isn’t wonderful: the ending is 
manifestly unsatisfactory. The revelation of her essential goodness is not wholly 
credible. The appearance of Gilda as dangerous is too strong to be fully contained or 
controlled by the detective’s discourse. The film’s ending attempts to undermine this 
challenge to authority but is itself undermined by the subversive power of the very 
challenge: as Doane notes, ‘[t]he ending does not “work” precisely because the image of 
volatile sexuality attached to Gilda is too convincing.’20 The uncertainty presented by 
Gilda is too much for the point de capiton to overcome; even the prison bar-like 
pinstripe of her sensible grey suit cannot contain her subversive potential. Beyond, for 
example, the question of Mundson’s tungsten monopoly and the fascist sub-plot – a 
loose end that is never tied off – there is in Gilda a more profound point at stake, a 
question unanswered and perhaps unanswerable. Laura Mulvey has suggested that 
closure cannot simply and retroactively erase preceding events: the very fact that it did 
take place in the film is too strong.
21
 This begs the question: Where does the burden of 
meaning lie? Gilda continually brings meaning into question, and ultimately points to 
an opening, an uncertainty in its own narrative capitonnage.
22
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What Gilda presents is then a sutured narrative. This of course returns Copjec’s 
notion of the sutured set – discussed in the previous chapter – to its origin in her work: 
in the detective story.
23
 An “openness” persists despite the narrative closure that is 
offered. It is almost as though the narrative requires there be an element left out or left 
over, a loose end that is never finally tied: recall Paul Verhaeghe’s image of the sliding 
tile puzzle that must leave one space empty in order to function. Far from being a 
simple closure, suture insists upon a gap, a constitutive lack. Copjec describes this in 
terms of the paradox of the locked room and the logic ‘which allows the corpse to be 
pulled out of an apparently sealed space.’24 She explains that the focus should not be on 
the corpse itself – such as Poe’s Madame L’Espanaye – but on the conditions of suture, 
which is to say the presence of ‘an element (…) added to the structure in order to mark 
what is lacking in it.’25 This Miller associates with the concept of zero, and Copjec 
rightly identifies as Lacan’s objet (a): the excess element that designates the internal 
limit of the (Real-within-the-) Symbolic. For Copjec, it is this limit that ‘guarantees the 
infinity of [the room’s] contents, guarantees that an unlimited number of objects may be 
pulled out of it;’ it constitutes the “room” as always-already “open” to the possibility of 
one signifier more.
26
 Similarly then, the paradoxical status of the meaning brought 
about by suture – which is to say, for instance, the narrative capitonnage offered at the 
end of Gilda – is that the indefinite slippage (glissement) of signification is, as Copjec 
has explained, ‘brought to a halt and allowed to function “as if” it were a closed set 
through the inclusion of an element that acknowledges the impossibility of closure.’27 
To extend the stitching metaphor, the point de capiton cannot entirely suture the gap, 
but instead leaves a scar that at once both closes and renders impossible the total closure 
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of the wound. The “closed” narrative cannot therefore constitute a meaningful “whole”, 
only a signifying “all” – a sutured, as-if-closed set – that requires an unresolved (and 
unresolvable) element: for Gilda, in the specific instance of the tungsten monopoly as 
well as the general, and overwhelming, feeling of uncertainty or unknowability that 
pervades the final scenes.
28
  
However, while Gilda offers an attempted recuperation through meaning in its 
closing scenes, The Maltese Falcon, in insisting ultimately on unmeaning rather than 
meaning, is perhaps an even more radically open narrative discourse. The story might 
seem “all tied up” at the end, with Brigid’s confession and the capture of Gutman’s 
gang and there still remains the necessary “loose ends” (as identified by Wadia), but the 
revelation that the priceless statue they have all been pursuing is a fake – a process of 
alchemy in reverse with gold turned into base metal – has the most profound 
destabilising effect imaginable. The whole “meaning” of the narrative is false: it is no 
meaning at all. Such a move bears the mark of the Lacanian lalangue: the shattering of 
language, or what was described in Chapter 2 as the impossible complex of language 
effects, the erratic, polysemous and equivocal effects of the signifier. The narrative 
stumbles over its point de capiton; instead of enabling meaning, the punctuating mark in 
The Maltese Falcon refuses to make sense. It marks the failure of the narrative 
discourse. Gilda certainly attempts throughout to undermine any stable meaning-
making – which could in itself be interpreted as a “feminine” or lalinguistique process – 
but nonetheless it still relies upon the (compromised) point de capiton and this is the 
very condition of the sutured, masculine structure. The Maltese Falcon subverts entirely 
the structure of retroactive meaning-making itself, turning the point de capiton on its 
head, from the determiner of meaning to the guarantor of nonsense: this is a 
lalinguistique effect par excellence. At the very place where the point de capiton 
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intervenes, the site where the signifying effect (meaning, or the signified) should come 
into being there is just dross: the dead materiality of the leaden Falcon. Meaning is 
found to be lacking. To recall the structure presented in the Graph of Desire, the barred 
Other (A) is found in the locus of (A), the big Other, at the site of the signification of 
the Other, s(A): it now becomes the precise point at which nonmeaning is produced in 
meaning, or perhaps, s(A).  
Even fuller expression of this open narrative discourse is given, in spectacular 
fashion, by another noir: Kiss Me Deadly. Equally as important to the history of the noir 
category as The Maltese Falcon – recall that Borde and Chaumeton described the 
former as ‘the desperate flip side’ to the latter – Kiss Me Deadly, or at least a certain 
version of the film, presents a far more literal example of a lalinguistique narrative 
“shattering”.29 Until 1997, a common print of Aldrich’s film (on 16mm and home 
video) ended in a way quite different from the finale shot in 1954. As Alain Silver has 
pointed out, this version omits scenes number 305 and 307, which show Mike Hammer 
and Velda escaping the house and clutching each other on the beach.
30
 The “truncated” 
ending to Kiss Me Deadly, familiar to many viewers before 1997 (and indeed to those 
after: this alternate ending is included as a DVD “extra feature”), presents a stunningly 
different conclusion: without the shots of Hammer and Velda, the Malibu beach house 
simply explodes in an atomic fireball with everyone presumably annihilated in the blast. 
This vicious and astonishingly bleak conclusion brings all meaning into question.
31
 The 
movie finishes but there is no possible closure. It certainly gives the Aristotelian sense 
of ending – that “there is nothing else after” – but in such an astonishing fashion that 
any sense at all is impossible. The sense of closure is quite literally exploded, blown 
                                                 
29
 Borde and Chaumeton, Panorama, p. 155. 
30
 Alain Silver, ‘Kiss Me Deadly – Evidence of a Style’, FNR, pp. 209-235 (p. 228). Silver first notes this 
anomaly in the third edition of the Encyclopedic Reference, p. 370. 
31
 A meta-historical note at this point: Kiss Me Deadly is often read in terms of a Cold War absurd 
universe where the atomic bomb and potential nuclear holocaust have rendered the world meaningless. 
220 
 
apart. The “End” title itself seems to explode out of the house, and with it goes any 
possibility of capitonnage. Glenn Erickson observes that even the score in this ending is 
chopped off mid bar.
32
 There is no resolution, just an explosion of pure narrative 
contingency. As an “ending” it is lalinguistique in the extreme: a forceful opening-out 
of the discourse. It does not so much unknot the point de capiton as detonate it. 
Coherence, consistency, signification: all are consumed in the nuclear fire. However, 
Silver has shown that Aldrich himself had no knowledge of this version of the film, 
pointing to an interview with Edward Arnold and Eugene Miller where he states: 
I have never seen a print without, repeat, without Hammer and Velda stumbling in the 
surf. That’s the way it was shot, that’s the way it was released; the idea being that Mike 
was left alive long enough to see what havoc he had caused, though certainly he and 
Velda were both seriously contaminated.
33
 
This ending is certainly less radical but – as the director himself suggests – opens up far 
more questions than it answers: What of Hammer’s gunshot wound? Have the pair been 
exposed to the radiation? Fatally so? What exactly was “the great whatsit”? These are 
not “loose ends” that can be sutured, elided by some great, final explanatory point 
because none is offered; they are total uncertainties that can never be resolved.
34
 
As a further point of comparison, in the case of these films noirs at least, a 
MacGuffin plays – to a lesser or greater degree – a role in the possible open-endedness 
of the narrative. And while Gilda uses an entire subplot as its MacGuffin – which is 
itself not central to the potential openness, being rather more a simple loose end – both 
Kiss Me Deadly and The Maltese Falcon rely on an object (the whatsit, the statue) that 
plays a crucial role in both the progression of the narrative and its ultimate opening-out. 
Of course, in a Lacanian filmic analysis, where the term “MacGuffin” appears, the name 
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Žižek must surely follow. Žižek has famously identified the MacGuffin – the ‘pretext 
whose sole role is to set the story in motion’ – as ‘the objet petit a, a gap in the centre of 
the symbolic order – the lack, the void of the Real setting in motion the symbolic 
movement of interpretation, a pure semblance of the Mystery to be explained.’35 Indeed, 
for the characters in both films, the object is manifestly this Lacanian object, the object-
cause of desire: objet (a).
36
 In fact, the Maltese Falcon is often cited as the paradigmatic 
example of a MacGuffin above and beyond any of Hitchcock’s objects.37 In her 
intriguing story/essay on the fate of the falcon props used in the shooting of the film, 
Vivian Sobchack characterises the Falcon statue – as both fictional item and piece of 
movie memorabilia – as ‘an Ur-souvenir of unfulfilled longing’ and ‘an object of desire 
(indeed, as a meta-object of desire).’38 She also points to a curious poetical study by 
John Jenkins and Ken Bolton, entitled The Gutman Variations, which presents an 
imagined monologue for Caspar Gutman as he opines on the priceless black bird. 
Described in a press release as their ‘aphoristic and meditative study of Lacan’ and by 
Sobchack as a ‘powerful, poignant, and funny “materialist” parody of Lacanian 
“desire”,’ The Gutman Variations does indeed read like a well-observed study of the 
subject in the throes of its affair with the objet (a).
39
 The imagined “Gutman” explains, 
‘If I had/ the bird sir/ I would not throw it away, I would put it on the counter/ and say 
bank that. No sir – throw it away? – I don’t like that sir.’40 For Gutman the quest for the 
statue goes on: he leaves Spade’s office (with Cairo in tow) to pursue once more the 
object-cause of his desire. Gutman participates fully in the infinite metonymy of desire; 
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when, in the course of the film, he finally gets his hands on the statue, he realises “that’s 
not it”, it is a fake and the perpetual, open-ended pursuit continues. The MacGuffin, as 




2. The Maltese Falcon = √-1 
Without doubt, the Maltese Falcon statue functions as objet (a) for the characters such 
as Gutman and Cairo. Spade’s cod-Shakespearean description of the statue as ‘the stuff 
that dreams are made of’ is exactly right: object, statue, dreams, they are all “made” of 
desire. Indeed, Naremore reads the Falcon story as ‘a parable about art and surplus 
value, showing how a fetish object is created through the sheer power of myth,’ which 
chimes almost exactly with Žižek’s insistence in The Sublime Object of Ideology that, 
‘Marxian surplus-value announces effectively the logic of the Lacanian object petit a.’41 
There is a danger, however, that the Falcon becomes an entirely overdetermined 
Lacanian object in such discussions, and Sobchack notes that it is perhaps, above all ‘an 
immaterial heuristic device that enables theoretical and philosophical speculation.’42 
However, there is one other way in which the Falcon must be considered in this 
discussion: if, in a filmic sense, it functions for the characters as objet (a), then, at the 
cinematic level, it functions for the audience – in narrative terms – in a manner that can 
be understood in terms of Lacan’s discussion of √-1. 
In 1966 Lacan attended Charles Morazé’s paper on ‘Literary Invention’, given at 
Johns Hopkins University’s The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man 
conference. During the discussion of the concept of “invention” following the paper, the 
organiser, Richard Macksey, offered the following observation: ‘one day someone 
decided that the symbol “i” had to be invented, and that the symbol would be defined: 
“i2 equals -1” and that solved all kinds of problems.’43 Lacan’s own use of √-1 as a 
theoretical tool – which in fact predates this conference by at least seven years – 
similarly presents a solution to a given problem, in this case concerning the structure 
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and function of the Symbolic order. It did of course present its own problems – to lazy 
readers of the Écrits, for example – and Lacan is in fact aware of the apparent 
incongruity of introducing such a notion into psychoanalytical discussion. In Le Désir et 
son interprétation, he says to his audience, ‘I am asking you to accept the following 
notation – I would even allow myself to be so ridiculous as to refer to a notation of 
[root] -1 concerning the Imaginaries.’44  
Arkady Plotnitsky offers an interesting commentary on Lacan’s √-1; he does, 
however, deal mainly with the now infamous remarks on the phallus and attempts – 
unnecessarily – to decouple the mathematical metaphors from Lacan’s prose.45 But 
Plotnitsky does argue for the importance of understanding the function of Lacan’s 
“mathematics” in psychoanalytic theory and furthermore, he suggests that, ‘one has 
indeed to know something not only about Lacan but also about imaginary and complex 
numbers and their history.’46 This necessitates a return to the concept of the line of real 
numbers, first mentioned in Chapter 2: real numbers correspond to quantities on a 
continuum, points along an infinitely long line that can be used for measurement. 
Plotnitsky explains that, in this domain ‘the square root can be defined, can be given 
unambiguous mathematical meaning, only for positive numbers’ and that, ‘square roots 
of negative numbers (...) do not exist, at least in the way that real numbers exist or 
appear to exist.’47 There is, therefore, no point on the real number line that would 
correspond to √-1. As Reinhard Remmert explains, ‘[t]he quadratic equation x2 + 1 = 0 
has no solutions in the field R of real numbers, because every sum of squares r
2
 + 1 with 
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r € IR is positive.’48 The answer was to assume the existence of an imaginary number, i, 
that would allow such an equation to be solved even if its value could not be designated 
among the real numbers. It is such an assumption that will be crucial both to Lacanian 
theory and the understanding of noir that will follow. 
A key theorist in the development of this concept, Leonhard Euler, commented 
that, ‘the square roots of negative numbers cannot be reckoned among the possible 
numbers (...). This circumstance leads us to the concept of numbers, which by their very 
nature are impossible, and which are commonly called imaginary numbers (...) because 
they exist only in our (...) imagination.’49 The imagination is of course not what is 
meant by the Lacanian Imaginary, but the function that these numbers perform in the 
development of mathematics does have a correlation with the psychoanalytic concept. 
This mathematical innovation allowed for the introduction of the field of “complex 
numbers”, which Plotnitsky explains, ‘in general are written in the form a + bi, where a 
and b are real numbers,’ and of which √-1 is the simplest example. This then allowed 
for the solution of certain polynomial equations, which Plotnitsky describes as ‘one of 
the most beautiful and important theorems in mathematics.’50 In sum, Plotnitsky 
suggests that, the mathematical (and Lacanian) √-1 enables the introduction of a new 
field or system that ‘allows one to deal with problems that arise within previously 
established situations but that cannot be solved by their means.’51 
Lacan is fully aware of both this history of and importance to mathematics 
regarding the concept of the imaginary number. In L’Identification, Lacan gives a brief 
description of the ‘elementary arithmetic’ of √-1: that there is no (real) number that 
could fulfill the function of being the root of a negative number because ‘any number 
squared cannot give a negative number, since all negative numbers squared become 
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positive.’52 Furthermore, he introduces the concept of the complex number as ‘any 
number composed of a real number “a” to which there is joined an imaginary number [a 
+ ib]’ and notes that, ‘you can perform with this complex number, and with the same 
success, all the operations that you can perform with real numbers.’53 And in La 
Logique du fantasme, he re-emphasises the importance of the concept of the imaginary 
number that ‘now intervenes in all calculations, in the most common fashion, to ground 
what is called – extending real numbers – the complex numbers.’54 
In L’Objet de la psychanalyse, Lacan discusses the historical context of the 
imaginary number in mathematics, pointing to Descartes’ struggle with negative 
numbers and roots.
55
 It was of course Descartes who first coined the term, stating in The 
Geometry that, ‘[n]either the true nor the false roots are always real; sometimes they are 
imaginary; that is, while we can always conceive of as many roots for each equation as I 
have already assigned, yet there is not always a definite quantity corresponding to each 
root so conceived of.’56 And even in this originary expression can there be found a 
suggestion of the confluence of the mathematical and Lacanian Imaginaries. This is 
made clearer in an echo of another of the great theorists of √-1, Gottfried Leibniz, when 
Lacan refers to the “irrational” as ‘an image, a mathematical metaphor’ concerning the 
concept of the imaginary number: he states that, ‘[t]he square root of minus one doesn’t 
correspond to anything that is subject to our intuition, anything real – in the 
mathematical sense of the term – and yet, it must be conserved, along with its full 
function.’57 The function of the imaginary number is vital to mathematics, even if its 
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value cannot be counted within the realm of “real numbers”. The correspondence to 
Lacanian theory here is not direct; the field of “real” numbers is not of course the 
Lacanian Real and while it would be unnecessary to identify them absolutely, it could 
perhaps be useful to consider this field in terms of the Symbolic (as was the case in 
Chapter 2). In both cases is it necessary to take recourse to another order – designated 
Imaginary – that confers a certain consistency on that first field. For the signifier, this 
imaginary realm is of course that of meaning and the signified.
58
 This, Lacan explains, 
‘is why the root of minus 1 is nothing but algorithm, but it is an algorithm that is of use 
[C’est pourquoi √-1 n’est rien qu’un algorithme, mais c’est un algorithme qui sert].’59 
As such, Lacan’s commentary on the relation between the (-1) and the set of 
signifiers – first introduced in Chapter 2 – can now be completed. In ‘The Subversion of 
the Subject’ he states, 
Now insofar as the battery of signifiers is, it is complete, and this signifier 
[S(A)] can only be a line that is drawn from its circle without being able to be 
counted in it. This can be symbolized by the inherence of a (-1) in the set of 
signifiers. 
It is, as such, unpronounceable, but its operation is not, for the latter is what 
occurs whenever a proper name is pronounced. Its statement is equal to its 
signification. 
Hence, by calculating this signification according to the algebra I use, namely: 
              
             
                    
with S = (-1), we find: s =    .60 
Given the presence of a (-1) within the set of all signifiers – which is to say that, 
recalling Chapter 2, the set cannot be totalised because there always lacks a final 
signifier, that there is no Other of the Other – the Symbolic order is still able to signify 
thanks to what could be considered an “imaginary” function: √-1.  
Lacan appears to suggest that this “imaginary” operation is in evidence 
“whenever a proper name is pronounced”. Apropos of this, Fink notes that the proper 
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name can be considered a (-1) with regard to the set of signifiers because ‘[t]he process 
of naming shows that the set of all signifiers is missing something.’61 Naming often 
involves the introduction of a new signifier to the set (A) – Fink’s example is “Internet” 
– that was not previously part of the set but must now be counted amongst its elements, 
suggesting that this signifier was, in a sense, missing from the Symbolic.
62
 This suggests 
that each time a name is used the lack in the Other is glimpsed before being covered 
over once more by imaginary wholeness. However, this is not limited to the instance of 
the proper name, which is but Lacan’s example of the “unpronounceable operation”; the 
imaginary function, Lacan’s formula makes clear, pertains to the process of 
signification as such. Indeed, Fink suggests – not unreasonably, given that Lacan claims 
to be “calculating signification” with his algebra – that, ‘we have to assume (or 
speculate) that signification is being denoted here by Lacan as S/s (the signifier over the 
signified).’63  
Therefore, taken as the general formula for signification as such, Lacan’s 
“algebra” reveals that this effect – the production of the signified, or meaning, by the 
signifier – is an imaginary function comparable to √-1 (and the mathematical imaginary 
which gave rise to the field of complex numbers). The function is “unpronounceable” 
because it does not pertain to the Symbolic but the Imaginary, which exist in a 
necessary ratio comparable to that of the fields of real and imaginary numbers. Nowhere 
in the network of signifiers does meaning reside: a certain function must therefore be 
assumed, which Lacan designates “signification”. The lack in the Other is a condition of 
every enunciation; every signifier is subtended by this void. This leads to Lacan’s well-
known conclusion that, ‘[n]o authoritative statement has any other guarantee here [in 
the Other as the “locus of the signifier”] than in its very enunciation, which could in no 
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way appear outside that locus. I formulate this by saying that there is no metalanguage 
that can be spoken, or, more aphoristically, that there is no Other of the Other.’64 To 
overcome the paradox of the lack in the Other recourse must be taken to the imaginary 
function, in the same way that, in order to overcome the formal contradiction of the 
“inexistence” of √-1, mathematics was compelled to articulate the theory of imaginary 
numbers. In both cases then, the presence of (-1) within the set of signifiers requires a 
function: √-1 or i. Meaning does not, however, provide an absolutely Other locus from 
which the Symbolic can be determined; indeed, in his Seminar RSI, Lacan situates 
meaning at the intersection of the Symbolic and the Imaginary in his Borromean knot of 
R,S and I.
65
 Just as imaginary numbers cannot be said to “exist” (within the field of real 
numbers) but nonetheless have an effect within that field, the Lacanian Imaginary exerts 
its influence over the Symbolic, imbuing it with meaning, filling out the inert letters that 
make up the neutral matrix of signifiers with its signifieds. Meaning is therefore, as a 
response to or a result of the lack in the Other (-1), an imaginary function that can be 
understood in a similar manner to the mathematical concept of i. 
It is now perhaps possible to begin unlocking the formulation, The Maltese 
Falcon = √-1. The statue is of course revealed to be a fake – the very locus of 
unmeaning – at the film’s end. In short, the statue (as MacGuffin) is just such an 
imaginary number, that “does not exist” but in the presence of which certain 
calculations are made possible. The black bird is only a worthless lump of lead – 
nothing but a meaningless “algorithm” – but, in terms of the narrative, it is a lump of 
lead that is of use. Lacan notes that it is from the development of the mathematical 
imaginary that ‘emerged what can be called the complex number, that is to say one of 
the most useful and fruitful things that have been created in mathematics.’66 Equally, it 
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is from the development of the legend surrounding the “priceless” statue that emerges 
the entire fabric of the plot of The Maltese Falcon. The film’s “Charles V” prologue and 
Gutman’s paean to the ‘glorious golden Falcon, crusted from head to foot with the finest 
jewels’ are as fecund as Descartes’ and Euler’s creation. Without the assumption of 
such a value, The Maltese Falcon could not function. If the statue were thought to be 
worthless from the outset, then Brigid O’Shaughnessy and Joel Cairo would never have 
entered Spade and Archer’s office, Miles Archer would never have walked down that 
blind alley, and so on. In short, without this MacGuffin, there would be no film. The 
film then proceeds from an utter void of meaninglessness, which begs a question: if the 
Maltese Falcon of Gutman’s dreams “does not exist”, how then does it come to exert 
such influence over the film’s narrative? This can – in the light of Lacan’s theory of √-1 
– perhaps be reframed thus: how does the Falcon signify, if it is nothing but a 
meaningless fake? The statue is found to be situated at the very site of the lack in the 
Other (A), but nonetheless, it is imbued with significance throughout the film: s(A), the 
signification of the Other or meaning-making process, functions. Indeed, it is worth 
nothing that, on the left hand side of the Graph of Desire, between these two loci Lacan 
places the formula for fantasy ($ <> a) that – while involving its own logic not to be 
explored in detail here – as the “fantasmatic support” of inconsistent, everyday reality, 
points to a similar imaginary function as that of the value of √-1.67 
This notion of “value” is crucial both to the function of the statue and Lacan’s 
theory of meaning. Recall from Chapter 1 Saussure’s suggestion that the meaning of a 
sign was determined by its “value”, which is to say its differential relation to all other 
signs. The linguistic value of the sign is what constitutes it as a meaningful unit, what 
allows it to make sense. Saussure is explicit on this, having stated: ‘value, as defined, 
can be equated with meaning’ and discusses the value of a five franc coin by way of 
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 Apropos of Lacan’s revised Saussureanism, Joël Dor relates this function of 
delimitation to the point de capiton as the point which gives signifiers meaning, which 
imbues them with value.
69
 Recall too that Lacan insists, ‘[e]verything radiates out from 
and is organized around this signifier,’ and thus the Falcon, as the film’s point de 
capiton, imbues the narrative with meaning; it is itself imbued with meaning throughout 
as everything relates back to the statue and its significance.
70
 As Sobchack notes, crucial 
to the unfolding of The Maltese Falcon is ‘the question of what [the statue] is (that is, 
its function) – and, intimately related, the question of its value (that is, its meaning).’71 
Here Sobchack, like Saussure, explicitly connects the concepts of meaning and value, 
and emphasises the crucial role this “value” plays in relation to the narrative structure. 
Furthermore, to relate the statue to the imaginary function of fantasy, described above, 
Sobchack also describes the bird as the film’s ‘“[l]ife-support” – a vital sustaining 
“prop”’ that allows the narrative to develop.72 The meaning of the statue is crucial to the 
film’s narrative, and yet it is meaningless, an inherently worthless object like the 
Lacanian letter. David Lehman observes that, like the Falcon, the letter is empty and 
therefore, ‘[s]ince its meaning is to be guessed at and cannot be verified, its significance 
must be in some sense nearly arbitrary; the purloined letter, like paper money, is 
valuable only because people think it is.’73 Beyond the film’s prologue, the statue’s 
diegetic value comes from Gutman, who discusses it in terms of ‘extreme, 
immeasurable wealth’, a million dollar bird. Spade notes the worth of the ‘dingus’ to 
Gutman when he tells him, ‘I know the value in human life you people put on it’. The 
emphasis here should be on the value you people put on it. This places the function of 
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the statue firmly into the imaginary realm; the statue is assigned a value – in a sense, 
outside the realm of the film itself, since it is a fake, a “false value” – like that assigned 
to i, the imaginary number. It provides the film with a meaningful framework and yet it 
is at the end revealed to be the very point of unmeaning. 
This can, moreover, be related to Catherine Malabou’s theorisation of the 
relation between meaning and trauma, presented in Les Nouveaux blessés, and discussed 
by Žižek in his Living in the End Times. Malabou suggests that trauma is resistant to 
hermeneutics, that it is meaningless, an external shock resistant to any form of 
interpretation or integration. In the face of such devastating – albeit profoundly different 
– shocks as the Holocaust or the neurological destruction of Alzheimer’s disease, 
Malabou suggests that, ‘all hermeneutics is impossible.’74 This could perhaps be 
considered the contingent irruption of the pure, tychic Lacan Real but the way in which 
Malabou formulates her theorisation of trauma positions it against the nachträglich 
understanding of such intrusions expounded by early psychoanalysis. Contra Freud, 
Malabou argues that such incursions are not effective because they resonate with some 
other, sexual trauma. As Žižek observes, in this conceptualisation, ‘trauma remains 
external to the field of sense, it cannot be integrated into it as a mere deterrent which 
triggers the resuscitation of a latent psychic trauma.’75 Malabou’s concern is thus the 
utterly overwhelming traumas that can erase subjectivity entirely, whether 
psychological or physiological, and are experienced as an utter void of meaninglessness. 
Žižek suggests that, ‘Malabou’s basic reproach to Freud is that, when confronted with 
such cases, he succumbs to the temptation to look for meaning: he is not ready to accept 
the direct destructive power of external shocks.’76 However, is the reverse therefore not 
also the case, that meaninglessness is experienced as traumatic? In everyday 
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experience, is the response to “trauma” not dissimilar to Freud’s own, clinical-
intellectual need to give it meaning? Can the narrative unfolding of The Maltese Falcon 
not be understood as an automative response to the worthless, meaningless object at its 
heart? The construction of the film is an attempt to integrate this traumatic kernel into 
the realm of sense. Every effort of the film’s narrative is an attempt to account for the 
void of meaning, constructing ever more elaborate intrigues and betrayals in an effort to 
mask the very lack that constitutes the statue, and therefore the film itself. 
This sort of double status of the Falcon, as the point where lack and meaning 
coincide, is the most interestingly Lacanian dimension of the film. The equation of the 
Falcon with √-1 can in fact now shed some light on Lacan’s comparison of the phallus 
to the imaginary number. In his essay, ‘Plasticity, Paternity, Perversity: Freud’s Falcon, 
Huston’s Freud’, Lee Edelman recognises the destabilisation of the word inherent to 
both the Falcon and the film itself. Edelman argues for the ‘figural identification of the 
falcon and the phallus’ as the object properly belonging to Father-King (Charles V), 
which ‘institutes, defines, and participates in a symbolic economy of desire.’77 The 
Falcon, like the phallus, is thus the signifier to which all others signify. Edelman then 
voices the question put forward by the film’s narrative: ‘But what if the falcon, and, by 
extension, the phallus, were not the unique and privileged signifier of the signifying 
system itself?’78 Instead of a jewel encrusted treasure, it is a worthless imitation. The 
Maltese Falcon therefore reveals for Edelman,  
the illusory quality that attends [the phallus’] demarcation of signifiers (...), the 
fraudulence through which it articulates meaning by obscuring its own substitutive 
status as the thematic elaboration, within the order of thought, of the Thing that resists 
but occasions meaning while remaining, itself, unthinkable.
79
 
The phallus is itself a fake, a lead dummy for the Real Thing. Like the King 
himself, the Falcon has dominion (over the film) – just as the phallus does over the 
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symbolic – but this authority is not derived from some inherent worth: it is but a 
function of this position, a symbolic mandate. In Le Désir est son interprétation, Lacan 
observes that Hamlet performs a similar conflation when he tells Guildenstern, ‘The 
King is a thing –/ (...) Of nothing.’80 In reading this portion of the play, Lacan implores 
his audience: ‘I beg you simply to replace the word “king” with the word “phallus”.’81 
The phallus then: a thing of nothing. Like the Falcon, it is positioned, valued above all 
things while being itself no-thing at all. This Žižek describes as the phallus qua ‘erected 
Guarantee of Meaning.’82 The Falcon, like the phallus, is the very element that Žižek 
identifies as representing, within the field of meaning, ‘the agency of pure signifier – the 
element through which the signifier’s non-sense erupts in the midst of Meaning – [that] 
is perceived as a point of extreme saturation of Meaning, as the point which “gives 
meaning” to all the others and thus totalizes the field of (…) meaning.’83 The Falcon 
qua phallus functions within the film as guarantor: a “transcendent” Other that 
determines the meaning of the narrative that is, however, nothing but the placeholder of 
lack, of the lack of meaning as such. Žižek suggests that the element that holds together 
the entire symbolic edifice – this “phallic Guarantee of Meaning” – is precisely ‘the 
embodiment of a lack, of a chasm of non-sense gaping in the midst of (…) meaning.’84 
It both embodies and suppresses the radical contingency of meaning upon which its 
discourse depends. 
It is in this respect that The Maltese Falcon can help to elucidate Lacan’s (now 
infamous) suggestion that, ‘the erectile organ [i.e. the phallus] can be equated with the 
√-1.’85 Lacan situates meaning at the intersection of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, 
because meaning – engendered, that is, by the point de capiton – is but a product of the 
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relation between signifiers, a value assigned to meaningless letters.
86
 This Lacan 
describes as a ‘signification otherwise called a signified effect.’87 As Frederic Jameson 
notes, ‘the signified – the meaning or conceptual content of an utterance – is (…) to be 
seen as a meaning-effect, as that objective mirage of signification generated and 
projected by the relationship of signifiers among themselves.’88 The phallus, or more 
precisely, its phallic signification is therefore an imaginary number. It is an impossible 
value that nonetheless functions, providing a seeming plenitude of meaning that – like 
the Falcon – determines all other signifiers. Indeed, Žižek – who observes that, ‘the 
“imaginary” number (the square root of -1) is the “meaning of phallus”, its signified’ – 
describes the phallus as the ‘the element in which excess and lack coincide.’89 Both the 
phallus and the Falcon stand for the point at which both meaning and nonmeaning are 
revealed. This imaginary realm of phallic signification is, Žižek suggests, an 
‘impossible fullness at the level of meaning (of the signified) (…) sustained by the void 
(…) at the level of the signifier.’90 What The Maltese Falcon thus points to is Lacan’s 
crucial, “final word” on the point de capiton in Les Formations de l’inconscient: ‘The 
pinning [épinglage] of which I speak – the point de capiton – is only a mythical affair, 
because no one has ever pinned [épingler] a signification to a signifier. On the other 
hand, what one can do, is pin [épingler] a signifier to a signifier and see what that 
produces.’91 The point de capiton “anchors” meanings to nothing, other than another 
signifier; it is only a knotting, a tying together of signifying chains that holds the matrix 
of signifiers in place. The point de capiton suspends the signifying chain in a 
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meaningful position as it attempts to span the void of meaninglessness.
92
 The Maltese 
Falcon can therefore be understood as just such an attempt to bridge the gap, suture the 
trauma of unmeaning; the statue can be understood as the phallus, whose imaginary 
value, its signification – equal to √-1 – is both the wound and the stitches that constitute 
the film. 
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3. The Necessary Fiction of Noir 
The Maltese Falcon is concerned throughout with questions of truth and lies. The 
characters use a number of stories, lies and ruses both to conceal their true motives and 
achieve their aim of taking possession of the statue. The examples are numerous: 
Gutman of course uses a number of ploys to deceive Spade and get hold of the Falcon. 
Joel Cairo enters Spade’s office as a client, but with the intention of sticking him up and 
searching the premises. Spade and Lt. Dundy have an argument in which Dundy 
accuses him of giving ‘a lot of lying answers’, and again, exclaims, ‘you’re a liar and 
I’m telling you so’. Spade has then to explain to the police why Cairo is sitting, 
bloodied in his office; he then tells Cairo, ‘Sorry about the story’s goofiness, a sensible 
one would have landed us in the cooler’. During an interrogation, the police tell Cairo, 
‘Try telling the facts’, to which he replies, ‘What... facts...?’ There is, furthermore, a 
level of performance involved in these strategies. For example, during a confrontation 
with Gutman, Spade feigns outrage and leaves the room in a fit of temper; he then walks 
calmly away satisfied with his deception. And in his final discussion with Brigid, Spade 
tells her, ‘Don’t be so sure I’m as crooked as I’m supposed to be. That sort of reputation 
might be good business, bring in high-priced jobs and make it easier to deal with the 
enemy’. The Maltese Falcon is a film in which appearances are almost always 
deceiving. 
As the archetypal duplicitous femme fatale, much of this epistemological 
uncertainty of course rests with Brigid. As the plot develops, Spade sees her for what 
she is, telling her, ‘You aren’t exactly the sort of person you pretend to be, are you?’ 
And as her untruths begin to unravel, he tells her, smiling, ‘You’re a liar’. They then 
have the following exchange: 
BRIGID: I am. I’ve always been a liar.  
SPADE: Well don’t...don’t brag about it. Was there any truth at all in that yarn? 




BRIGID: Oh, I’m...I’m so tired, so tired of lying and of making up lies, not 
knowing...what is a lie and what is the truth.  
However, what is perhaps most interesting, from a Lacanian perspective, in Brigid’s 
long list of deceptions is the first suggestion that she is not everything that she makes 
herself out to be. During her second encounter with Spade, she tells him, ‘Mr Spade, I 
have a terrible, terrible confession to make: that story I told you yesterday was just a 
story’. Her whole “Miss Wonderley” spiel about Thursby and a missing sister was 
nothing but a ruse, intended to involve Spade and Archer in the recovery of the Falcon 
without their knowledge. What distinguishes Brigid’s story from a simple lie in this 
instance is what could be considered the complicity of the Other: the willingness on the 
part of the Other to believe such a discourse. Spade tells Brigid, ‘We didn’t believe your 
story (...) We believed your two hundred dollars’. He explains, ‘I mean you paid us 
more than if you’d been telling the truth, and enough more to make it alright’. This 
revelation of a “lie” prefigures the revelation of the imitation statue at the film’s climax, 
and in both cases is there a certain usefulness, a benefit to be gained if this “lie” is 
treated as if it were true.  
This is very much the realm of the imaginary number: a “lie”, or a non-existent 
entity whose presence allows a certain calculus to function. The most striking example 
of this is Spade’s plot to find a “fall guy” to feed to the authorities. He tells the assorted 
conspirators gathered in his office (Gutman, Cairo and Wilmer) that, ‘The police have 
got to have a victim; somebody they can pin those three murders on’. Seeing an 
opportunity to abuse Wilmer one final time, he suggests, ‘Let’s give them the gunsel’. 
This is of course, in part, a ruse on Spade’s part to extract from Gutman the truth behind 
the murder and betrayals committed in the pursuit of the Falcon. He insists, ‘Now let’s 
get the details fixed first. Why did he shoot Thursby, and why and where and how did 
he shoot Captain Jacoby?’ But it is also an invention necessary to exculpate himself and 
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the others; as if to prove that he is constructing an imaginary discourse, Spade explains 
that, ‘I’ve got to know all that happened so I can be sure that the parts that don’t fit are 
covered up’. Recall here Fink’s observation that meaning – the imaginary dimension of 
language – pertains to that which fits, for instance with the ego’s own self-image, and 
any element that does not fit must be repressed. Here Spade must occlude that which 
does not fit to construct his narrative. And if there were indeed any doubts that Spade is 
dealing with an imaginary number, that he is conjuring with that ‘fine and wonderful 
resource of the human spirit, almost an amphibian between being and not being’ that 
Leibniz called √-1, then they must be banished when he tells Gutman and Cairo, ‘Let 
him [Wilmer] talk his head off, I guarantee nobody’ll do anything about it’.93 The fall 
guy presents a perfect solution to the problem they were facing – joint complicity in 
multiple murders, arson and theft – in a way that constitutes a simple, impermeable 
discourse of the Imaginary. Spade explains that, ‘I can show Brian our District Attorney 
that if he goes around trying to collect everybody, he’s going to have a tangled case. But 
if he sticks to Wilmer here, he can get a conviction standing on his head’. The DA 
would prefer a neat, imaginary discourse with nothing that does not fit (provided it is 
not examined too closely). The fall guy, like the Wonderley story and the Falcon itself, 
can be considered a form of necessary fiction. More than a lie, it is a construction that 
benefits the Other (as much as the teller), granting it consistency, wholeness, 
meaningfulness. Just as the fiction of the imaginary number benefited Descartes, 
Leibniz and those mathematicians who came after them, the fall guy story benefits 
Spade and his co-conspirators, and allows the DA – qua big Other, figure of the Law – 
to maintain an appearance of justice having been done. Equally, like the phallic 
signification that allows the Symbolic order to function, such an imaginary discourse is 
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produced by the “value” of the Falcon statue, itself the fiction necessary to the 
functioning of the film’s narrative. 
This is, once again, The Maltese Falcon at its most Lacanian. The concept of 
fiction is crucial to psychoanalysis in several respects, the most significant of which 
perhaps being Lacan’s famous aphorism that, ‘every truth has the structure of a 
fiction.’94 Lacan explains that “fiction” or “fictitious” does not, for him, have simply the 
meaning of deceptive or illusory that is suggested by the French “fictif”; instead the 
“truth” of this fiction is hinted at in what he feels to be an overlooked aspect of the work 
of Jeremy Bentham: his Theory of Fictions.
95
 Lacan draws a contrast between 
Bentham’s investigations of ‘the dialectic of the relationship of language to the real’ and 
the ‘opposition between fiction and reality’ in the Freudian experience, in that Bentham 
situates pleasure on the side of the real whereas Freud situates it on the side of fiction.
96
 
However, Lacan is explicit in his own understanding of the term “fiction” when he 
claims that, ‘[t]he fictitious is not, in effect, in its essence that which deceives, but is 
precisely what I call the symbolic.’97 He reiterates this position later in the same year, 
observing that, ‘The Theory of Fictions shows [that Bentham] is the man who 




This would appear to present a considerable problem for the relationship 
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic already established in this project, which 
would suggest that “fiction” should more logically be situated on the side of the former. 
More problematically, Žižek goes one step further in this contrary formulation of the 
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rapport between Lacan and Bentham, positing that Bentham ‘produced avant la lettre 
the Lacanian distinction between the Symbolic and the Imaginary: fictitious entities 
make up the realm of the Symbolic, whereas “unicorns,” etc. are imaginary 
fabrications.’99 And it is by no means some sort of aberration on Lacan’s part, isolated 
to a couple of utterances in the course of one Seminar out of nearly thirty; he returns to 
the subject a decade later to insist once more that, ‘the Theory of Fictions is (…) the 
putting into question of that which is involved in all human institutions.’100 This should 
again be understood as the realm of the Symbolic order, particularly in light of what 
Lacan then adds: 
Nothing could be done, to take things from the sociological angle, that better isolates 
that which is involved in this category of the symbolic, which is found to be precisely 




But it is also in this Seminar that a way out of the deadlock is perhaps suggested. 
Firstly, Lacan always seems to discuss Bentham in terms of utilitarianism and what he 
refers to, in D’un Autre à l’autre, as ‘the revision of the problem of ethics’ in 
psychoanalysis.
102
 He cites the “human institutions” and the social function in this 
discourse in relation to Bentham, and so it perhaps makes sense, in this context, to 
discuss fictions in terms of the Symbolic order.
103
 However, Lacan identifies the Real as 
‘the pivotal point of that which is involved in the ethics of psychoanalysis,’ and 
subsequently adds that, ‘I suppose, of course, that this Real is subject to the very severe 
interposition (…) of the joint operation of the Symbolic and the Imaginary.’104 The key 
point here is this “joint operation” of Symbolic and Imaginary, where the site of 
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meaning has already been located. Lacan also comments that it was no coincidence that 
it was Charles Ogden – as someone who interrogated language in terms of what Lacan 
expressed as ‘the meaning of meaning, focusing on the question of what is meaning, 
that things have a signification’ – that edited Bentham’s work on fiction.105 Therefore, 
returning to Bentham and teasing out the correlations with Lacanian theory while also 
keeping in mind the functioning of fiction in The Maltese Falcon helps to work through 
this apparent contradiction and apprehend an imaginary dimension to the concept. 
 The naissance of Bentham’s theory of fictions is well-known: in his 
jurisprudence, Bentham encountered certain “false propositions” or abstract legal terms 
that had no basis in reality and/or whose original significance had been lost and were 
therefore – like the Lacanian “fictif” – deceptive or illusory. Bentham sought to 
eradicate these “legal fictions” from the legal discourse but found that it could not do 
entirely without terms such as “property” or “right”, even where there were no 
corresponding real entities. It is from here that the Theory of Fictions emerged, and 
already a very Lacanian note is sounded when, in an analysis of the development of this 
Theory of Fictions, LJ Hulme observes on Bentham’s part, ‘a limited rehabilitation for 
fictions as “fictitious entities” which had their origin in the requirements of discourse 
and the inescapable limitations of language.’106 So for Bentham, it seems, fictions have 
their origin in the “limitations of language”, in the same way that – as has already been 
seen, and will be further explored below – so much proceeds from Lacan’s own 
articulation of this limitation, the barred Other (A). More specifically (and as already 
suggested above), Bentham divided such abstract language into two categories: the 
names of fictitious entities and fabulous entities, the former being ‘an entity to which, 
though by the grammatical form of the discourse employed in speaking of it, existence 
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be ascribed, yet in truth and reality existence is not meant to be ascribed’ and the latter, 
‘the name employed for the designation of the other class of unreal entities,’ which is to 
say “imaginary nonentities” such as ghosts.107 The crucial point for Bentham was that 
fictions were things that were spoken of in the same way as real objects but did not 
become reified or, as he puts it, ‘to which existence is seriously meant to be ascribed 
(...) but without any such danger as that of producing any such persuasion as that of 
their possessing (...) any real existence.’108 In short then, fictions are spoken as though 
they were real, while fabulous entities are not.
109
 
 In fact, Lacanian and Benthamite theory are at certain points here working in 
very similar territory. Bentham insisted that fictions are a function of discourse when he 
declared, ‘[t]o language, then – to language alone – it is, that fictitious entities owe their 
existence; their impossible, yet indispensable existence.’110 They are then, discursive 
constructs, as Michael Twining observes: ‘Bentham’s theory of fictions is a 
constructivist epistemology based on utility: we construct our knowledge of the world 
through the lens of language, itself a human construct.’111 This once again places 
fictions on the side of the Lacanian Symbolic – where signifiers interpose to constitute 
structure – and the realm of discursivity already explored in previous chapters. Apropos 
of this, Wolfgang Iser observes a short circuit between language and fiction in the 
Benthamite account when he notes that, ‘[a]lthough fiction depends on language for its 
existence, it also constitutes discourse to such a degree that the only reality one can talk 
about is that of discourse-related real entities.’112 As a result, he adds, ‘[b]ut if an 
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independent reality is enveloped by discourse, then the assumed presence of physical 
objects is on the way to becoming a type of discourse itself, which comes close to 
liquidating its factual independence.’113 This might suggest a descent into a pure, 
postmodern dissolution into “discursive reality”, but this is to overlook the ever-
important, inescapable function of the Real, from which, as both Bentham and Lacan 
have suggested, such things as fictions – in their “impossible existence” – proceed.  
In the “indispensible existence” of fictions, Bentham’s theory points to a further 
psychoanalytic contact: the notion of necessity. In fact, Bentham stated quite explicitly 
that, ‘[f]iction, in the simplest (...) case in which language can be employed, becomes a 
necessary resource.’114 For him discourse cannot function without fiction. Bentham 
insisted that the result of fiction ‘is the work of invincible necessity; on no other terms 
can discourse be carried on.’115 The function of necessity has already been explored, at 
length, in Chapter 3. It will be pursued further, in this Lacano-Benthamite 
configuration, below. This is, however, not wholly to conflate the Lacanian and 
Benthamite accounts of language. Indeed, Marc De Kesel suggests that, ‘Bentham’s 
interpretation of language differs profoundly from Lacan’s, if only because of 
Bentham’s idea that language should be seen as an instrument (i.e., as a sign) and not as 
a signifier.’116 He quotes Bentham, who insisted that, ‘[l]anguage is the sign of thought, 
an instrument for the communication of thought from one mind to another (...) of the 
thought which is in the mind of him by whom the discourse is uttered.’117 Whereas for 
Lacan, such communication is itself a fiction: ‘[i]n your most ordinary conversations 
language has a purely fictional character, you give the other the feeling that you are 
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always there, that is to say, that you are capable of producing the expected response.’118 
It is on the basis of this common fiction that any sense of “communication” or 
“understanding” between two subjects can be achieved. 
Perhaps the most striking point of correlation has already been suggested by 
Bentham’s description of the relation between fictions and reality. In one of the many 
statements intended to define a fiction, he declared,  ‘[b]y a fictitious entity, understand 
an object, the existence of which is feigned by the imagination – feigned for the purpose 
of discourse – and which, when so formed, is spoken of as a real one.’119 The crucial 
phrase here is the final one: “spoken of as a real one”. Ogden clarifies this further when 
he states, quoting Bentham, that ‘[t]o be spoken of at all every fictitious entity must be 
spoken of as if it were real.’120 The Theory of Fictions thus operates within the realm of 
the “as if” that, in the Lacanian context, has already been explored thoroughly in 
Chapter 3. Ogden also points to a parallel development in the theory of fictions in the 
form of Hans Vaihinger’s Philosophie des Als Ob (Philosophy of the As If), an 
important text in the development of Fictionalism. In this book, Vaihinger states that, 
‘The principle of Fictionalism is as follows: An idea whose theoretical untruth or 
incorrectness, and therewith its falsity, is admitted, is not for that reason practically 
valueless and useless; for such an idea, in spite of its theoretical nullity may have great 
practical importance.’121 This “as if” mode is both very close to Bentham’s own 
formulations – although Ogden is clear that Vaihinger’s philosophy emerged 
independently of Bentham’s – and part of a much longer trajectory of thought.122 
Indeed, Kiarina Kordela suggests that it extends at least from Pascal to Althusser and 
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 Both Pascal’s Wager, which of course suggested acting “as if” you 
believe, and Mannoni’s famous “je sais bien, mais quand même...”, the perverse “as if” 
of fetishism are indeed very close to Bentham’s treatment of fictions. And interestingly, 
Žižek identifies a retroactive temporality in such an “as if”: reading, via Althusser, what 
Žižek describes as Pascal’s ‘Act as if you believe, pray, kneel down, and belief will 
come by itself,’ he points to ‘an intricate reflective mechanism of retroactive 
“autopoietic” causality, of how “external” ritual performatively generates its own (…) 
foundation.’124 Concomitant to this “as if” temporality is then the future anterior of an 
act that will have been in devotion once faith has arrived.  
Furthermore, there is in general something of a rapport between the reception of 
Bentham’s work and the project of structuralism that first compelled Lacan. Ogden 
insists that the Theory of Fictions ‘must be developed as the nucleus of a complete 
theory of symbolism in every branch of human thought.’125 This resonates with 
Saussure’s own insistence that semiology should be a science of the entire domain of 
human experience, of which linguistics would be but a sub-discipline.
126
 And in a 
thought provoking paper on Bentham and musicology, Cynthia M Grund argues that the 
Theory of Fictions should ‘arouse the interest of those philosophers and semioticians 
who are interested in questions of [in this case, but also more generally] musical 
semiotics and/or ontology.’127 In a manner that will indeed be taken forward in this 
project, she adds that ‘fictionalism may contribute to theoretical examination of several 
problems of ontology, epistemology and signification which are raised by aesthetic 
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objects.’128 In the first instance here, it is the function of fiction in film that suggests a 
reconsideration of the Lacano-Benthamite intersection. 
In light of The Maltese Falcon then, it seems necessary to read Lacan avec 
Bentham in order to apprehend an imaginary dimension to fiction, in line with Lacan’s 
insistence upon the “joint operation” of the Symbolic and Imaginary. The fiction offered 
by Spade – that of Wilmer as fall guy – is, as Spade himself makes clear, a discursive 
construction that gives the appearance of a consistent and meaningful whole.
129
 This is 
in fact the necessary role of everyday language as such: the point at which the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic come together to produce meaning, which, as it was 
identified in Chapter 3, is the consistency of discourse. Without the fiction of meaning – 
the fiction of what Bentham described as the transmission of thought from one mind to 
another via discourse – the world begins to lose its consistency. As Žižek observes, 
‘Bentham was sharp enough to steer clear of the delusion that we can dispense with this 
fetishistic split (“I know that fictions are unreal, but I nonetheless speak of them as if 
they are real objects”).’130 Without fictions to support it, the world would disintegrate, 
becoming an inconsistent and meaningless chaos. And as Roberto Harari notes, the 
function of fiction is indispensible: ‘we must not “overcome” fiction in order to go on to 
the truth. On the contrary, insofar as truth is said – and saying it all does not entirely 
exist – there is no alternative but to endure it as fictional.’131 Lacan, like Bentham, does 
not seek to do away with such fictions; they are a necessary condition. In The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, he suggests that he is accused of claiming little more than “The king is 
naked”. He explains that,  
If I do say “The king is naked”, it is not in the same way as the child who is supposed 
to have exposed the universal illusion, but more in the manner of Alphonse Allais, 
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who gathered a crowd around him by announcing in a sonorous voice, “How 
shocking! Look at that woman! Beneath her dress she’s stark naked!” Yet in truth I 
don’t even say that. If the king is, in fact, naked, it is only insofar as he is so beneath a 




For Lacan it is enough to understand that fiction clothes everything and that underneath 
such fictions everybody is indeed naked, but nonetheless such fictions must be 
retained.
133
 For, as Žižek states, ‘as soon as we renounce fiction and illusion, we lose 
reality itself, the moment we subtract fictions from reality, reality itself loses its 
discursive-logical consistency.’134  
Apropos of this unavoidable necessity, Žižek conjures a striking image when he 
states that, ‘[w]ithout the sheet of paper which patches up its gaps (as in Dick’s Time 
Out of Joint), reality itself falls apart.’135 Fiction qua “sheet of paper” which “covers 
over the gaps” is perhaps the strongest possible indicator of the imaginary dimension to 
the Lacano-Benthamite Theory of Fictions. It is the “paper” itself that lends the world a 
consistent, meaningful quality. Philip Dravers furthers this formulation in his work on 
Lacan and Poe when he offers the following aphoristic conclusion: ‘Fiction is the 
envelope of being.’136 (To move from Žižek’s metaphor to Dravers’, recall that Dupin 
realises that it is enough to fold a sheet of paper – in that case the letter – back on itself 
to form an envelope.) Fiction, then, as an envelope – a piece of paper that folds around 
being – is a necessary condition of meaningfulness and consistency. Renata Salecl 
diagnoses the malady of postmodern society as a disbelief in this fiction of the big Other 
– the Symbolic order as such, as it relates to the subject – and a desire to encounter what 
is “behind” the fiction.137 Such an encounter is traumatic, and it is only the wall of 
fiction that saves the subject from such trauma; as an everyday example, Salecl 
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highlights the rules of politeness in speech that dictate one says, “Hi, how are you?” 
even if one means, “Drop dead, I hate you” and the abandonment of such polite words 
is not a liberation but a violent disruption.
138
 As Cecilia Sjöholm observes, ‘a belief in 
the fiction needs to be sustained for social bonds to exist, whether we talk about Santa 
Claus, simple polite phrases, or other social codes.’139 For the Symbolic to function 
there must be an imaginary additive, a fiction to guarantee its discourse. And so pace 
Lacan – and even contra Žižek (but also, given his description of fictions, pro Žižek in 
the same breath) – it could be suggested that while fictions are certainly implicated in 
the Symbolic (they are comprised of signifiers), bringing Lacan, Bentham and The 
Maltese Falcon together insists upon an imaginary dimension therewith.
140
 To complete 
the construction, if fictions are “made of signifiers” they bring about a “signified 
effect”: a cohesive, meaningful discourse produced in the Imaginary. Fiction then as the 




In one final note before turning to the question of fiction and film noir itself, it is 
worth acknowledging Lacan’s subsequent turn to Bentham in the early 1970s Seminars 
as it relates to what has previously been said of The Maltese Falcon and the imaginary 
number. At this point, Lacan speaks of “verbal fictions” and repeats his declaration that, 
“there is no metalanguage”. This, he explains, is because there can be no point ‘whereby 
language itself becomes “meta”;’ this division is not tenable because – as discussed in 
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Chapter 3 – there can be no Archimedean point “outside” it.142 Therefore, Lacan 
concludes that, in the case of metalanguage, ‘it is necessary to develop it as a fiction.’143 
This condition of immanence within the Symbolic means that any such “meta” point 
must be forged within language as a ‘fiction on the basis of the word.’144 Furthermore, 
remembering that “there is no metalanguage” is but another way of expressing the lack 
in the Other (A), this returns fiction to its source in failure, dissonance or impossibility 
in language. This point, at which Lacan’s and Bentham’s fictions converge, in turn 
aligns the concept with what has already been said regarding √-1 and phallic 
signification: it is another form of response to lack, a construction that – like the 
imaginary number – makes things work. Metalanguage and phallic signification are of 
course two distinct concepts (although the phallus, or phallic function, could be 
considered – as Chapter 3 has already explained – a fictional meta-point for the 
Symbolic; indeed, Dravers calls fiction ‘a function of the phallus).’145 They are perhaps 
then two parallel strands in Lacanian theory, the same or similar responses to a common 
fault or fissure. This suggests that phallic signification functions as a fiction, and more 
specifically returns to √-1 the status of fiction that it was originally granted by the 
philosophers of mathematics.
146
 The Maltese Falcon should then be considered a fiction 
in every sense: the statue’s enamel coating an imaginary veneer that conceals the fake 
beneath, and its vicissitudes and deceits providing a number of constructions for the 
smooth running of the Law. It is fictitious throughout. 
Can the same perhaps be said of the film itself – in the cinematic framework – of 
its role in film noir, of the question of film noir in general? In this context, it is Lacan’s 
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use of “fiction” in relation to Freud and the theory of the drives that points the way 
forward for a critical exploration of the construction of noir. In The Four Fundamental 
Concepts, Lacan notes that Freud called the drive ‘a Grundbegriff, a fundamental 
concept’ for psychoanalysis.147 And yet the concept’s epistemological status is utterly 
uncertain: like Freud’s other crucial gambit – the unconscious – the drive is not subject 
to direct empirical observation but rather must be ascertained, inferred or deduced from 
its effects on reality – which is to say on the subject – in the form of the dream and the 
symptom. Lacan adds that Freud, being a “good epistemologist”, knew that on its 
introduction to science, the concept of the drive ‘would be preserved if it functioned, as 
one would now say—I would say if it traced its way in the real that it set out to 
penetrate.’148 The drive, as a concept first emerging in a nascent form in the Project for 
a Scientific Psychology, through to its first, full expression in the Three Essays, its 
formulation in the Papers on Metapsychology, and its utter reformulation in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (and then onto to Lacan who subsequently identifies it as one of the 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis) has self-evidently been preserved and 
functioned for psychoanalytic theory. Lacan notes that ‘[s]omewhere else, [Freud] says 
that the drive belongs to our myths’ but adds that he (Lacan) ignores the term myth (for 
all its Lévi-Straussian connotations, perhaps) and instead prefers Freud’s other given 
term: ‘the word Konvention, convention, which is much closer to what we are talking 
about and to which I would apply the Benthamite term, fiction.’149 A ‘fundamental 
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concept’ or ‘fundamental fiction,’ the drive – in relation to metapsychology – is yet 
another algorithme qui sert, which is of use.
150
 
In fact, Freud himself recognised the value of fiction when constructing his 
metapsychology. In the theoretical section of The Interpretation of Dreams, he 
discussed the concept of repression in terms of what he described as ‘psychological 
scaffolding’ and plainly states that he had, ‘already explored the fiction of a primitive 
psychical apparatus.’151 Furthermore, Laplanche and Pontalis, in their discussion of 
metapsychology in The Language of Psychoanalysis, also describe the ‘conceptual 
models’ of the theory of psychoanalysis in terms of, for example, ‘the fiction of a 
psychical apparatus divided up into agencies.’152 Freud’s metapsychology thus 
constituted a set of models, tools, devices employed in order to understand better the 
functioning of the human psyche. And moreover, in another example of the intersection 
of psychoanalysis with the Theory of Fictions, both Bentham and Ogden align the 
language of psychological investigation with the discourse of fictions: the former stated 
that, ‘[f]aculties, powers of the mind, dispositions: all these are unreal; all these are but 
so many fictitious entities,’ and the latter noting that, ‘[Bentham’s] chief contention, 
that every sort of psychological description is fictional (...) relegated the “faculties”, 
which dominated both the associationist and nineteenth century schools, to the position 
of mere heuristic conveniences.’153 Bentham, like Freud, realised that a specialised, 
abstract language must be employed in the discourse on psychology. 
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It is at this point that a new approach to the understanding of noir can be 
suggested. Epistemologically speaking, the most interesting – and most difficult – point 
in Freud’s work is his most speculative: the twists and the turns, false steps and 
revisions of his late work, such as Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Analysis, 
Terminable and Interminable. It is here that Freud most clearly recognised the necessity 
of such fictions in order to proceed, in order to further the theoretical understanding and 
thus practical development of psychoanalysis. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle he 
framed his work as “speculation”, ‘an attempt to follow out an idea consistently, out of 
curiosity to see where it will lead.’154 And it in fact leads to one of the most startling and 
compelling pieces of the Freudian oeuvre, producing the concept of the death drive, 
which came to characterise – via Lacan’s eleventh Seminar – the very character of the 
drive as such. In Analysis, Terminable and Interminable, Freud was even more 
emphatic: when faced with the (ultimately unanswerable) question regarding the 
“taming” of the drives, he had no choice but to appeal to ‘the Witch Meta-psychology. 
Without metapsychological speculation and theorizing – I had almost said 
“phantasying” – we shall not get another step forward.’155 Freud’s abiding principle in 
his theoretical endeavours was then the one set out in the Papers on Metapsychology: 
‘[a] gain in meaning is a perfectly justifiable ground for going beyond the limits of 
direct experience.’156 The metapsychology provided Freud with heuristic principles: a 
set of useful, even necessary fictions that took his understanding further, deeper and into 
new territory. 
Is the concept of “film noir” not just such a fiction, a (critical) construction 
brought about in order to take further the understanding of “a certain type of crime 
film”? Wolfgang Iser notes that, ‘fiction becomes a contrivance enabling discourse to 
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open up realities.’157 As explored in Chapter 1, the intervention of a signifier (in the 
form of the fiction, “noir”) enabled an entire critical discourse. Film noir as a category 
is crucial to the functioning of film criticism and film making (as will be seen in the 
next section) and yet, in a very real sense, it did not exist. Despite the claims of a critic 
such as Sheri Beisen for a consistent, American discourse on “noir” contemporaneous to 
the films themselves (see Chapter 2, where this claim is found to be lacking), “film 
noir” did not exist – literally – as a signifier in the Anglo-American tradition until thirty 
years after it was said to have appeared as a phenomenon.
158
 And the deconstructive, 
revisionist works of critics such as Vernet and Elsaesser have shown any common 
understanding of the concept to be fraught with difficulty. In this way, beyond existing 
simply ex post facto, film noir could be considered to exist in absentiā factī: it “does not 
exist” and yet has a very palpable effect on the reality of the cinema. In fact, this is 
Miran Bozovic’s very definition of a “fiction”, as an entity that has an effect on reality 
‘despite its inexistence.’159 Mark Bould further compounds this sense of fictitious noir 
suggesting that, ‘when we approach film noir, we are faced with neither an objectively-
existing object out there in the world nor some ideal to which particular films more or 
less conform.’160 He adds, in harmony with Naremore and indeed with the conclusions 
of Chapter 1 of this project, that ‘film noir is an intersubjective discursive phenomenon: 
a fabrication.’161 However, quoting Dudley Andrew’s Mists of Regret, Bould concludes 
that ‘[a] fabrication ... is by no means a fiction.’162 Of course, fiction here is meant in a 
pejorative, non-Benthamite manner, as somehow valueless. Andrew’s remark is made 
                                                 
157
 Iser, Fictive, pp. 119-120. 
158
 For example, Steve Neale states that, ‘[a]s a single phenomenon, noir, in my view, never existed’ 
(Genre, p. 173). 
159
 Bozovic, Utterly Dark Spot, p. 95. Bozovic further suggests that a fabulous entity is one that has an 
effect because of its inexistence (see the comment on ghosts, above). This could suggest a convergence 
with the open ontology of noir set out in Chapter 2, which makes a virtue of film noir’s inexistence; 
however, the suggestion of noir as a fabulous entity is incompatible with the formulations of this project 
and as such will not be explored. 
160
 Bould, Film Noir, p. 2. 
161
 Ibid., p. 2. 
162
 Ibid., p. 2, quoting, Dudley Andrew, Mists of Regret: Culture and Sensibility in Classic French Film 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995), p. 12. 
255 
 
apropos of the original French film noir, Poetic Realism, and further exploration of his 
commentary shows that he himself is in fact functioning within the fictitious discourse: 
like the American noir, Poetic Realism was – Andrew suggests – ‘in effect a fabrication 
of the critical establishment, and it remains so today.’163 It was, however, an incredibly 
useful fabrication that provided a label, ‘to help sort out the increasing number of films 
that displayed at least a common ambition.’164 This fabrication is therefore indeed a 
(Benthamite) fiction, one that opens out critical possibilities and deepens understanding. 
Noir must therefore be retained, like Freud’s metapsychology, as an heuristic 
device – un algorithme qui sert – that enables both the practice of film criticism and, in 
turn, the practice of film making and one which has established for the concept a 
prominent place within the cultural imagination. This returns the formulation of noir set 
forth in this project to one of its starting points, in the work of James Naremore, who – 
having established noir as a discursive construct – concludes in his introduction that, 
noir ‘nevertheless has heuristic value, mobilizing specific themes that are worth further 
consideration.’165 Here Naremore almost echoes Freud’s own desire to pursue 
“speculative phantasying” in order to take another step forward, to take up the fiction – 
with full knowledge of its fictitious state – and use it better to understand the realm of 
Film Studies. Noir is then, like Freud’s Konvention of the drive, a necessary fiction, 




And moreover, Freud’s “speculative phantasying” recalls a note in the 
Panorama on Borde and Chaumeton’s analysis of Gilda. In his translator’s note on the 
text, Borde and Chaumeton’s description of Gilda’s long evening gloves as “a pair of 
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black stockings” is explained by Paul Hammond as a ‘délire d’interprétation:’ in 
psychiatry a “delusion of reference”, the paranoid inference of specific meaning where 
there is none; or perhaps more loosely (but literally) a delirium of interpretation, or even 
an unreading (dé-lire after Barthes’ déjouer) of the film.167 Indeed, the fetishistic 
overtones of a stocking fantasy or even stocking frenzy (délire) are very much in 
keeping with the surrealist tendencies of Borde and Chaumeton and their peers, which 
are in fact signalled by Marcel Duhamel’s recollection of the ecstasy of cinema-going in 
the age of noir.
168
 As Naremore explains in a note on the Panorama, such serial viewing 
and what Louis Aragon described as a method of “synthetic criticism” aimed to 
emphasise the libidinal implications of shots or scenes, and served as ‘springboard for 
(...) poetic imagination.’169 And so the question begs, is Hammond’s commentary 
necessarily any less true of the rest of the work? What Borde and Chaumeton produced 
in their analysis was perhaps a certain delirium or “fantasy of noir”: finding meaning 
where there perhaps was none and thereby constructing the very fiction that enabled 
their endeavour and engendered their category. 
However, this formulation leaves the classic films of the 1940s and 1950s in a 
rather nebulous position (particularly in relation to the original French criticism). Seen 
retrospectively as noir without being noir – which is to say, understood as “noir” in 
France and yet almost wholly innocent of this appellation in America – they figure as a 
sort of void, even a proton-pseudos at the very heart of critical discourse. This term 
“noir” could be understood as a “primordial lie”: like the Falcon statue, although this 
time a cinematic rather than filmic MacGuffin that set the wheels of discourse in 
motion. In this way, just as Althusser claimed that he published works in order to 
conceal the fact that he did not exist, so too could the seemingly endless stream of 
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works on noir (of which this project is of course a part) be understood as an attempt to 
conceal this proton-pseudos, this first lie of film criticism, so crucial is it to the 
coherence of Film Studies as a discipline.
170
 In fact, Bentham suggested that when 
fictions are thus regarded as realities, ‘many an empty name is considered as the 
representative of a correspondent reality’ and the following, final section will explore 
the way in such an empty name – or perhaps an “empty signifier” – as “noir” came to be 
regarded as a reality in Hollywood through the critical generification of the concept of 
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4. Neo-Noir, Genre and the Master Signifier 
Any understanding of the classic noir, of the very idea of noir itself is intimately bound 
up with both the films and filmmakers of the period associated with the appearance of 
“neo-noir” in Hollywood. As the overview of critical literature on noir in Chapter 1 has 
shown, the Anglo-American idea of noir emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s: the 
same moment in which films such as Point Blank (1967), The Long Goodbye (1973), 
Chinatown (1974) and Taxi Driver (1976) signalled a renewed interest in Hollywood in 
the filmic possibilities of noir.
172
 A term attributed to Todd Erickson, neo-noir – as the 
name suggests – constitutes a renewal of noir that is aware of the heritage of the past 
while at the same time moving with distinct motivations.
173
 Erickson contends that, 
Contemporary film noir is a new genre of film. (...) The term for this new body of 
films should be “neo-noir”, because these films still are noir films; yet a new type of 
noir film, one which effectively incorporates and projects the narrative and stylistic 
conventions of its progenitor onto a contemporary cinematic canvas.
174
 
This confluence of both the filmic and the cinematic possibilities of noir, in particular in 
the 1970s, will form the necessary, final stage in the investigation of the idea of noir. 
 Broadly following Richard Martin’s model in Mean Streets and Raging Bulls, 
the stages in the development of the post-noir movements can be organised by decade: 
from 1960s revival, to 1970s revisionism, 1980s pastiche, 1990s irony, and (to 
supplement Martin) 2000s hyper-stylisation or re-mediation.
175
 Indeed, in each case is 
there an instance of the “return with difference” under the signifier of noir that was first 
identified in relation to substitution/repetition in Chapter 1: noir was resuscitated almost 
immediately following its “demise” in 1958, where the idea of noir once again 
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flourished in France with the Nouvelle Vague. Instigated in large part by Jean-Luc 
Godard’s À bout de souffle (1960), the critic-filmmakers of the Cahiers du cinéma 
group in particular valorised the tropes of classic film noirs, reworking them in films 
such as François Truffaut’s Tirez sur le pianiste (1960) and Jean-Pierre Melville’s Le 
Samouraï (1967).
176
 Parallel to this, in America noir subsisted on television during the 
1960s in series such as The Fugitive, Dragnet, and Lineup. And by the end of the 
decade the hard-boiled crime story had returned to Hollywood with Harper (1966) and 
Point Blank.
177
 It was not, however, until the 1970s – when the Franco-American 
cultural dialectic turned once again and the influence of the Nouvelle Vague began to be 
felt in Hollywood – that the idea of noir was (re)established in the USA. Anticipated 
first by Arthur Penn’s Bonnie and Clyde (1967), the Hollywood New Wave filmmakers 
– for example, Martin Scorsese, Robert Altman, and Penn – incorporated the 
experimentation of Godard and Melville with a more critical regard for their own 
heritage (a history of Hollywood drawn largely from formal training at film school or in 
television) to produce films such as The Long Goodbye and Taxi Driver that once again 
rethought the possibilities of noir.
178
 And here film noir almost begins to resemble 
Benjamin’s Angel of History, with his face ‘turned toward the past’ and yet ‘irresistibly 
[propelled] into the future to which his back is turned.’179 Neo-noir is a case of 
Hollywood turning to its own past, in order both to repeat and transform what is found 
there, and thus to carry it forward. It is, as Martin notes, ‘informed by a growing 
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awareness (in industrial, critical and academic circles at least) of the concept of “film 
noir”.’180 
 By the 1980s this awareness had become increasingly comfortable, with the 
overarching tendency of the period being towards pastiche, in the Jamesonian sense, as 
‘a neutral practice of (...) mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated 
of the satiric impulse.’181 Critical interest was sustained in the idea of noir at the end of 
the 1970s and into the 1980s in academia, where the first book-length Anglophone 
studies of noir were published: Kaplan’s Women in Film Noir, Silver and Ward’s 
Encyclopedic Reference and Hirsch’s The Dark Side of the Screen, while neo-noir films 
moved away from the analytical, revisionist approach to become more formulaic and 
uncritical in their approach to noir. Films such as Body Heat (1981) (a tacit remake of 
Double Indemnity), Against All Odds (1984) and No Way Out (1987) evoked the 
typologies of noir through repetition rather than revision.
182
 Neo-noir in this period was 
then a return with (minimal) difference of the idea of noir, a recreation or restaging of 
the classic period in modern dress. Such films took the idea of noir into the mainstream, 
to the extent that, by the 1990s, neo-noir productions seemed to dominate Hollywood. 
Following in the wake of Quentin Tarantino’s success with the neo-heist movie, 
Reservoir Dogs (1991) and the knowingly titled, Pulp Fiction (1994), films such as The 
Usual Suspects, Seven, Casino, and Heat (all 1995) offered a bricolage of the various 
iterations that had preceded it; they are informed by every stage in the development of 
noir and refer to this history in a playful and allusive manner that leads Martin to 
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describe the mode as “Nineties Irony”.183 By the 2000s, this process had been refined to 
such an extent that “noir” films seemed to be working directly with the signifiers of 
“noirishness” rather than references to specific films. The hyper-stylised, graphical noir 
worlds of the Frank Miller films (Sin City (2005), The Spirit (2008)), for example, show 
film noir to be established in what Naremore describes as the ‘mediascape’ of cultural 
consciousness.
184
 The idea of noir has become part of the shared text of popular culture. 
And moreover, the critical conception of noir functions in conjunction with the 
filmmaking process in a continuing, dialectical relationship. Nowhere is this better 
exemplified than in Brian De Palma’s Femme Fatale (2002).185 This film, which treads 
the ground between neo-noir and erotic thriller and whose opening scene Mark Bould 
suggests, presents an arresting image that could perhaps encapsulate the history of noir 
in a single shot. Femme Fatale begins with a scene from Double Indemnity – the final 
confrontation between Neff and Phyllis – played on television with French subtitles, the 
reflection in the screen showing a woman lying in bed watching the film.
186
 Here is a 
picture of noir in microcosm: the Hollywood movie, overlaid with French text, a hint of 
eroticism combined with danger, brought to a contemporary audience through the 
medium of television. As Bould observes, ‘this is how film noir was fabricated: in 
French and by the rearticulation of old films in new venues.’187 
This development from the 1960s constitutes the process of generification of 
film noir in both critical and industrial terms. It is, moreover, a dual process of 
generification in that first – logically if not entirely chronologically, as this occurred 
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contemporaneously with the second – the entity known as “classic film noir” was 
established through a coincidence of both filmmaking and film criticism regarding the 
past. Secondly, through this production a second genre – “neo-noir” – emerged and was 
codified by the 1980s, when it was recognised ‘as a distinct formal category.’188 This 
first stage could not occur until the (French) idea of noir had worked its way back 
through Hollywood, and while Richard Martin argues that it has been the ‘investigation 
and revival of film noir in the Hollywood cinema (...) that has most significantly 
contributed to the evolving concept of what film noir actually is,’ the crucial role of the 
investigation of noir in the academic and critical contexts must not be overlooked.
189
 It 
is the fact that these filmic and cinematic discourses worked together to shape the idea 
of noir that makes the neo-noir period so significant. As Steve Neale suggests, it is as a 
result of the ‘growing ubiquity of the term’ and the ‘fashion for producing films which 
draw on its image’ that ‘film noir now has a generic status it did not originally possess 
in the past.’190 Indeed, it is this dialectic of the theory and practice of noir – where book-
length studies such as Silver and Ward’s Encyclopedia, Kaplan’s collection on Women 
in Film Noir and Hirsch’s first noir volume, The Dark Side of the Screen as well as 
films such as Harper, Taxi Driver and Body Heat all function together – that has 
established film noir as a genre. 
Rick Altman argues that film genres begin as ‘reading positions’ established by 
critical dissection (by either studio personnel or film critics themselves), which are then 
expressed and reinforced through the act of filmmaking.
191
 In fact, he argues that ‘film 
production constantly involves a process of criticism that actually precedes the act of 
production’ but this must itself be preceded by an act of production to critique, and so 
on, so that the relationship is indeed dialectical – as expressed above – rather than 
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simply ‘applied criticism’ as Altman states.192 The next step involves ‘broad industry 
acceptance of the proposed reading position and genre’ and as a result of this, expanded 
filmmaking practice and finally public awareness of this position, so that ‘the process of 
viewing would always be filtered through the concept.’ 193 Films are thus read in terms 
of a certain identifier (the name of the genre) and attendant generic expectations 
(characters, plot, visual style); the concept of the genre therefore determines the 
meaning attributed to films by the audience. This was, however, impossible during the 
period identified as “classic film noir” because such a reading position did not exist:  it 
was not used in the industry or by contemporary Anglophone critics or viewers. Certain 
vague identifiers were posited at the time – as outlined in Chapter 2 – but none of them 
became established reading positions.  
And so film noir was not a genre, nor could it become a genre, until its 
reappraisal in the 1960s and 1970s. These combined filmic and cinematic discourses 
had the effect of constituting this cycle of films in the past as a “genre” (qua reading 
position, and pace those identified in Chapter 1 who argue it is not a “genre” per se 
because it is identified by other traits) so that “film noir” stood as a retroactive, ordering 
principle through which films were read and their meaning determined. Having been 
established as a generic term in the 1970s, the signifier “noir” now had an effect on the 
past: as Steve Neale suggests, ‘films like Double Indemnity, Detour (1945) and Out of 
the Past are now viewed generically as noirs in a way they never were when initially 
released.’194 The past is here re-read in and by the present, given a new meaning 
through the concept of the genre, and a canon of “noir” comes into existence as remakes 
and retrospectives cement these films as “classics”. This idea of noir also began to 
function in relation to filmmaking practice in a way that it could not have done during 
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the classic period; this “reading position” became a widespread industrial genre as the 
films of directors such as Robert Altman and Martin Scorsese engaged with the generic 
concept to produce a series of films that carried the idea forward and expressed it in new 
ways. This led to the development of neo-noir as a generic category, which came to 
such prominence through the 1980s that Dennis Hopper could describe noir in 1990 as, 
‘[e]very director’s favourite genre.’195 
Rick Altman notes that this process can be understood as the transition of a 
critical term from adjective to noun; from a descriptive, such as “epic poetry” (for 
example, Homer or Virgil), to ‘the standalone substantive an epic’ (War and Peace or 
Ben Hur (1959)), the term becomes a categorical noun which can connect texts across 
different media, and thus functions as a signifier allowing the substitution-repetition 
process outlined above.
196
 In this case it is from the descriptive “roman noir” and then 
“film noir” to the substantive “noir”, from the deployment of a French descriptive term 
“noir” by critics such as Frank and Chartier (and the rightwing moralists before them) 
to characterise the tone or mood of a small number of films to its emergence as a 
categorical noun in both the work of Durgnat, Schrader, et al. and the material 
surrounding films such as Body Heat and The Hot Spot (1990) which refer to the 
concept or the cycle as a whole.
197
 Altman recalls editing Thomas Schatz’s dissertation 
in the 1970s, which used the term “noir” as a noun, stating that, ‘[o]blivious to the 
winds of change, I wanted him to use the full noun-plus-adjective expression.’198 He 
adds that by 1981 the editors of Hollywood Genres were willing to accept this new, 
substantive usage, which showed that “noir” had indeed completed ‘the full adjective-
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to-noun trajectory.’199 This is also reflected in the transition – although not in all works 
– from the italicised “noir”, indicating a foreign word that is marked as different, almost 
misplaced in the text, to the standard “noir”: the borrowed French word of the 1940s has 
by the 1970s and 1980s been absorbed into the Anglophone critical idiom like any other 
term. Noir has thus, in Naremore’s words, ‘fully entered the English language, and (...) 
formed a rich discursive category that the entertainment industry could expand and 
adapt in countless ways.’200 
It is, moreover, in the contrast between these two points – the function of noir in 
1946 and, say, 1972 – that a final distinction can be made between the point de capiton 
and the master signifier. Recalling the schema of the point de capiton as set out in the 
Elementary Cell of the Graph of Desire – as discussed in Chapter 1 – it should be noted 
that it is S2, some second signifier arriving after the fact, which determines S1 qua pre-
existing chain of signifiers. How then does this relate to the master signifier? This 
structure must be understood in terms of Lacan’s theory of the four discourses in The 
Other Side of Psychoanalysis, where these mathemes are assigned very specific values. 
S1 becomes the master signifier and S2 “knowledge”: ‘S1 is, to say it briefly, the 
signifier, the signifier function, that the essence of the master relies upon. From a 
different angle you may perhaps recall what I emphasized several times last year – that 
the slave’s own field is knowledge, S2.’
201
 Transcribing the schema into this context, the 
Graph can now be understood to reveal the dependency of the master signifier, S1, on 
the network signifiers (knowledge), S2, to give it significance. To understand this shift, 
it will be necessary to turn once more to Žižek’s polyvalent use of the point de 
capiton/master signifier. A distinction between the two Lacanian terms has already been 
outlined in Chapter 3, but to this Žižek seems to bring another dimension: that of the 
                                                 
199
 Ibid., p. 61. 
200
 Naremore, MTN, p. 37. 
201
 Lacan, S17, p. 21. Alternately, they are designated as S1, the big Other, and S2, the battery of signifiers, 
which is instructive for the current discussion. See S17, p. 13. 
266 
 
“empty signifier”.202 Ernesto Laclau explains that the empty signifier is, of course, 
‘strictly speaking, a signifier without signified,’ and adds that such a signifier can ‘only 
emerge if there is a structural impossibility in signification as such.’203 The empty, 
master signifier would thus appear to be of the same order as the phallus, as described 
above: a fictitious response to the lack in the Other. Indeed, like the Falcon, it stands for 
an impossible fullness of meaning sustained by a void. Žižek states that the master 
signifier is ‘a kind of empty container, a designation that holds open the space for the 
thriving of the irreducible plurality.’204 The master signifier must therefore be filled out 
with some positive content.
205
 This is how the schema must now be reinterpreted: as 
Adrian Johnston explains, ‘[t]hese S2s labor to elaborate a network of content (as 
“knowledge” [savoir]) on the basis of the (contingent) [designation] provided by S1.’
206
 
Now the difference between the function of the signifier “noir” in the 1940s and 
1970s becomes clear: in 1946, “noir” of course functioned as a point de capiton, a 
retroactive ordering principle that determined the meaning of a group of films. In 1972 
– the year of Schrader’s ‘Notes on Film Noir’ – it does in fact also act in this retroactive 
fashion: having only recently entered the Anglophone tradition at this point, it 
functioned again as an ordering principle for Hollywood and its past. However, the 
signifier also functions during this period along the progressive vector of the Graph, as a 
master signifier. Richard Martin states that, ‘noir was subjected to such rigorous 
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academic and critical investigation that the concept of what exactly constituted film noir 
became diffuse and fragmented.’207 It was therefore emptied out, made to mean almost 
anything. As a codified, generified signifier, noir (and its extension as neo-noir) stood – 
for industry, critics and audiences alike – as an empty receptacle for the idea of noir 
(qua network of signifiers, S2). Naremore expresses this possibility when he insists that, 
‘[t]he idea of noir, after all, can accommodate many different things.’208 
This can be seen at the beginning of Martin’s study of neo-noir when he poses a 
question from Derrida: ‘What are we doing when, to practice a “genre,” we quote a 
genre, represent it, stage it, expose its generic law, analyze it practically? Are we still 
practicing the genre?’209 Martin’s eventual answer is “yes”: ‘Of course (...). It is just that 
the genre itself has changed.’210 These changes have already been mapped out above, 
and each of these instances of “practicing the genre” can thus be understood in terms of 
the elaboration of S1 by S2. It did in fact only become a matter of “practicing the genre” 
in the 1970s and 1980s when noir was established as a generic concept and could thus 
function as a master signifier, standing over Hollywood filmmaking and determining its 
meaning but at the same time being determined by its content. While there is a sense in 
which Martin feels that there is more “worth” or interest in the critical approach of the 
1970s as compared to the formulaic neo-noir, all of the various iterations of the idea of 
noir can be seen as part of an ongoing filmic discourse that elaborates – practices – the 
genre through the various logics of, for example, pastiche, remake, irony or 
revisionism.
211
 Each version of neo-noir posits this idea as something slightly different, 
expressing the concept of noir – which is to say, filling out the master signifier with its 
positive content – in a reconfigured way. The manner in which neo-noir films seem to 
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work directly with the “signifiers” of noir has already been noted: reduced to certain 
images or types, films such as the D.O.A. remake, L.A. Confidential (1997) or Sin City 
each express a distinct idea of noir.
212
 These (retrospective) processes are but different 
modalities of the relationship between S1 and S2, different ways in which the network of 
“knowledge” about noir can be expressed. 
This “production of knowledge” is related to what Lacan calls the ‘university 
discourse.’213 It is, in effect, the designation Lacan gives to the elaboration of S2 
(“putting knowledge into circulation”) in the service of S1 (master).
214
 The university 
discourse works to preserve the master signifier and consolidate its hegemonic position; 
indeed, Žižek situates the space of hegemony itself in ‘the tension between the empty 
Master-Signifier and the series of “ordinary” signifiers which struggle to fill in the 
Master-Signifier with a particular content.’215 This is then the space of genre: noir as a 
generic term – a master signifier, S1 – guarantees the meaning, the readability of the 
films that come under its rubric, but only because these films – S2 – work to determine 
precisely what that meaning is. As Žižek explains, ‘the university discourse which then 
elaborates the network of Knowledge which sustains this readability by definition 
presupposes and relies on the initial gesture of the Master.’216 The master signifier 
“noir” intervenes as an ordering principle that in itself adds no new content, only a 
sense of order: a reading position, or genre. 
The university discourse performs the task of detailing this genre. Noir began in 
a very literal sense, although this is not what is meant by the Lacanian term, as a 
discourse of the university; as Foster Hirsch commented in 1981, ‘[n]oir is being 
rediscovered on college campuses and in revival theatres, as American cinéastes are 
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finally catching up with the discovery of French critics over twenty five years ago.’217 
And this situation persists: Warner Brothers suggested that L.A. Confidential was not a 
commercial success because, ‘[t]he bulk of the audience who enjoys film noir are 
directors, film students, critics and the most ardent, generally upscale film 
enthusiast.’218 These are indeed the agents of the idea of noir, and this all-encompassing 
effect of the discourse can be seen in a very real sense in the nexus of filmic and 
cinematic discourses that come together in the making of Taxi Driver. There are perhaps 
two no more influential figures in the shaping of the modern concept of noir than Paul 
Schrader and Martin Scorsese. Both film school graduates and both with an obvious 
regard for classic film noir: Schrader is of course author of ‘Notes on Film Noir’ and 
director of a remake of the noir horror Cat People (1982), Scorsese worked a clip from 
The Big Heat (1953) into his first proper feature, Mean Streets (1973), and since then 
has sought the preservation and proliferation of noir through documentaries (The Film 
Noir Story and his own A Century of Cinema), producing neo-noir projects such as The 
Grifters (1990) and a Night and the City remake (1992), and sponsoring the restoration 
of A Double Life (1947) and Force of Evil (1948).
219
 Like the Cahiers du Cinéma group 
before them, Schrader and Scorsese brought together film criticism and practical 
filmmaking in the service of the idea of noir.
220
 Taxi Driver is therefore an almost 
overdetermined site of the elaboration of the master signifier noir that studiously 
observes its noir antecedents and offers a reconfiguration of the idea of noir to take 
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forward. It can be taken as a microcosm of the discursive practices of film noir criticism 
and production that help sustain the master signifier.  
There is therefore a sort of short circuit between S1 and S2 because the chain of 
signifiers can unfurl under the aegis of the master signifier only because the master 
signifier is itself determined, retroactively defined by this very chain of signifiers. It is 
in this gap between S1 and S2, the concept and its content, that all the work of noir qua 
genre is carried out. “Noir” can be made to mean almost anything because, as Žižek 
suggests, ‘[w]hat the emptiness of the Master-Signifier conceals is thus the 
inconsistency of its content (its signified) (...); [it] obfuscates the inconsistent multitude 
of its possible meanings.’221 This is why, like art or pornography, it is easier to 
recognise film noir than define it: it is understood through the various iterations of its 
network of knowledge. It is only through this elaboration that the order which is 
designated by the master signifier can be defined. This furthermore points once again to 
the double temporality of the progressive and retrospective vectors of the Graph of 
Desire, and the relationship between them. It is at the point – in the Hegelian sense of 
Punkt as the coincidence of space and time – that everything comes together: 
synchrony/diachrony, logical/chronological, retroactive/progressive, 
universal/particular, structure/content.
222
 And here this project turns once again to 
Lacan’s description of the point de capiton as ‘the point of convergence that enables 
everything that happens in this discourse to be situated retroactively and 
prospectively.’223 The idea of noir (S1) can only be understood in terms of a given, 
individual expression (S2). Žižek expresses this as, ‘a proper Lacanian paradox in which 
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a synchronous, paradigmatic structure exists only in so far as it is itself again embodied 
in One, in an exceptional singular element.’224 
 
Each time the idea of noir is reconfigured, the present (re)constitutes the past in its own 
image: this is key to both psychoanalysis and this project. The past may have a grip 
upon the present but it is the most liberating insight of psychoanalysis to understand that 
there is, in the present, the possibility to determine the past and what it can mean. 
Without the past there can of course be no present but nonetheless it remains possible to 
introduce new possibilities into the past. Žižek captures this when he states, ‘I am 
determined by causes, but I retroactively determine which causes determine me.’225 
Each iteration of film noir is just such a possibility; from Harper to Sin City (and 
everything between and beyond) there exists a potentiality of S2s to fill out S1. Each 
time neo-noir claims classic noir as its antecedent, constitutes the noir canon as its 
predecessor, it suggests the ability to posit again and again a different version of the 
idea. The study of noir thus shows both how to understand the past and how to shape it 
(and the way in which these are inextricably linked). 
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The Moment of Concluding 
 
The inception of this project was at a juncture where – like the appearance in 1895 of 
the Lumière Brothers’ projections at the Grand Café and of Freud and Breuer’s Studies 
on Hysteria – cinema and psychoanalysis appeared to coincide, and given the long-
standing relationship between the two, a juncture which suggested a way in which this 
relation had not yet been articulated.
1
 Central to this thesis from the outset has been the 
Elementary Cell of Lacan’s Graph of Desire, which presents a diagram of the relation 
between past, present and future as it is understood in psychoanalytic theory. From the 
bi-directionality of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit and the structure of Lacan’s point de 
capiton to the historical emergence of film noir (and then neo-noir) as a category and 
the narrative trajectories of films noirs such as Double Indemnity, the two vectors of the 
Graph – progressive and retroactive – have been found to function at every level in this 
investigation: filmic, cinematic and theoretical. 
Starting from the observation that meaning (and therefore understanding) comes 
about ex post facto, the first chapter began by re-emphasising the critical truism that 
film noir was a category constituted very much after the fact: the “noirness” of a group 
of films such as The Maltese Falcon and Laura was discerned by critics in France 
several years after their production and release in Hollywood. Of particular interest in 
this respect, and equally as fundamental to the project as the Lacanian Graph – was 
James Naremore’s account of this process as the discursive construction of the idea of 
film noir, which involved a retroactive movement from French film criticism to 
Hollywood film production. The chapter then set out to establish what could be 
considered, in Lacanian terms, the symbolic structure involved in this relation, which 
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was found to be that of Lacan’s point de capiton: the punctuation that marks the 
completion of the sentence that preceded it and thus seals its meaning. This can be 
expressed in its simplest terms as the relationship between two signifiers: a first 
signifier S1, which is modified by a second signifier, S2, that comes after it. In this 
elementary structure is contained the interdependence of present, past and future 
involved in the temporality of psychoanalysis (as well as film noir): a signifier is spoken 
in the present in anticipation of its future determination by another signifier, and this 
future signifier then fixes the first in the past, determines it as what it always already 
was. In this way, both the ex post facto emergence of the idea of noir (as described by 
Naremore) and the final revelations in films noirs such as Double Indemnity and D.O.A. 
could be understood. The retroactive, noir temporality was found to be the same as that 
expressed by Lacan in his theorisation of the relationship between the diachronic and 
synchronic actions of the chain of signifiers. However, a paradox was revealed in this 
logic of retroactive meaning: that any idea of a “final” signifier is impossible because a 
meaning will always – by virtue of its own structure – be subject to the intervention of 
another signifier that would reconstitute its signification. S1 may be determined by S2 
but there still remains the possibility of S3, S4, and so on. This can be seen, for instance, 
in both the continual renewal of the project to discuss and define noir, and the multiple, 
reworked endings to the films themselves. In both noir ontology and narrative it is then 
impossible to have the last word. 
 The unfolding of this signifying chain is what constitutes the progressive vector 
of the Graph 
     
    and this was explored in terms of the way in which the signifier 
seems to anticipate the arrival of a second signifier. This was symbolised by adding 
three dots to the first signifier – S1... – to indicate both its incompleteness and its 
orientation towards the future. Such anticipation of meaning was found in particular in 
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Gilda – where a series of signifiers is presented (a voice, a word, an empty frame), all of 
which point to the figure of Gilda herself as the S2 – and The Killers, where 
Hemingway’s short story is itself the first signifier that finds its determination in the 
elaboration of Siodmak’s film as S2. There was, moreover, a dimension of the Real 
discerned in this vector, as the S1... was associated with Lacan’s concept of the letter – 
the floating signifier – that constitutes the base material of language, and which is not in 
itself meaningful but only signifies once it is put into relation with another signifier. 
 Having identified Lacan’s concept of the Real in the first chapter, the second 
chapter then went on to present a number of different ways through which it could be 
approached and found the Real to be present at, once again, both the filmic and 
cinematic levels in film noir. In general, this chapter was situated through the work on 
noir of Marc Vernet, first in the analysis of film narrative and then an interrogation of 
the critical category. An initial approach to the Real as trauma was explored in Vernet’s 
discussion of the explosive disruption of the normal order presented in noir narratives. 
Everyday tranquillity is upset by the sudden revelation of a terrible crime, as in Out of 
the Past, which Vernet likens to the opening up of a “black hole”. This was compared to 
Lacan’s version of tuché, understood – like Freud’s Schreck – as an unexpected and 
violent intrusion, which is experienced as trauma. This tychic black hole can never be 
symbolised but nonetheless drives the machinery of symbolisation (Lacan’s automaton) 
and thus presents a constitutive impossibility – an absent cause – in the field of 
signifiers. 
 Through this confluence of Vernet and Lacan, the Real came to be understood 
not as “out there” but, as it were, “in here”, at the heart of the Symbolic order. This led 
to an appreciation of Lacan’s crucial formulisation of the concept of the big Other as 
lacking, barred from the inside by the Real, which could be understood as an inherent 
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fault in the logic of the signifier comparable to Russell’s paradox. This fault in the 
universe – as Lacan describes it – is central to his theory, which insists that every 
structure must be found lacking because totalisation is impossible. In this light, the 
history of film noir – conceived of as the progressive unfolding of the chain 
     
    – was 
explored, not in terms of the French critical perspective but the contemporaneous 
Hollywood discourse. In contradistinction to the Eurocentric and retrospective take on 
film noir commonly expressed in the critical discourse, the historical accidents of the 
emergence of the films understood as classic noir were examined for the ways in which 
such history presented a complex past that struck faults and fissures in the conventional 
historiography of noir. An example such as Sheri Biesen’s discourse on American “red 
meat” crime films was itself found to be lacking, and historiography was shown to be an 
imperfect process. The crucial lesson that every structure is found to be lacking was 
reaffirmed. 
 More significantly, Vernet’s deconstruction of the very idea of noir (as both an 
historical and aesthetic construction) and, for example, the founding myth of the 
American accommodation of a German émigré style, pointed to an utter dissolution of 
the critical concept and a conclusion that, in fact, film noir does not exist. The process 
of defining a totalising essence of noir in a Symbolic order that is inherently lacking 
was found to be impossible, and this pointed towards Lacan’s logic of feminine 
sexuation as a non-universalisable, “not-all” structure where there can be no essence of 
womanhood because “Woman doesn’t exist”. Read as an expression of the Symbolic as 
an open set, this logic was then brought to bear on the flawed definitions of noir. Noir as 
a concept was understood equally as an open set, which could never be delimited from 
the outside and continues to admit new elements to the critical lists of films. A way of 
“living with the Real” in criticism was suggested by Vernet’s attentiveness to the flaws 
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of noir and the notion of a critical topology was introduced – which proceeds from the 
Lacanian fault in the universe – and functions according to the principles of Lacan’s 
concept of lalangue, as the signifying chain in its flawed, stuttering and open modality. 
 The third chapter then proceeded with a reading of the other side of the Graph of 
Sexuation, presenting a version of Lacan’s theory of masculine structure as an “as-if” 
closed set, in order to approach the question of defining film noir. It was emphasised 
that this did not constitute a “complement” to the closed set – Lacan states that there is 
complementarity between the sexes – rather, it presents another mode of failure in the 
Symbolic. This structure entailed a return of and to the logic of suture – understood in 
its original context, as expressed by Miller, as the relation between the zero and the one 
– to account for the emergence of the “as-if” closure, which comes about as the result of 
the repression of lack. Such action allows for Imaginary boundaries to be constructed 
around the masculine set, as the limit inherent to the Symbolic is turned outwards, into 
an (imaginary) other of the Other – or Father-function – who stands as a transcendental 
guarantor.
2
 It was then through this logic of exception and exclusion – as further 
expounded by Milner in relation to linguistics – that an approach to noir could be taken. 
The chapter suggested that the question of what is and, moreover, what is not noir was 
the fundamental principle of the masculine, “as-if” closed ontology. Naremore’s image 
of the “film noir shelf” in a video store was taken as a useful schema for this operation, 
and Frank Krutnik’s approach to the definition of noir was presented as paradigmatic of 
the masculine logic. 
 From its function in noir ontology, the operation of the Lacanian Imaginary was 
then traced in relation to the historiography of noir, with particular reference to the work 
of Thomas Elsaesser. Like Vernet, Elsaesser offers a deconstruction of the myth of noir 
and the history of German cinema in Hollywood, insisting that the émigré narrative 
                                                 
2
 “Suture” was then the name for this process of transformation of a limit into a boundary. 
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does not hold up. It does, however, persist because, Elsaesser suggests, it lends an 
imaginary coherence to the history of noir. This explicitly Lacanian invocation provided 
the starting point for the psychoanalytic investigation of noir historiography in Chapter 
4. First, the complex temporality involved in Elsaesser’s concept of the “historical 
imaginary” was considered. It was read, via Žižek, as an approach to the past qua 
“virtual history”, and – drawing upon TS Eliot’s notion of the “historical sense” – the 
chapter emphasised the way in which the past is made present, or even made in the 
present. This, furthermore, suggests the Bergsonian concept of introducing new 
possibilities into the past, which finds its corollary in Elsaesser’s desire to “give back 
histories” that had been obscured by the film noir historical imaginary, in particular the 
idea that European cinema figured as a signifier of psychopathology in Hollywood films 
(such as Stranger on the Third Floor or Spellbound). 
 Elsaesser’s suggestion of “obscured histories” then pointed to a progression of 
the Lacanian engagement with noir historiography in terms of the structure of (paternal) 
metaphor, as the repression of a (troubling) signifier. In Lacanian terms, the resultant 
“phallic signification” presents a set of co-ordinates for the subject by constituting 
language as a meaningful, consistent discourse: the introduction of an imaginary 
dimension to the Symbolic. This could be compared – in Žižekian terms – to an act of 
interpretation, which introduces order (or, meaning) where there was chaos. Similarly 
then, was the noir historiography found to have presented the history of noir as a 
meaningful whole, and the effect of this was a reverse teleology whereby the 
contingent, historical accidents of the past are rendered necessary from the perspective 
of the present. In this way, a necessary element of the historical imaginary was 
identified in any approach to the past that sought to constitute it as a discourse. As an 
example of this process, Vincendeau’s investigation of Poetic Realism as an antecedent 
of noir was explored, and a “precursor function” similar to that identified by JL Borges 
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in his analysis of Kafka’s place in literary history. In Ginette Vincendeau’s work, the 
past – Poetic Realism – becomes transformed, in the present, into the necessary 
conditions for the very emergence of the present: in this case, a precursor to noir. Noir 
thus begins to function not just as point de capiton, but as master signifier, through 
which all other signifiers (which is to say, films) must be read. 
 The final chapter began by bringing together the theories of open and “as-if” 
closed structures suggested by Lacan’s Graph of Sexuation in order to understand the 
operation of certain film noir narratives. Moving, then, once again from the cinematic to 
the filmic, a logic was first set out in which the conclusion of the film (in this case, 
Casablanca), qua point de capiton, contributes to a repression of contingency where all 
latent, virtual possibilities are repressed by the actual content. This repression also, of 
course, insisted upon the return of the repressed, as the relationship between the given 
ending and the lost endings to Double Indemnity was examined. The Maltese Falcon 
was then considered; instead of a “closure”, it was noted that this film offers a 
décapitonnage, an opening up of narrative as the statue is revealed to be a fake. These 
points furthermore suggested a new relevance for the Lacanian theory of sets in the 
analysis of film noir narrative. A sutured structure was identified in the narrative of 
Gilda, where a neat conclusion appears to tie all plot strands together and yet still leaves 
certain loose ends untied. A theatrical release of Kiss Me Deadly, which omitted the 
very last shot of the film, was then taken as a means of approaching an open narrative 
structure in that it presented a radically unresolved and unresolvable ending that literally 
exploded any sense of closure. 
 The concept of the MacGuffin, which had been found to operate in both Gilda 
and The Maltese Falcon, was then carried forward and explored in relation to Lacan’s 
use of the notion of the imaginary number. An extended reading of the latter film 
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provided further insight into both the structure of the narrative of The Maltese Falcon 
and an often misunderstood aspect of Lacanian theory. The √-1, like the Falcon statue, 
was understood to constitute a “supplement” to the field that was in itself worthless – in 
both cases, the object’s value is understood as imaginary – but nonetheless had an 
appreciable effect: granting consistency, allowing the proper functioning of 
mathematics (and film narrative alike). The statue, in this sense, does not exist – it is a 
fake – and yet it is of use; it provides meaning in the face of unmeaning in a manner that 
recalls the operation of phallic signification. Indeed, as the coincidence of meaning and 
lack, the statue could be compared – following Lee Edelman – to the Lacanian phallus: 
a (false but necessary) guarantor of meaning, worthless material with an assumed value. 
 Further investigation of the epistemology at work in The Maltese Falcon led to a 
consideration of the concept of fiction, both as it functions in the film and in the 
relationship it could establish between Lacanian theory and Benthamite philosophy. 
Throughout the film certain “useful lies” are told (Miss Wonderley, the statue itself) 
that the characters are more than willing to treat as if they were true. Indeed, if the 
statue were not treated as if it were real then there would be no plot whatsoever. The 
crucial example here was found to be Spade’s construction of a “fall guy” towards the 
film’s end. He insists that, instead of the convoluted mess presented by the film’s plot, 
the DA would prefer a single figure (Wilmer, the fall guy: a fake) to prosecute. The fall 
guy would render the prosecutor’s discourse coherent and whole, but would be 
predicated upon a lie: a fiction. Reading Lacan and Bentham together on the subject of 
fiction – via The Maltese Falcon – insisted upon an the apprehension of an imaginary 
dimension to discourse that compensated for the fundamentally meaningless nature of 
the signifier, and the conclusion that fiction responds to the lack in the Other. The 
statue, the √-1 and phallic signification could thus all be understood in terms of this 
structure of fiction. Furthermore, such structure could also be discerned at the cinematic 
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level in the epistemology of noir criticism. Naremore suggests that “noir” should be 
retained as an heuristic, ordering principle and here he was found to be operating very 
closely to Freud in his approach to metapsychology, as a set of necessary assumptions 
(unconscious, drive) that permitted further intellectual inquiry. 
 Finally, this chapter returned to the structure of retroaction at work in film noir 
criticism to explore the retrospective formation of noir – and subsequently neo-noir – in 
the work of 1970s Hollywood: a discourse that was first introduced in Chapter 1 but 
could not be interrogated fully until this point, where the necessary theoretical tools had 
been established. Noir was thus understood as a function of Hollywood’s relation to its 
own past. Through a series of revivals, revisions and re-mediations, each stage in the 
development of the post-noir period in Hollywood – from the 1960s to the present – 
posited its own notion of what noir was in the past. Here the double trajectory returned 
again, as neo-noir filmmakers such as Schrader, Scorsese and Altman proceeded, Janus-
faced, to turn to the past in order to move forward with filmmaking in the present. The 
idea of noir was thus projected back – into Hollywood history – as the noir canon was 
constructed, as well as carried forward through both film criticism and practice. The 
result of such development has been the integration of the idea of noir into mainstream 
culture, to the extent that the concept now functions as genre. Moving forwards, noir 
was thus understood to function as an empty signifier that is filled out by the idea of 
noir with each iteration of film noir. It is made to mean anything, in any context, from 
graphic novels to computer games and is therefore more readily defined by example 
than by any stable characteristics. In this way, the relation between S1 and S2 could be 
nuanced for the last time: while the structure of the point de capiton described the 
intervention of a single signifier, S2, that granted order and meaning on the past, S1, as 
was the case construction of the idea of noir in 1946, the empty, master signifier reveals 
the dependency of such a single signifier, now considered S1, upon a succession of 
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further signifiers, S2s, to fill it out with positive content, (retroactively) to give it 
meaning, which is how “noir” now functions qua genre. The thesis thus ends, in a sense, 
where it began, with the structure and temporality of retroaction, and an interdependent 
relation where the past does indeed determine the present, but the present itself 
determines what such a past can be.  
In returning then to the beginning, to begin again, this is a seemingly very 
obvious point: that everything from the most elementary act of speech to the most 
sophisticated creative works (of, for example, the cinema) is understood only ex post 
facto. This simple observation did, however, present a point of departure for the thesis; 
it allows for an opening up of the assumptions that underpin this quotidian structure of 
meaning. For example, the S1 itself thus comes to be understood retroactively as being 
produced in anticipation of its meaning in the future; the production of a first signifier in 
this sense presupposes its reception by the Other. Indeed, one aim of this project 
throughout has been to show that the appearance of simplicity (in the present) often 
occludes a complex, even contradictory, set of elements (in the past), to explore the way 
in which a consistent discourse takes the place of, for example, the confused 
multiplicity of historical experience, retroactively constituting it qua past.
3
 This is in 
fact one important aspect of psychoanalysis: to take something as singular as the 
symptom and discern the overdetermined and multifaceted origins that subtend it. The 
Wolf-Man’s dream, for example, presented an image that can be summed up in a phrase 
– several white wolves sitting in a walnut tree – but which had to be traced back to an 
uncertain past and numerous encounters with the trauma of sexuality. As such, it can be 
seen that this engagement with the work of Lacan has brought fresh insight into the 
already well-explored category of film noir. First redescribing the existing analyses in 
                                                 
3
 However, at the same time, this project has also sought to present seemingly difficult theoretical 
material – such as Lacan’s Encore – in a way which renders it as clearly and comprehensibly as possible, 
while still aiming to retain the necessary complexities of its formulation. 
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the field in a new way and then – more crucially – casting noir in its own terms, this 
work of Lacanian film theory has endeavoured to leave the concept of noir better 
examined and, in exploring the truism that underpins this concept, the structures at work 
both in and around film noir better understood. 
Furthermore, this “simple point” does perhaps appear simple, or obvious, 
because it speaks to a more universal structure of retroaction and meaning (in film 
criticism). Noir is in fact a specific instance of a more general form, albeit exaggerated 
over a distance of some 30 years and 3,000 miles; indeed, it is this magnification of the 
structure of criticism and meaning in noir that necessitates its thorough theoretical 
investigation. Rick Altman, in his analysis of the discursive construction of genre, 
identifies what he calls ‘the Critic’s Game,’ which is retrospective and fundamentally 
synchronic in nature: in other words, the intercession of a point de capiton.
4
 This 
“game” – the act of criticism – necessarily involves a retroactive ordering of the past 
through the analysis of films, which – with hindsight – appear to contribute to the 
establishment of a generic category.
5
 This presents one way in which the theoretical 
structure can be transferred, or perhaps expanded, to other films, other genres, or indeed 
the concept of genre as such. In general, an act of “criticism” (or interpretation) is 
necessarily an a posteriori intervention, a production of meaning in response to a given 
object or event. This is, then, the Lacanian “moment of concluding”, the final, necessary 
stage in Lacan’s formulation of Logical Time: the ex post fact determination of S1 by 
S2. It is perhaps equally as true in the case of, for example, art or literary criticism – see 
the previous references to Eliot and Borges – and here this thesis can speak to a more 
general context. There is, however, something in the intimate, dialectical relationship 
between production and reception – between theory and practice – in cinema that lends 
                                                 
4
 Altman, Film/Genre, p. 38. 
5
 Ibid., p. 38. 
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itself to the psychoanalytic structures expounded by Lacan. Conversely, and in keeping 
with the emphasis in this thesis upon bi-directional schema, Altman also identifies a 
‘Producer’s Game,’ which is prospective and constitutes the production of films within 
a generic discourse: in Lacanian terms, the determination of an S1 by a series of S2s. 
Indeed, while such a conclusion does insist that more than just film noir is at stake in a 
theory of criticism, the particular configuration of noir here described equally insists 
that, moving elsewhere, these insights into noir must be carried forward. The same 
project could not, in fact, have been achieved with another genre or category but, 
nonetheless, this project can cast light on the function of other critical concepts. 
Moreover, it is in this space between two signifiers that psychoanalysis itself 
operates: not just as discourse, but as cure. This prototypical structure, S1...S2, is found 
throughout Lacanian psychoanalysis: Lacan, for example, defines the signifier itself as, 
‘that which represents a subject for another signifier,’ and both Lacanian theory and 
practice can be understood as operating between two terms, such as Subject and Other, 
analyst and analysand, Φ and S(A).6 The analysand comes to the analyst with some 
symptom, an S1... in search of meaning, in the hope that the analyst – as subject 
supposed to know – can provide an answer, S2, that will function as cure. In reality, of 
course, the analyst does not know but it is through such “belief in the symptom” that the 
psychoanalytic process – which takes place in this very space between the two 
signifiers, indicated by the ellipsis, (...) – can be initiated. This leads to another question 
that is crucial to the engagement between film and theory in this thesis. To recall the 
structure of the point de capiton, Lacan states that, in a sense, the sentence only exists 
once its meaning has been determined retroactively. This presents a further aspect of 
this project’s “simple assumption” that is not immediately apparent, and one that 
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psychoanalysis is perhaps uniquely suited to interrogate: what status does this S1 have 
before the intervention of the S2? 
 If it has been established that “film noir” did not, in a very real sense, exist in 
Hollywood in the 1940s and 1950s – there were the films themselves (S1) but the 
appellation “noir” (S2) was still “in the future”, in France – how then is it possible to 
talk about something that does not exist? This has been a fundamental concern in this 
project’s engagement with psychoanalytic theory and film history. It is, furthermore, a 
problematic that troubled Freud throughout his metapsychological work: a central tenet 
of psychoanalysis such as the concept of the unconscious or the drive could not be 
proven to exist through empirical observation, but such existence could nonetheless be 
apprehended through the effects on the subject. The theory of fictions expounded by 
this thesis presents, therefore, a useful way in which the constructions of both film 
narrative and criticism can be understood to function, particularly in relation to history 
and constructions of the past. 
It is perhaps here that, once again, an important and more general implication of 
this thesis resides. To recall the discussion of Chapter 3, Elsaesser, in his large 
collection of essays on European Cinema, offers something of an apologia for the 
notion of the historical imaginary. He professes to be ‘well aware of how contested a 
notion it is; how it places itself between film theorists and film historians, without 
necessarily convincing either.’7 As such, he seeks to minimise the import of the notion, 
claiming that ‘it was never meant to be systematic, but to help answer a particular set of 
problems.’8 However, no apology is necessary on Elsaesser’s part. The “historical 
imaginary” is a powerful tool precisely because of its liminal status between theory and 
history: it points to the necessary relation between theory and history, a relation which 
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 Elsaesser, European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2005), pp. 19-20. 
8
 Ibid., p. 20. 
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is not always amicable in the realm of Film Studies.
9
 For those who think, for instance, 
that “Lacan” and “history” have no business appearing together on the same page, the 
psychoanalytical dimension of Elsaesser’s approach to historiography shows how 
Lacanian theory can inform the philosophy of history: the necessary understanding of 
how it is that history is understood. Elsaesser’s concept of the historical imaginary 
provides a locus for some academic “marriage counselling”, to bring together the unruly 
(and sometimes unwilling) partners in the study of film noir. 
This has from the outset been an historically situated project, both in terms of its 
context and its approach to noir. With its foundations in the era of 1970s film theory, 
when film theory was interested in how film as a medium could be meaningful to its 
audience (Metz), it nonetheless stands apart from this semiotics of the cinema, being not 
a Metzian psychoanalytic engagement but a properly Lacanian one. If a critic once as 
ardently anti-Lacanian as Steven Shaviro can admit that, apropos of film theory, 
“another Lacan” is possible, and if this new wave of Lacanian film theory was first 
suggested by the work of Žižek (who, of course, insisted that “Lacan himself” be given 
a chance) and is currently represented by the vital contributions of theorists such as 
Todd McGowan, then this project should be considered a contribution to the continued 
(re)invigoration of Lacan in Film Studies. Working from an almost strictly Freudo-
Lacanian perspective in the first chapter, where the crucial theoretical concepts were 
laid out, and moving in later chapters – still very much with Lacan – into the work of 
contemporary post-Lacanian theory, this project has striven to put the Lacan back into 
Lacanian film theory, beginning with the concept of the point de capiton and the 
structure of noir.
10
 Building out critically from the original juncture of cinema and 
                                                 
9
 As such, the concept is similar to psychoanalysis itself: its status “in between” – for example, science 
and philosophy, or clinic and theory – is what makes it both interesting and useful in an interdisciplinary 
approach such as this thesis. 
10
 This is, then, in contrast to McGowan’s work such as The Real Gaze, which focuses on Lacan’s Four 
Fundamental Concepts, and particularly the objet (a). 
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psychoanalysis yet addressing similar questions – indeed, the thesis does at one point 
turn to that central tenet of the old “Lacanian film theory”, suture, to “put the Miller 
back in” as it were, in returning the concept to its original context as the logic of the 
signifier – and in contradistinction to the current movements in film-philosophy, this 
project sought to explore not how they think or feel, but how films mean: how their 
structures bring about meaningfulness (through narrative), and how similar structures 
can be discerned in the discursive construction of a critical category, such as noir, to 
which these films are said to belong. 
More generally, the aim throughout has been to bring together film (noir) and 
psychoanalysis in productive ways. For example, Chapters 2 and 3 laid out an approach 
to set theory that endeavoured to articulate Lacanian theory in a new way, in order to 
shed light on the concept of film noir as a critical category and the structures and 
functions of certain film noir narratives. A reading of Lacan’s notion of sexuation was 
presented that addressed some often misunderstood concepts such the “not-all”, which 
then led into an in-depth exploration of both the processes through which critics have 
sought to define noir and the ways in which films noirs themselves both invite and resist 
narrative closure. Conversely, Chapter 4 attempted to investigate The Maltese Falcon in 
a novel way in order to provide a new reading of Lacanian theory: to expose a new 
dimension of its relation to philosophy. A close reading of the film, and in particular the 
role the Falcon statue plays in the workings of the narrative, suggested a perhaps 
overlooked dimension of Lacan’s work that brought it closer to the thought of Jeremy 
Bentham than even Lacan himself had contemplated. This project has endeavoured to 
show at every point that – far from no longer having enough to say about film – Lacan 
and cinema must be brought together, again and again, in order to discover the new and 
original insights such a mutual engagement can provide. 
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Like the structure of noir that has here been identified, the work of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic film theory might then entail a repeated process of “return with 
difference”, turning back as it must time and again to the work of Lacan (as Lacan 
himself insisted his work must (re)turn always to Freud) in order to move forward, to 
formulate new ways of engaging with the cinema, while at the same time seeking out 
those instances where the cinema itself offers challenges to Lacanian theory. The work 
of such film theory can (and must) never be concluded because – like the idea of noir as 
it has been reiterated with each development in the New Hollywood – the 
psychoanalytic approach is made anew with each fresh intervention. It is an ethical 
imperative for the Lacanian theorist never to forget the origins of this discourse in the 
clinic and the analysis of psychopathology, but nevertheless film theory remains a 
crucial venue for the expression of psychoanalytic principles, just as psychoanalysis 
must be retained for the invaluable and inimitable perspective it provides on the 







Figure 1 – Elementary Cell of the Graph of Desire (Écrits, p. 681) 
 
 





Figure 3 – Modified version of the elementary cell of the Graph of Desire 
 
Žižek points out that the succession of the four forms of the graph ‘cannot be reduced to 
a linear gradual completion’ and therefore implies itself ‘the retroactive changing of 
preceding forms.’1 The intersections “s(A)” and “A” can thus be thought of as always-
already designated on the Elementary Cell in the way that is suggested in this modified 
version. 
  
                                                 
1












À bout de souffle. Dir. Jean-Luc Godard. France, SNC, 1960. 
Abschied. Dir. Robert Siodmak. Germany, UFA, 1930. 
Against All Odds. Dir. Taylor Hackford. USA, Columbia Pictures, 1984. 
The Asphalt Jungle. Dir. John Huston, USA, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1950. 
Attack!. Dir. Robert Aldrich. USA, Associates & Aldrich Company, 1956. 
The Band Wagon. Dir. Vincente Minelli. USA, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1953. 
La Bandera. Dir. Julien Duvivier. France, SNC, 1935. 
Ben Hur. Dir. William Wyler. USA, MGM, 1959. 
La Bête humaine. Dir. Jean Renoir. France, Paris Film, 1939. 
The Big Gamble. Dir. Fred Niblo. USA, RKO Pathé Pictures, 1931. 
The Big Heat. Dir. Fritz Lang. USA, Columbia Pictures, 1953. 
The Big Sleep. Dir. Howard Hawks, USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1946. 
The Bigamist. Dir. Ida Lupino. USA, The Filmakers, 1953. 
Der blaue Engel. Dir. Josef von Sternberg. Germany, UFA, 1930. 
The Blue Dahlia. Dir. George Marshall. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1946. 
Body Heat. Dir. Lawrence Kasdan. USA, The Ladd Company, 1981. 
Bonnie and Clyde. Dir. Arthur Penn. USA, Warner Bros.-Seven Arts, 1967. 
Bringing Up Baby. Dir. Howard Hawks. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1938. 
Des Cabinet des Dr. Caligari. Dir. Robert Wiene. Germany, Decla-Bioscop AG, 1920. 
Casablanca. Dir. Michael Curtiz. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1942. 
Casbah. Dir. John Berry. USA, Marston Productions, 1948. 
Casino. Dir. Martin Scorsese. USA/France, Universal Pictures, 1995. 
Cat People. Dir. Jacques Tourneur. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1942. 
Cat People. Dir. Paul Schrader. USA, Universal Pictures, 1982. 
La Chienne. Dir. Jean Renoir. USA, Les Établissements Braunberger-Richebé, 1931. 
292 
 
Chinatown. Dir. Roman Polanski. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1974. 
Christmas Holiday. Dir. Robert Siodmak. USA, Universal Pictures, 1944. 
Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1941. 
Conflict. Dir. Curtis Bernhardt. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1945. 
La Crise est finie. Dir. Robert Siodmak. France, Nero-Film AG, 1934. 
D.O.A.. Dir. Rudolph Maté. USA, Cardinal Pictures, 1950. 
The Dark Mirror. Dir. Robert Siodmak. USA, International Pictures, 1946. 
The Day of the Jackal. Dir. Fred Zinnemann. UK/France, Warwick Film Productions, 
1973. 
Le Dernier Tournant. Dir. Pierre Chenal. USA, Gladiator Productions, 1939. 
Detour. Dir. Edgar G Ulmer. USA, PRC, 1945. 
Double Indemnity. Dir. Billy Wilder. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1944. 
A Double Life. Dir. George Cukor. USA, Garson Kanin Productions, 1947. 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Dir. Victor Fleming. USA, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1941. 
A Drun ard’s Reformation. Dir. DW Griffith. USA, American Mutoscope and 
Biograph, 1909. 
The Enforcer. Dir. Bretaigne Windust. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1951. 
The Falcon Takes Over. Dir. Irving Reis. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1942. 
Fantômas. Dir. Louis Feuillade. France, Société des Etablissements L. Gaumont, 1913. 
Femme Fatale. Dir. Brian De Palma. France, Epsilon Motion Pictures, 2002. 
Force of Evil. Dir. Abraham Polonsky. USA, Enterprise Productions, 1948. 
Die freudlose Gasse. Dir. GW Pabst. Germany, Sofar-Film, 1923. 
Geheimnisse einer Seele, Dir. GW Pabst. Germany, Neumann-Filmproduktion, 1926. 
Gilda. Dir. Charles Vidor. USA, Columbia Pictures Corporation, 1946. 
The Glass Key. Dir. Frank Tuttle. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1935. 
The Grifters. Dir. Stephen Frears. USA, Cineplex-Odeon Films, 1990. 
293 
 
This Gun for Hire. Dir. Frank Tuttle. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1942. 
Harper. Dir. Jack Smight. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1966. 
Heat. Dir. Michael Mann. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1995. 
High Sierra. Dir. Raoul Walsh. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1941. 
The Hitch-Hiker. Dir. Ida Lupino. USA, RKO Pictures, 1953. 
The Hot Spot. Dir. Dennis Hopper. USA, Orion Pictures, 1990. 
Hôtel du Nord. Dir. Marcel Carné. France, Sédif Productions, 1938. 
How Green Was My Valley. Dir. John Ford. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1941. 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers. Dir. Don Siegel. USA, Allied Artists Pictures, 1956. 
Le Jour se lève. Marcel Carné. France, Sigma, 1939. 
Kiss Me Deadly. Dir. Robert Aldrich. USA, Parklane Pictures Inc., 1955. 
L.A. Confidential. Dir. Curtis Hanson. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1997. 
The Lady from Shanghai. Dir. Orson Welles. USA, Columbia Pictures, 1947. 
The Lady in the Lake. Dir. Robert Montgomery. USA, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1947. 
Laura. Dir. Otto Preminger. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1944. 
Liliom. Dir. Fritz Lang. France, Les Productions Fox Europa, 1934. 
The Long Goodbye. Dir. Robert Altman. USA, Lion’s Gate Films, 1973. 
The Lost Weekend. Dir. Billy Wilder. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1945. 
M. Dir. Fritz Lang. Germany, Nero-Film AG, 1931. 
The Maltese Falcon. Dir. John Huston. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1941. 
Man Hunt. Dir. Fritz Lang. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1941. 
Mean Streets. Dir. Martin Scorsese. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1973. 
Menschen am Sonntag. Dir. Kurt Siodmak, et al.. Germany, Filmstudio Berlin, 1930. 
Mildred Pierce. Dir. Michael Curtiz. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1945. 
Molinier. Dir. Raymond Borde. France, Cinémathèque de Toulouse, 1966. 
Murder, My Sweet. Dir. Edward Dmytryk. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1944. 
294 
 
Muscateers of Pig Alley. Dir. DW Griffith. USA, Biograph Company, 1912. 
My Favorite Blonde. Dir. Sidney Lanfield. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1942. 
My Favorite Brunette. Dir. Elliott Nugent. USA, Hope Enterprises, 1947. 
Night and the City. Dir. Irwin Winkler. USA, Tribeca Films, 1992. 
No Way Out. Dir. Roger Donaldson. USA, Orion Pictures, 1987. 
La Nuit du Carrefour. Dir. Jean Renoir. France, Europa Films, 1932. 
Oklahoma!. Dir. Fred Zinnemann. USA, Magna Theatre Productions, 1955. 
On a volé un homme. Dir. Max Ophuls. France, Les Productions Fox Europa, 1934. 
On Dangerous Ground. Dir. Nicholas Ray. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1952. 
Out of the Past. Dir. Jacques Tourneur. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1947. 
Pépé le Moko. Dir. Julien Duvivier. France, Paris Film, 1937. 
The Penguin Pool Murder. Dir. George Archainbaud. USA, RKO Pictures, 1932. 
Phantom Lady. Dir. Robert Siodmak. USA, Universal Pictures, 1944. 
Pièges. Dir. Robert Siodmak. France, Spéva Films, 1939. 
Point Blank. Dir. John Boorman. USA, MGM, 1967. 
The Postman Always Rings Twice. Dir. Tay Garnett. USA, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
1946. 
Pulp Fiction. Dir. Quentin Tarantino. USA, Miramax Films, 1994. 
Le Quai des brumes. Dir. Marcel Carné. France, Ciné-Alliance, 1938. 
Reservoir Dogs. Dir. Quentin Tarantino. USA, Live Entertainment, 1991. 
The RKO Story. UK/USA, BBC/RKO Pictures, 1987. 
Road House. Dir. Jean Negulesco. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1948. 
Rosita. Dir. Ernst Lubitsch. USA, Mary Pickford Company, 1923. 
Le Samouraï. Dir. Jean-Pierre Melville. France, CICC, 1967. 
Satan Met a Lady. Dir. William Dieterle. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1936. 
Scarlet Street. Dir. Fritz Lang. USA, Fritz Lang Productions, 1945. 
295 
 
Seven. Dir. David Fincher. USA, New Line Cinema, 1995. 
Shadow of a Doubt. Dir. Alfred Hitchcock. USA, Universal Pictures, 1943. 
The Shanghai Gesture. Dir. Josef von Sternberg. USA, Arnold Productions Inc., 1941. 
Sin City. Dir. Frank Miller/Robert Rodriguez/Quentin Tarantino. USA, Dimension 
Films, 2005. 
Somewhere in the Night. Dir. Joseph L. Mankiewicz. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 
1946. 
Son of Dracula. Dir. Robert Siodmak. USA, Universal Pictures, 1943. 
Sorry, Wrong Number, Dir. Anatole Litvak. USA, Hal Wallis Productions, 1948. 
Spellbound. Dir. Alfred Hitchcock. USA, Selznick International Pictures, 1945. 
The Spirit. Dir. Frank Miller. USA, Lionsgate, 2008. 
Die Strasse. Dir. Karl Grune. Germany, Stern-Film, 1923. 
Stranger on the Third Floor. Dir. Boris Ingster. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1940. 
Sunset Blvd.. Dir. Billy Wilder. USA, Paramount Pictures, 1950. 
Taxi Driver. Dir. Martin Scorsese. Columbia Pictures, 1976. 
Time to Kill. Dir. Herbert Leeds. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1942. 
Tirez sur le pianiste. Dir. François Truffaut. France, Les Films de la Pléiade, 1960. 
Touch of Evil. Dir. Orson Welles. USA, Universal International Pictures, 1958. 
Two Seconds. Dir. Mervyn LeRoy. USA, First National Pictures, 1932. 
The Unsuspected. Dir. Michael Curtiz. USA, Warner Bros. Pictures, 1947. 
The Usual Suspects. Dir. Bryan Singer. USA/Germany, PolyGram, 1995. 
La Vie Parisienne. Dir. Robert Siodmak. France, Nero-Film AG, 1934. 
We Were Strangers. Dir. John Huston. USA, Columbia Pictures Corporation, 1949. 
Whirlpool. Dir. Otto Preminger. USA, Twentieth Century Fox, 1949. 
The Window. Dir. Ted Teztlaff. USA, RKO Radio Pictures, 1949. 




Althusser, Louis, ‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’, in For Marx, trans. by Ben 
Brewster (London: Verso, 2005). 
Altman, Rick, Film/Genre (London: BFI, 2000). 
André, Serge, What Does Woman Want?, trans. Susan Fairfield (New York: Other 
Press, 1999). 
Andrew, Dudley, Mists of Regret: Culture and Sensibility in Classic French Film 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995). 
Aristotle, The Poetics, trans., Malcolm Heath (London: Penguin, 1996). 
— Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999). 
Arnold, Edwin T. and Eugene L Miller, The Films and Career of Robert Aldrich 
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1986). 
Bainbridge, Caroline, A Feminine Cinematics: Luce Irigaray, Women and Film 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
Barthes, Roland, Mythologies (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972). 
— Le Neutre (Paris: Éditions Seuil, 2002). 
Baudry, Jean-Louis, ‘Cinéma: effets idéologiques produits par l’appareil de 
base’, Cinéthique, 7-8 (1970), 1-8. 
Benjamin, Walter, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations: Essays and 
Reflections, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken 
Books, 2007), pp. 253-264. 
Bentham, Jeremy, Theory of Fictions, ed. by CK Ogden (London: Kegan Paul & Co., 
1932). 
Bergson, Henri, Oeuvres (Paris: PUF, 1991). 
Bergstrom, Janet, ed., Endless Night: Cinema and Psychoanalysis, Parallel Histories 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 
Bond, Henry, Lacan at the Scene (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
297 
 
Buckland, Warren, The Cognitive Semiotics of Film (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000). 
Biesen, Sheri Chinen, Blackout: World War II and the Origins of Film Noir (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 2005). 
Bolton, Ken and John Jenkins, The Gutman Variations <http://www.eaf.asn.au/ 
otis/jjkb.html> [accessed 14th August 2010]. 
Borde, Raymond and Etienne Chaumeton, A Panorama of American Film Noir, 1941-
1953, trans. by Paul Hammond (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2002). 
Bordwell, David and Noël Carroll, Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1996). 
Bordwell, David, Kristin Thompson and Janet Staiger, The Classical Hollywood 
Cinema: Film Style & Mode of Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia UP, 
1985). 
Bourgeois, Jacques, ‘La Tragédie policier’, Révue du Cinéma, 2 (1946), 70-72. 
Borges, JL, ‘Kafka and his Precursors’, in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other 
Writings, ed. by Donald Yates and James Irby (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), 
pp. 193-195. 
Bould, Mark, Film Noir: From Berlin to Sin City (London: Wallflower, 2005). 
Bowie, Malcolm, Lacan (London: Fontana Press, 1991). 
Bozovic, Miran, An Utterly Dark Spot: Gaze and Body in Early Modern Philosophy 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000). 
Bronfen, Elisabeth, ‘Noir Wagner’, in Sexuation, ed. by Renata Salecl (Durham, NC: 
Duke UP, 2000), pp. 170-215. 
Burgoyne, Bernard, ‘Autism and Topology’, in Drawing the Soul: Schemas and Models 
in Psychoanalysis, ed. by Bernard Burgoyne (London: Karnac Books, 2009), pp. 
190-217. 
— ‘Topology’, May 2009, CFAR, Birkbeck College, London. 
Buscombe, Edward, et al., ‘Why We Have Resigned from the Board of Screen’, Screen, 
17, no. 2 (1976), 106-109. 
298 
 
Butler, Judith, Bodies That Matter: on the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (London: 
Routledge, 1993). 
Cahiers du Cinéma, ‘John Ford’s Young Mr Lincoln: A collective text by the Editors of 
Cahiers du Cinéma’, trans. by Helen Lackner and Diana Matias, Screen, 13, no. 
3(1972), 5-44. 
Caruth, Cathy, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1996). 
Chaitin, Gilbert, Rhetoric and Culture in Lacan (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996). 
Chartier, Jean-Pierre, ‘Americans Are Also Making Noir Films (1946)’, trans. by Alain 
Silver, in Film Noir Reader 2, ed. by Alain Silver and James Ursini (New York: 
Limelight Editions, 1999), pp. 21-23. 
Chiesa, Lorenzo, Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007). 
Chion, Michel, The Voice in Cinema, (New York: Columbia UP, 1999). 
Churchill, Douglas W, The New York Times, 12 October 1941. 
Cohen-Séat, Gilbert, Essai sur les principes d’une philosophie du cinéma (Paris: PUF, 
1946). 
Conard, Mark T., ‘Nietzsche and the Meaning and Definition of Noir’, in The 
Philosophy of Film Noir, ed. by Mark T. Conard (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 
2006), pp. 7-22. 
Copjec, Joan, Read My Desire: Lacan against the Historicists, (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1994). 
Cowie, Elizabeth, Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis, (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
— ‘Film Noir and Women’, in Shades of Noir, ed. by Joan Copjec (London: Verso, 
1993), pp. 121-166. 
Crowther, Bosley, The New York Times, 2 September 1940. 
—The New York Times, 4 October 1941. 
299 
 
—The New York Times, 14 May 1942. 
— The New York Times, 7 September 1944. 
— The New York Times, 9 March 1945. 
— The New York Times, 15 March 1946. 
— The New York Times, 3 May 1946. 
— The New York Times, 29 August 1946. 
— The New York Times, 20 March 1947. 
Damico, James, ‘Film Noir: A Modest Proposal (1978)’, in Film Noir Reader, 8th edn, 
ed. by Alain Silver and James Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 2006), pp. 
95-105. 
Declerq, Frédéric and Paul Verhaeghe, ‘Lacan’s Analytic Goal: Le Sinthome or the 
Feminine Way’, in Re-Inventing the Symptom: Essays on the Final Lacan, ed. by 
Luke Thurston (New York: Other Press, 2002), pp. 51-79. 
Derrida, Jacques, ‘The Law of Genre’, trans. by Avital Ronell, Critical Inquiry, 7, no. 1 
(1980), 55-81. 
— ‘Living On: Borderlines’, trans. by James Hulbert, in Deconstruction and Criticism, 
ed. by Harold Bloom (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 62-142. 
Descartes, René, The Geometry, trans. by DE Smith and ML Latham (New York: 
Dover, 1954). 
Deutscher, Guy, The Unfolding of Language (New York: Metropolitan, 2005). 
Dickos, Andrew, Street with No Name: A History of the Classic American Film Noir 
(Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 2002). 
Dimendberg, Edward, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 2004). 
Doane, Mary Ann, Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis, 
(Routledge, 1991). 
— ‘Gilda: Epistemology as Striptease’, Camera Obscura, 11 (1983), 6-27. 
300 
 
Dolar, Mladen, A Voice and Nothing More (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 
Dor, Joël, Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious Structured like a 
Language (New York: Other Press, 1998). 
Dravers, Philip, ‘To Poe, Logically Speaking’, in Lacan: Topologically Speaking, ed. by 
Dragan Milovanovic and Ellie Sullivan (New York: Other Press, 2004), pp. 205-
248. 
Duncan, Paul, Film Noir (Harpenden: Pocket Essentials, 2000). 
Durgnat, Raymond, ‘Paint It Black: The Family Tree of the Film Noir (1970)’, FNR, pp. 
37-52. 
Dyer, Richard, The Culture of Queers (London: Routledge, 2002). 
Edelman, Lee, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 
2004). 
— ‘Plasticity, Paternity, Perversity: Freud’s Falcon, Huston’s Freud’, American Imago, 
51, no. 1 (1994), 69-104. 
— ‘Seeing Things: Representations, the Scene of Surveillance, and the Spectacle of 
Gay Male Sex’, in Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, ed. by Diana 
Fuss (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 93-116. 
Eidelzstein, Alfredo, The Graph of Desire: Using the Work of Jacques Lacan (London: 
Karnac, 2009). 
Eliot, TS, Collected Poems, 1909-1962 (London: Faber & Faber, 1963). 
— ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’, in The Sacred Wood (London: Methuen, 
1983). 
Elsaesser, Thomas, European Cinema: Face to Face with Hollywood (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2005). 




Erickson, Glenn, ‘The Kiss Me Mangled Mystery: Refurbishing a Film Noir’, Images, 
Issue 3 <http://www.imagesjournal.com/issue03/features/kmd1.htm> [accessed 
9th August 2010]. 
Erickson, Todd, ‘Kill Me Again: Movement Becomes a Genre’, FNR, pp. 307-329. 
Ewing Jr, Dale E, ‘Film Noir: Style and Content’, FNR2, pp. 73-84. 
Field, Harty, Science without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1980). 
Fink, Bruce, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Theory and 
Technique (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999). 
— Lacan to the Letter: Reading Écrits Closely (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2004). 
— The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UP, 1995). 
— ‘The Real Cause of Repetition’, in Reading Seminar XI: Lacan’s Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Richard Feldstein, et al. (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1995), pp. 223-229. 
Forrester, John, The Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud, Lacan and Derrida 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991). 
Frampton, Daniel, Filmosophy (London: Wallflower, 2006). 
Frank, Nino, ‘A New Kind of Police Drama: The Criminal Adventure (1946)’, trans. by 
Alain Silver, FNR2, pp. 15-19. 
Freud, Sigmund, ‘The Aetiology of Hysteria (1896)’, ed. & trans. by James Strachey, 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
vol.  III (London: The Hogarth Press, 1966), pp. 189-221. 
— Analysis, Terminable and Interminable, SE XXIII pp. 209-254. 
— ‘Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy’, SE X, pp. 3-152. 
— ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)’, SE XVIII, pp. 3-66. 
302 
 
— The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1877-1904, ed. & trans. 
by Jeffrey Masson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985). 
— ‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918 [1914])’, SE XVII, pp. 3-123. 
— The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Part 1, SE IV. 
— The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Part 2, SE V. 
— Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-1917 [1915-1917]), SE XVI. 
— ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950 [1895])’, SE I, pp. 283-397. 
— ‘Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis (1909)’, SE X, pp. 153-249. 
— ‘The Unconscious’, SE XIV, pp. 159-216. 
Freud, Sigmund and Joseph Breuer, Studies on Hysteria (1895), SE II. 
Gates, Philippa, ‘The Maritorious Melodrama: Film Noir with a Female Detective’, 
Journal of Film and Video, 61, no. 3 (2009), 24-39. 
Gifford, Barry, The Devil Thumbs a Ride (New York: Grove, 1988).  
— Out of the Past: Adventures in Film Noir (Jackson, MI: University of Mississippi 
Press, 2001). 
Goodnow, Katherine, Kristeva in Focus: From Theory to Film Analysis (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2010). 
Grigg, Russell, Lacan, Language & Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008). 
Grund, Cynthia M, ‘Jeremy Bentham’s Theory of Fictions: Some Reflections on its 
Implications for Musical Semiosis and Ontology’ in Musical Semiotics in 
Growth, ed. by Eero Tarasti (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1996), pp. 57-72. 
Hake, Sabine, German National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2002). 
Hall, Oakley M, How Fiction Works: Proven Secrets to Writing Successful Stories That 
Hook Readers and Sell (Cincinnati: Story Press, 2001). 
Harari, Roberto, Lacan’s Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: An 
Introduction, trans. by Judith Filc (New York: Other Press, 2004). 
303 
 
Hantke, Steffen, ‘Boundary Crossing and the Construction of Cinematic Genre: Film 
Noir As “Deferred Action”’, Kinema, 22 (Fall 2004), 5-18. 
Stephen Heath, ‘Cinema and Psychoanalysis: Parallel Histories’ in Endless Night, pp. 
25-56. 
— ‘Film/Cinetext/Text’, Screen, 14, no. 1/2 (1973), 102-128. 
— ‘Narrative Space’, Screen, 17, no. 3 (1976), 68-112. 
— Questions of Cinema (London: Macmillan, 1981). 
Higham, Charles and Joel Greenberg, Hollywood in the Forties (London: A. Zwemmer 
Ltd, 1968). 
Hirsch, Foster, The Dark Side of the Screen: Film Noir (New York: Da Capo Press, 
1983). 
— Detours and Lost Highways: A Map of Neo-Noir (New York: Limelight Editions, 
1999). 
Hume, LJ, ‘The Political Functions of Bentham’s Theory of Fictions’, in Jeremy 
Bentham: Life, Influence and Perspectives on His Thought, vol. 1, ed. by, 
Bhikhu C Parekh (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 522-533. 
Iser, Wolfgang, The Fictive and the Imaginary (Johns Hopkins UP, 1993). 
Jakobson, Roman, ‘The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles’, in Modern Criticism and 
Theory: A Reader, 2nd edn, ed. by David Lodge and Nigel Wood (Harlow: 
Longman, 2000), pp. 56-60. 
Jameson, Frederic, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, 
NC: Duke UP, 1991). 
Jensen, Paul, ‘Film Noir: The Writer, Raymond Chandler: The World You Live In’, in 
Film Comment, 20 (1974), 18-26. 
Johnston, Adrian, ‘Review’, <http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php? 
type=book&id=720> [accessed 12 December 2010]. 
— Žiže ’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern UP, 2008). 
304 
 
Johnston, Claire, ‘Double Indemnity’, in Women in Film Noir, rev. and expanded edn, 
ed. by E. Ann Kaplan (London: British Film Institute, 1998), pp. 89-98. 
Jones, Ernest, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, vol. III (New York: Basic Books, 
1957). 
Jung & Film: Post-Jungian Takes On The Moving Image, ed. by Christopher Hauke and 
Ian Alister (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2001). 
Kaplan, E Ann, ‘Darkness Within: Or, the Dark Continent of Film Noir’, in Looking for 
the Other: Feminism, Film, and the Imperial Gaze (London: Routledge, 1997), 
pp. 99-131. 
— Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera, University Paperbacks, (London: 
Methuen, 1983). 
Kennedy, Barbara M, Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2000). 
Kerr, Paul, ‘Out of What Past? Notes on the B film noir’, FNR, pp. 107-127. 
Kesel, Marc De, Eros and Ethics: Reading Jacques Lacan’s Seminar VII (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2009). 
Koepnick, Lutz Peter, The Dark Mirror: German Cinema Between Hitler And 
Hollywood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). 
Kordela, A Kiarina, $urplus: Spinoza, Lacan (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008). 
Koury, Phil A, Yes, Mr. De Mille (New York: Putnam, 1959). 
Kracauer, Siegfried, ‘Hollywood’s Terror Films: Do They Reflect an American State of 
Mind?’, Commentary, 2, no. 2 (1945), 132-136. 
Krutnik, Frank, In a Lonely Street: Film Noir, Genre, Masculinity (London: Routledge, 
1991). 
Krutzen, Henry, Jacques Lacan: Séminaire 1952-1980 Index référentiel, 3
rd
 edn (Paris: 
Economica, 2009). 
Kuhn, Annette, ‘Screen and Screen Theorizing Today’, in Screen 50, no. 1 (2009), 1-12. 
305 
 
Lacan, Jacques, ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’, trans. by James 
Hulbert, YFS, 55/56 (1977), 11-52. 
— Écrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1985). 
— ‘L’Étourdit’, in Autre écrits (Paris: Éditions Seuil, 2001), pp. 449-496. 
— ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’, in Écrits, trans. 
by Bruce Fink (London: Norton, 2007), pp. 197-268. 
— ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason since Freud’, in Écrits, pp. 
412-441. 
— ‘Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty’, in Écrits, pp. 161-185. 
— ‘Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever’, 
in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences 
of Man, new edn, ed. by Eugenio Donato and Richard Macksey (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 2007), pp. 186 – 204. 
— ‘On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis’, in Écrits, pp. 445-
488. 
— ‘Position of the Unconscious’, in Écrits, pp. 703-721. 
— ‘Radiophonie’, in Autre écrits, pp. 403-448. 
— Le Séminaire, Livre IV: La relation d’objet, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: 
Éditions Seuil, 1994). 
— Le Séminaire, Livre V: Les formations de l’inconscient, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller 
(Paris: Éditions Seuil, 1998). 
— Le Séminaire, Livre XVI: D’un Autre à l’autre, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: 
Éditions Seuil, 2006). 
— Le Séminaire, Livre XVIII: D’un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant, ed. by 
Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions Seuil, 2006). 




— Le Séminaire VI: Le désir est son interprétation, 1958-1959, unpublished 
manuscript. 
— Le Séminaire IX: L’Identification, 1960-1961, unpublished manuscript. 
— Le Séminaire XIV: La logique du fantasme, 1966-1967, unpublished manuscript. 
— Le Séminaire XV: L’acte psychanalytique, 1967-1968, unpublished manuscript. 
— Le Séminaire XIX: Le Savoir du psychanalyste, 1971-1972, unpublished manuscript. 
— Le Séminaire XIII: L’Objet de la psychanalyse, 1965-1966, unpublished manuscript. 
— Le Séminaire XXII: RSI, 1974-1975, unpublished manuscript. 
— The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique 1953-1954, 
trans. by John Forrester, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller (London: Norton, 1991). 
— The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the 
Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-55, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by 
Sylvana Tomaselli (London: Norton, 1991). 
— The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955-56, ed. by Jacques-
Alain Miller, trans. by Russell Grigg (London: Norton, 1997). 
— The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-60, ed. 
by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: Norton, 1997). 
— The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis 1964, trans. by Alan Sheridan, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller 
(London: Norton, 1977). 
— The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis 1969-
70, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Russell Grigg (London: Norton, 2007). 
— The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love 
& Knowledge 1972-73, trans. by Bruce Fink, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller 
(London: Norton, 1998). 
— ‘Seminar On “The Purloined Letter”’, in Écrits, pp. 6-50. 
307 
 
— ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian 
Unconscious’, in Écrits, pp. 671-702. 
— Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, ed. by Joan Copjec, 
trans. by Dennis Hollier, et al. (New York: Norton, 1990). 
Laclau, Ernesto, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996). 
Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 2
nd
 edn 
(London: Verso, 2001). 
Lang, Robert, ‘Looking for the “Great Whatzit”: “Kiss Me Deadly” and Film Noir’, 
Cinema Journal, 27, no. 3 (1988), 32-44. 
Laplanche, Jean, ‘Notes on Afterwardsness’, trans. by John Fletcher, in Essays on 
Otherness, ed. by John Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 260-265. 
Laplanche, Jean and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: 
Karnac, 1988). 
Laplanche, Jean and Serge Leclaire, ‘The Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Study’, trans. 
by Patrick Coleman, Yale French Studies, no. 48 (1972), 118-175. 
Lebeau, Vicky, ‘The Arts of Looking: D.W. Winnicott and Michael Haneke’, Screen, 
50, no. 1 (2009), 35-44. 
— Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Play of Shadows (London: Wallflower, 2001). 
Lehman, David, The Perfect Murder: A Study in Detection (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000). 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss, trans. by Felicity 
Baker (London: Routledge, 1987). 
Lewis, Michael, Lacan and Derrida: Another Writing (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 
2008). 
MacCannell, Juliet Flower, ‘Between the Two Fears’ in Lacan and Contemporary 
Film, pp. 47-82. 
Malabou, Catherine, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
308 
 
— Les Nouveaux Blessés : De Freud à la neurologie, penser les traumatismes 
contemporains (Paris: Bayard, 2007). 
Maltby, Richard, ‘The Politics of the Maladjusted Text’, MBFN, pp. 39-48. 
Manon, Hugh, ‘Some Like it Cold: Fetishism in Billy Wilder’s Double Indemnity’, 
Cinema Journal, 44, no. 4 (2005), 18-43. 
Mannoni, Octave, ‘I Know Well, but All the Same’, in Perversion and the Social 
Relation, ed. by Dennis Foster, et al. (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2003), pp. 68-92. 
Marks, Laura U, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the 
Senses (Durham: Duke UP, 2000). 
— Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002). 
Martin, Richard, Mean Streets and Raging Bulls: The Legacy of Film Noir in 
Contemporary American Cinema (London: Scarecrow Press, 1999). 
Maxfield, James F, The Fatal Woman: Sources of Male Anxiety in American Film Noir, 
1941-1991, (London: Associated University Presses, 1996). 
McGowan, Todd, The Impossible David Lynch (New York: Columbia UP, 2007). 
— The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007). 
McGowan, Todd and Sheila Kunkle, ‘Introduction: Lacanian Psychoanalysis in Film 
Theory’, in Lacan and Contemporary Film, ed. by McGowan and Kunkle (New 
York: Other Press, 2004), pp. xi-xxix. 
Mehlman, Jeffrey, ‘The “Floating Signifier”: From Lévi-Strauss to Lacan’, Yale French 
Studies, 48 (1972), 10-37. 
Metz, Christian, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema, trans. by Michael Taylor 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1974). 
— The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, trans. by Celia Britton et 
al., (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1982). 




Metzger, David, ‘Interpretation and Topological Structure’, in Topologically Speaking, 
pp. 134-149. 
Miklitsch, Robert, ‘Flesh for Fantasy: Aesthetics, the Fantasmatic, and Film Noir’ in 
Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Žiže , ed. by Jeff Boucher, 
et al. (Aldershot: Ashgate: 2005), pp. 47-68. 
Miller, Jacques-Alain, ‘Action de la structure’, Cahiers pour l’analyse, 9, no. 6 (1968), 
93-105. 
— ‘H20: Suture in Obsessionality’ <www.lacan.com/suturef.htm> [accessed 1st 
February 2010]. 
— ‘Suture (Elements of the Logic of the Signifier)’, trans. by Jacqueline Rose, Screen, 
18, no. 4 (1977), 24-34. 
Milner, Jean-Claude, For the Love of Language, trans. by Ann Banfield (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1990). 
Morazé, Charles, ‘Literary Invention’, in The Structuralist Controversy, pp. 22-55. 
Mulvey, Laura, Death 24x a Second (London: Reaktion Books, 2006). 
— ‘A Short History of the BFI Education Department’, unpublished pamphlet (London: 
British Film Institute, 1994), pp. 2-3, quoted in David Sorfa, ‘Laura Mulvey’, in 
Film, Theory and Philosophy: The Key Thinkers, ed. by Felicity Colman 
(London: Acumen, 2009), pp. 286-295. 
— ‘Visual Pleasure and the Narrative Cinema’, Screen, 16, no. 3 (1975), 6-18. 
Morgan, Janice, ‘Scarlet Street: Noir Realism from Berlin to Paris to Hollywood’, Iris, 
21 (1996), 31-53. 
Myers, Tony, Slavoj Žiže  (London: Routledge, 2003). 
Namow, Tyson, ‘In-and-Out of the Historical Imaginary with Eisner and Herzog’, in 







Naremore, James, More Than Night: Film Noir in Its Contexts, new edn (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008). 
— ‘A Season in Hell or the Snows of Yesteryear?’, in Panorama, pp. vii-xxi. 
Neale, Steve, Genre and Hollywood (London: Routledge, 2000). 
O’Brien, Charles, ‘Film Noir in France: Before the Liberation’, Iris, 21 (1996), 7-20. 
Ottoson, Robert, A Reference Guide to the American Film Noir, 1940-1958 (London: 
Scarecrow, 1981). 
Oliver, Kelly and Benigno Trigo, Noir Anxiety (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2003). 
Osteen, Mark, ‘Framed: Forging Identities in Film Noir’, Journal of Film and Video, 
62, no. 3 (2010), 17-35. 
Oudart, Jean-Pierre, ‘Cinema and Suture’, Screen, 18, no. 4, 35-47. 
Pisters, Patricia, The Matrix of Visual Culture: Working with Deleuze in Film Theory 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003). 
Place, Janey and Lowell Peterson, ‘Some Visual Motifs of Film Noir (1974)’, FNR, pp. 
65-75. 
Plotnitsky, Arkady, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science, Nonclassical 
Thought and the Two Cultures (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2002). 
Porfirio, Robert, ‘Interview with Billy Wilder’, in Film Noir Reader 3, ed. by Robert 
Porfirio, Alain Silver and James Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 2002), 
pp.101-119. 
— ‘Interview with Edward Dmytryk’, FNR3, pp. 27-38. 
— ‘Interview with Miklós Rósza’, FNR3, pp. 163-176. 
— ‘No Way Out: Existential Motifs in the Film Noir (1974)’, FNR, pp. 77-93. 
Porfirio, Robert and James Ursini‚ ‘Interview with Samuel Fuller’, FNR3, pp. 39-49. 
311 
 
Press Release, <http://members.ozemail.com.au/~writerslink/PressPress/PressPress 
_Bolton_Jenkins.html> [accessed 14th August 2010]. 
Propp, Vladimir, Morphology of the Folktale, ed. by Svatava Pirkova-Jakobson, trans. 
by Laurence Scott (Philadelphia: American Folklore Society, 1958). 
Ragland-Sullivan, Ellie, The Logic of Sexuation: from Aristotle to Lacan (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 2004). 
Regnault, François, ‘The Name of the Father’, in Reading Seminar XI, pp. 65-74. 
Reinhard, Kenneth, ‘Toward a Political Theology of the Neighbor’, in Reinhard, et al., 
The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology (Chicago: Chicago UP, 
2005), pp. 11-75. 
Remmert, Reinhold, ‘Complex Numbers’, in Numbers, ed. by Heinz-Dieter Ebbinghaus, 
et al. (New York: Springer, 1991), pp. 55-96. 
Reyes, Carlos V, ‘Film Noir’s Dark Secret “or” What Does the Hysteric Want?’, 
Canadian Journal of Film Studies, 19, no. 1 (2010), 75-88. 
Rosen, Philip, ‘Screen and 1970s Film Theory’, in Inventing Film Studies, ed. by Lee 
Grieveson and Haidee Wasson (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2008), pp. 264-297. 
Roudinesco, Elisabeth, Jacques Lacan: An Outline of a Life and History of a System of 
Thought (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 
Rushton, Richard, ‘Cinema’s Double: Some Reflections on Metz’, Screen, 43, no. 2 
(2002), 107-118. 
Salecl, Renata, (Per)versions of Love and Hate (London: Verso, 2002). 
Santos, Marlisa, The Dark Mirror: Psychiatry and Film Noir (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2010). 
Sanders, Steven, ‘Film Noir and the Meaning of Life’, PFN, pp. 91-105. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Roy Harris, ed. by 
Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye (London: Duckworth, 1983). 
Schrader, Paul, ‘Notes on Film Noir (1972)’, FNR, pp. 53-65. 
312 
 
Schroeder, Barbara, The Vestal and the Fasces: Property and the Feminine in Law and 
Psychoanalysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
Shaviro, Steven, The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993). 
— ‘The Cinematic Body: Redux’, parallax, 14, no. 1 (2008), 48-54. 
Shearer, Lloyd, ‘Crime Certainly Pays on the Screen (1945)’, FNR2, pp. 9-14 (pp. 9-
10). 
Shepherdson, Charles, Lacan and the Limits of Language (New York: Fordham UP, 
2008). 
— Vital Signs: Nature, Culture, Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 2000). 
Silver, Alain, ‘Introduction’, FNR, pp. 3-15. 
— ‘Kiss Me Deadly – Evidence of a Style’, FNR, pp. 209-235. 
Silver, Alain and Robert Porfirio, ‘Interview with Fritz Lang’, FNR3, pp. 51-65. 
Silver, Alain and Elizabeth Ward, Film Noir: An Encyclopedic Reference to the 
American Style, 3
rd
 edn (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1992). 
Silverman, Kaja, The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and 
Cinema, (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988). 
— Male Subjectivity at the Margins (London: Routledge, 1992). 
— The Subject of Semiotics (New York: Oxford UP, 1983). 
Singh, Greg, Film After Jung: Post-Jungian Approaches to Film Theory (London: 
Routledge, 2009). 
Sjöholm, Cecilia, The Antigone Complex: Ethics and the Invention of Feminine Desire 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004). 
Skriabine, Pierre, ‘Clinic and Topology: The Flaw in the Universe’, in Lacan: 
Topologically Speaking, pp. 73-97. 
Sobchack, Vivian, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992). 
313 
 
— ‘Chasing the Maltese Falcon: On the Fabrications of a Film Prop’, Journal of Visual 
Culture, 6, no. 2 (2007), 219-246. 
— ‘“Lounge Time”: Post-War Crises and the Chronotope of Film Noir’, in Refiguring 
American Film Genres: History and Theory, ed. by Nick Browne (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), pp. 129-170. 
Sokal, Alan and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers’ 
Abuse of Science (London: Profile, 1999). 
Spicer, Andrew, Film Noir (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2002). 
Stanley, Fred, ‘Crime and Romance in Hollywood’, The New York Times, 19 November 
1944. 
— The New York Times, 31 December 1944. 
Stavrakakis, Yannis, Lacan and the Political (London: Routledge, 1999). 
Sutton, Paul, ‘Afterwardsness in Film: Patrice Leconte’s Le Mari de la Coiffeuse’, 
French Studies, 53, no. 3 (1999), 307-17. 
Taylor, Barry, ‘Review: Joan Copjec Ed., Shades of Noir: A Reader; Frank Krutnik, in a 
Lonely Street: Film Noir, Genre, Masculinity’, Screen, 36, no. 2 (1995), 172-
176. 
Telotte, JP, Voices in the Dark: The Narrative Patterns of Film Noir (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1989). 
Thomas, Deborah, ‘Psychoanalysis and Film Noir’, in The Movie Book of Film Noir, ed. 
by Ian Alexander Cameron (London: Studio Vista, 1994), pp. 71-87. 
Turim, Maureen, Flashbacks in Film: Memory & History (London: Routledge, 1989). 
Twining, Michael, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000). 
Ursini, James, ‘Angst at Sixty Fields per Second’, FNR, pp. 275-288. 
Vaihinger, Hans, The Philosophy of ‘As if’: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and 
Religious Fictions of Mankind, trans. by CK Ogden, 2
nd
 edn (London: Routledge 
& Kegen Paul, 1935). 
314 
 
Variety Staff, Variety, 1 January 1947. 
Verhaeghe, Paul, Beyond Gender: From Subject to Drive (New York: Other Press, 
2001). 
— ‘Causation and Destitution of a Pre-ontological Non-entity: On the Lacanian 
Subject’, in Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, ed. by Dany Nobus 
(New York: Other Press, 1999), pp. 164-189. 
Vernet, Marc, ‘Film Noir on the Edge of Doom’, in Shades of Noir, ed. by Joan Copjec 
(London: Verso, 1993). 
— ‘The Filmic Transaction (1983)’, trans. by David Rodowick, in Film Noir Reader 2, 
ed. by Alain Silver and James Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 1999), pp. 
57-71. 
Vincendeau, Ginette, ‘Noir Is Also a French Word: The French Antecedents of Film 
Noir’, in The Movie Book of Film Noir, ed. by Ian Alexander Cameron (London: 
Studio Vista, 1994), pp. 49-58. 
Wadia, Rashna, ‘So Many Fragments, So Many Beginnings, So Many Pleasures: The 
Neglected Detail(s) in Film Theory’, Criticism, 45, no. 2 (2003), 173-195. 
Wedel, Michael, ‘Constitutive Contingencies: Fritz Lang, Double Vision, and the Place 
of Rupture’, in Mind the Screen: Media Concepts According to Thomas 
Elsaesser, ed. by Jaap Kooijman, et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2009), pp. 
166-187. 
White, Patricia, ‘Female Spectator, Lesbian Spectre: The Haunting’, in Women in Film 
Noir, pp. 130-150. 
Wood, Mary P, ‘Italian film noir’, in European Film Noir, ed. by Andrew Spicer 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 2007), pp. 236-272. 
Woolrich, Cornell, Darkness at Dawn: Early Suspense Classics, ed. by Martin Harry 
Greenberg and Francis M. Nevins (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1985). 
Žižek, Slavoj, ‘Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes Please!’, in Judith Butler, et al., 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left 
(London: Verso, 2000), pp. 90-135. 
315 
 
— ‘Da Capo Senza Fine’, in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality (London: Verso, 
2000), pp. 213-262. 
— Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, Rev. edn (London: 
Routledge, 2001). 
— First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (London: Verso, 2009). 
— ‘Four Discourses, Four Subjects’, in Cogito and the Unconscious, ed. by Žižek 
(Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1998), pp. 75-114. 
— For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
— The Fright of Real Tears: Krzysztof Kieslowski between Theory and Post-Theory, 
(London: BFI, 2001). 
— ‘I Did Not Order My Dreams’, in Dolar and Žižek, Opera’s Second Death (London: 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 103-104. 
— In Defense of Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2009). 
— The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters (London: 
Verso, 2007). 
— ‘Introduction’, in Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lacan (But Were 
Afraid to Ask Hitchcock), ed. by Žižek (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 1-12.  
— ‘Lacan: A Lateral Introduction’, 1st June 2006, Birkbeck College, London. 
— Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010). 
— Looking Awry: An Introduction to Lacan through Popular Culture (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1992). 
— The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Women and Causality (London: Verso, 
2005). 
— Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2004). 
— The Parallax View (London: Verso, 2006). 
— The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997). 
316 
 
— The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989). 
— Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology (Durham, NC: 
Duke UP, 1993). 
— ‘“The Thing That Thinks”: The Kantian Background of the Noir Subject’, SN, pp. 
199-226. 
— The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London: Verso, 
2000). 
— ‘The Undergrowth of Enjoyment: How Popular Culture Can Serve as an Introduction 
to Lacan’, in The Žiže  Reader, ed. by Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 11-36. 
Žižek, Slavoj, and Glyn Daly, Conversations  ith Žiže  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003). 
Zupančič, Alenka, ‘The Case of the Perforated Sheet’, in Sexuation, ed., Renata Salecl 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), pp. 282-296. 
 
